Copyright
by
Dina A. Ibrahim
2003
The Dissertation Committee for Dina A. Ibrahim certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

FRAMING OF ARABS AND MUSLIMS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH: A CLOSE READING OF NETWORK NEWS

Committee:

__________________________
Robert Jensen, Supervisor

__________________________
Donald Heider

__________________________
Karin Wilkins

__________________________
John Downing

__________________________
Rosental Alves
FRAMING OF ARABS AND MUSLIMS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH: A
CLOSE READING OF NETWORK NEWS

by

Dina A. Ibrahim, B.A., M.A.

Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
the University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Texas at Austin
August 2003
This dissertation is dedicated to my father, Dr. Abdel Wahab Ibrahim and my mother Dr. Aida El Bermawy, for all their love and unwavering support.

I would also like to thank my dissertation supervisor Robert Jensen, for his patience, diligence and sense of humor. Without him, none of this would be possible. I am extremely grateful to my committee members Don Heider, Karin Wilkins and John Downing for their input and advice. I am especially indebted to Rosental Alves, particularly for his help financing the network transcripts but most of all for his support and encouragement.

Finally, I would like to thank the friends I have made in Austin that watched over me while I was writing. I love you all.
Through a close reading and ideological critique of network news reports with particular attention to their use of sources, this study investigates the characteristics of Arabs and Muslims that network television highlighted and obscured in their coverage of the September 11th attacks. It analyzes how network news visual and rhetorical discourse framed Arabs and Muslims, to determine whether this case study indicates a departure from dominant trends in media coverage of those communities. By analyzing the types of sources used after 9/11 by the networks and what those sources said, the study illuminates patterns of ideological influence on media content about Arabs and Muslims established by scholars of the Middle East and American news.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ........................................................................................................p.1

Chapter 1: Literature Review ........................................................................p.18

Chapter 2: Framing Research ........................................................................p.54

Chapter 3: Methodology ................................................................................p.66

Chapter 4: Islam on Network News .................................................................p.85

Chapter 5: Arabs on Network News .................................................................p.144

Chapter 6: Discussion .....................................................................................p. 200

References ........................................................................................................p. 213

Vita .....................................................................................................................p. 229
Introduction

The September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center gave news organizations a giant story to cover. While newspaper readers were born again and news magazine sales soared, an overwhelming majority of the American public turned to their television sets for information and explanations relating to the attacks. Pew studies indicate that over two-thirds of Americans were more interested in the news after Sept. 11, a higher proportion than the 49% who expressed a heightened interest in the news as a result of the Gulf war. The change in news interest post-Sept. 11 was remarkable. On average, just 23% of the public paid ‘very close’ attention to the news before the attacks, but after the attacks, that number more than doubled, to 48% (Pew, 2001).

The immediate shock, horror, pain and human tragedy of the attacks were conveyed to the world in ‘real time’ by a vast array of television networks and cable channels. Given its low cost and easy access, television news is the primary source for coverage of contemporary terrorism, since video magnifies the impact of terrorist acts.

“Terrorism, as an extreme form of violence, is particularly newsworthy and well suited to the needs of television, which is a highly visual and compact medium with little time for exposition.” (Livingston, 1982, p. 62). For weeks
after the attacks, millions of TVs in America, and around the world, were tuned to news of the gruesome situation at the Pentagon and World Trade Center. It was an intensely visual crime, and the cameras were out in full force on the streets of New York and in Washington press briefing rooms. It was a national crisis.

Through a close reading and ideological critique of network news reports with particular attention to their use of sources, this study will investigate the coverage of this crisis by ABC, NBC and CBS. The focus of this study is to analyze which characteristics of Arabs and Muslims network television highlighted and obscured in their coverage of the September 11th attacks. Previous literature indicates that during incidents of terrorism throughout the 1980s, network television relied on official sources to explain why the attacks happened and to formulate an appropriate response (Dobkin, 1992, Nacos, 1994, Weimann & Winn, 1994). This dissertation will analyze the stories told by network reporters, editors and producers who reported America’s response to the events of Sept. 11th. It will try to determine the extent to which their collective discourse supported or rejected stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims, and whether this particular case study will find evidence to support an enduring, dominant trend in media coverage of terrorism of heavy reliance on official sources in crisis coverage. By analyzing the types of sources
used after 9/11 by the networks and what those sources said, the author hopes to understand whether patterns of ideological influence on media content about Arabs and Muslims established by scholars of the Middle East and American news in the 20th century remain pertinent to news about this ethnic and religious group in the 21st century. Media dependence on elite sources and the frames that they convey serves to mobilize public support for whatever establishment solution those elites espouse.

“Reporters report what people in power say, and what they debate. This tends to give the news an establishment bias. In a case like the current war on terrorism, where the elites and official sources are unified on the core issues, the nature of our press coverage is uncomfortably close to that found in authoritarian societies with limited formal press freedom.” (McChesney, 2002).

When examining coverage of September 11th, it is relevant to determine how the statements of sources were treated by anchors and reporters. How were the views of political elites as well as public opinion of citizens evaluated by anchors and reporters? National surveys indicate that the public may have tolerated controversial views. The Pew Center for People and Press reports that Americans polled three weeks after the attacks were comfortable with the overwhelming unity the country displayed in the wake of the attacks, and were also willing to accept the right of dissenting views to be aired, even if they didn’t agree with them.
The public was comfortable with the widespread expressions of patriotism and religious expression. Pew found that only 8% of Americans believed there was too much showing of the flag, 10% said there was disproportionate playing of patriotic songs, and 12% thought that expressions of religious faith and prayer by politicians were excessive. On the other hand, 71% were open to allowing peaceful protests of military action, and 75% said the media should air the views of those who feel American policies created the conditions that led to the terrorist attacks (Pew, 2001). It is important to examine how network news treated people who protested US policies and military retaliation in the weeks immediately following the attacks, and hopefully an examination of their ‘crisis mode’ initial coverage of Sept. 11th may provide part of the answer.

Without much objection from the press, a military solution was adopted by the Bush administration as an appropriate, and mandatory, response to the attacks. Before the bombing campaign in Afghanistan and the PATRIOT Act was enacted, the scope of debate on network news about the roots of anti-American sentiment among Arabs in the Middle East and Muslims around the world was limited. Perspectives that called for a serious reexamination of American foreign policy in the Middle East seemed marginalized and deemed irrational and unpatriotic.
“On September 11\textsuperscript{th}, there was only one story and generally one perspective on the multiple TV networks of North America. Most experts interviewed responded to security matters and did not seem interested in the larger political, social and economic causes of the attacks. The focus was primarily on the immediate reaction than on the larger issues.” (Karim, 2001).

Kellner (1992) describes how television frames of the Gulf War were also cast within patriotic metaphorical depictions. He argues that television news frequently used condensed expressions of patriotic hype, in a concerted effort to convey the justice and determination of American troops. These values were also supported on television by the proliferation of visual cues such as flags and yellow ribbons. The issue at hand for this particular case study is whether this type of television framing persists as the familiar lens through which the public is exposed to information during a national crisis.

The religious rhetoric of the Bush administration permeated the news, a phenomenon that has been described as the marketing of civil religion (Allen, 2002) by government officials to the public through the media to rally the nation towards military retaliation. Presidential word choices led to hazardous interpretations in Muslim cultures. For example, the ‘crusade’ that President Bush declared on terror, translated into Arabic as a ‘Campaign of the Cross’ thus conveying a message with religious
overtones to the most zealous religious factions of Arab and Muslim societies around the world. This study will also explore the how specific language choices made by elite and public sources to refer to Islam and Muslims during initial coverage of the attacks. It is important to study how Islam was framed in public and elite discourse immediately following the attacks, before troops were sent to Afghanistan.

“After some initial fumbling, the Bush administration was soon able to set the frames and the agendas for reporting the unfolding story. Indeed, most media – stunned by the events of the day – seemed all to willing to accept the government’s lead. As the hunt began for the ‘Islamic terrorists’ journalists’ narratives failed to provide a nuanced and contextual understanding of Islam, Muslims, or the nature of the ‘Islamic peril.’” (Karim, 2001, p. 154).

Islam was a religion that received significant attention, once the affiliations of the hijackers became public knowledge. This project will investigate how Islam was referred to by network anchors, reporters and their sources in the wake of the attacks, and to what extent Islam and its adherents were framed as deviants.

The frames involved in reporting the reaction of Arab countries to the attacks are of particular interest to this project, mainly because of this researcher’s interest and expertise in the Middle East. Arab countries tend to be classified into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ according to America’s policy towards
that country; depending on whether they were, in the words of President Bush, ‘with us or against us’. It was confusing for the networks to continue framing Egypt and Saudi Arabia as ‘good’ countries, since most of the hijackers and coordinators were Egyptian and Saudi Arabian. These two countries are traditional allies of the United States, therefore an examination of the framing mechanisms used by network news to denote America’s policies towards Arab countries will be revealing. In terms of voices represented on the evening network news, it is essential to investigate how the concerns of Arab countries were expressed. Through which sources were these views aired and what treatment did those concerns receive from reporters and anchors?

Because it is simply not enough to present statistics on who was represented, there must be a critical evaluation of the content of Arab and Muslim source quotes. How did their statements relate to the affirmation of cultural values, national sentiment and political orientation? This project aims to provide a close reading of the network stories, to categorize and critique not only the content of the statements made by sources, but also the source’s treatment by the reporters and anchors. Before proceeding further, the value of examining network evening news is briefly discussed.
Why the Networks?

Television was the primary medium that America turned to for news of the attacks, at least during the first few weeks of coverage. A Pew survey conducted Sept. 13-17, 2001 finds that 74% of those polled were ‘very closely’ paying attention to news about the attacks and 90% of Americans chose television as their main source of news on the attacks. Of that majority, 45% relied on cable news, placing network news in second place for the public’s attention. CNN was ranked first as having done the best job of covering the attacks, trailed by ABC, FOX, NBC, CBS and MSNBC. By mid-October, the number paying very close attention increased to 78%. Three weeks after Sept. 11, interest in news of the attacks was still greater than for stories such as the Los Angeles riots of 1992 (70%), the end of the Persian Gulf War (67%) and the Oklahoma City bombing (58%). Network news got a much-needed surge in its audience, but they were not as popular as the newer cable networks, of which CNN was ranked first, closely followed by Fox news directly after the 9/11 attacks. Most Americans turned to cable news for reports about the war on terror during the first month after Sept. 11. Pew reports that 53% of Americans chose cable as their primary source for news on the crisis, versus 17% for network TV and 18% for local TV. Other non-
television sources lag well behind cable, although the number relying mostly on newspapers tripled in the weeks after the attacks (Pew, 2001).

As more and more Americans subscribed to cable channels, the networks were rapidly losing their shine in the last decade of the 20th century, and well into the new millennium. Even though they were not the primary source of news for the American public after the Sept. 11th attacks, network news still had a somewhat relevant presence among television news viewers, perhaps due to their extended experience with crisis coverage, particularly their decades of terrorism coverage. Rather, Brokaw and Jennings were the most seasoned TV newsmen who had anchored the evening news during countless incidents of terrorism and war in the 1980s and 1990s. Tom Brokaw and Peter Jennings began anchoring the Nightly News and World News Tonight in 1983 and Dan Rather has anchored the CBS evening news since 1981. With the advent of cable news, these three men were faced with serious competition, which warrants an examination of their performance.

In May 2002, Fox News Channel's Roger Ailes was quoted in the New York Times describing network anchors as dinosaurs approaching extinction. Ailes argued that they had become relics of traditional news, and the Pew statistics concur with his interpretation. After Sept. 11th, however, almost 20 percent of American news consumers were watching
the continuous news coverage of the three national networks, preferring to
trust in familiar faces. Frank Rich writes,

“Many viewers didn’t want to take the risk of turning to the personalities
of cable on Sept. 11, 2001, when separating fact from fiction mattered
more than it had for most Americans in their lifetimes. From the Big
Three anchors, there was little possibility of recklessness. Turn on cable
TV news in the evening, and you’re told that the world is about to end,
over and over into the night. The evening news, in a triumph of form over
content, restores order in a discrete half-hour. In our new, information-
saturated century, there may be less need than ever for the news in the
evening news. But there may be just as big a market as ever, if not more
so, for its illusion of peace.” (Rich, 2002).

When there are serious doubts as to whether network news
remains relevant, and media commentary in the New York Times decides
that network news is still important to the public, in my view it becomes
more pertinent to examine how the rapidly aging flagships of television
news covered one of the most challenging contemporary stories.

Network news is still worthy of study, even if it’s in trouble. Dan
Rather, Tom Brokaw and Peter Jennings were household names,
delivering the news to homes across the United States long before the
cable networks broke their first story.

“The network newscasts remain important by default. Their audience
remains huge. More than 30 million people watch the network news
programs each night, while the cable news channels — CNN, MSNBC and Fox News Channel — would be lucky to reach 3 million in prime time combined. To that large audience, the men so familiarly known as Dan and Tom and Peter are more reassuring than the revolving door of upstarts and has-beens recycling through cable." (James, 2002).

Network news has been studied extensively across communication disciplines, mainly because the networks eventually became the primary source of news for the American public, as newspaper readership continued to decline and the number of television viewers soared after 1950. As network news now takes second place behind the cable channels, studying their content in a time of crisis could provide some insight into their declining ratings. This dissertation is the cornerstone of a much larger research project that will eventually compare the networks to CNN, FOX and MSNBC. Ideally, an additional comparison with the public service broadcasting of PBS should be analyzed in future research. A focus on the networks is not intended to deliberately ignore the more influential cable channels, but it is a starting point from which an effective methodology will hopefully be developed and applied to other news organizations. The frames that this study reveals within the network news stories should be compared to other television news outlets in future projects examining coverage of Arabs and Muslims, particularly post September 11th.
Research Questions:

A. Islam

On Network News after September 11th:

1. Which aspects of Islam were highlighted or obscured within coverage of the religion both from within and outside the United States?
2. How was Islam visually represented?
3. How were Jihad and suicide bombings interpreted?
4. How were the reactions of non-Arab Muslim countries framed?
5. How were hate crimes against Arab-Americans and Muslims within the US covered by the networks?
6. How was the history of events in Islamic countries explained?
7. How closely did frames of Islam concur with the ideology of officials?

B. Arab Countries and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

On Network News after September 11th:

1. How were Arab reactions to the attacks framed?
2. How were American allies in the region, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan framed?
3. How did Arab official statements differ from the sentiments expressed on the streets?

4. How were Israeli and Palestinian official vs. popular reactions to the attacks framed?

5. What treatment did Arab and Israeli sources receive from the reporters and anchors?

6. How was the role of Iraq framed?

7. Who were the Arab experts that spoke on the news?

Project Summary

The first chapter of this dissertation is a survey of research literature on American news coverage of Arabs and Muslims. The literature is presented chronologically, beginning with an analysis of New York Times Middle East coverage as early as 1917 and ending with studies of broadcast news reporting on Iraq in the late 1990s. The studies included in the literature survey span a wide range of methodologies, media outlets and theoretical perspectives. The goal of this chapter is to provide the reader with a sense of how Arabs and Muslims have been portrayed in American news before the 9/11 attacks, and the various methods used to discern those portrayals from media texts. Few of the
studies regarding Arabs and Muslims in American news employ framing research as a theoretical base, however research on media depictions of terrorism have found framing analysis to be a useful tool for explaining how coverage of terrorist events relate to ideological power structures.

The second chapter discusses framing research and its valuable contribution to understanding how terrorism is covered by American media. Literature is presented on the definition of frames and how terrorism has been framed by American media in the past. The third chapter describes the various methods used in previous research by media scholars in their measurement of frames in media texts. Chapter 3 also details the close reading, or textual analysis methodology used in this particular case study, which is inspired by studies that use discourse analysis and semiotics to examine the portrayal of racial or ethnic prejudice in news coverage.

The fourth chapter, Islam on Network News, examines the opposing frames used by network news to describe Islam and Muslims after September 11th: a) Islam as a violent threat, and b) Islam as a religion of peace. The news stories are also analyzed in terms of their visual representation of Islam and how radical Islamist manifestations of Jihad and suicide were interpreted and explained in network reports. After President Bush’s speech in which he declared that Islam was a religion of
peace was delivered on September 17th during his visit to the Islamic Center in Washington DC, coverage of hate crimes increased. The chapter describes how hate crimes against Arab-Americans and Muslims within the United States were covered by the networks. The explanation and interpretation of historical events in the Middle East and how past relations with Muslim countries are portrayed by network reporters are also discussed. The question of who speaks for Islam is a sensitive one, because Islam does not have a central religious authority figure and it is practiced in various sects all over the world. With this in mind, the above aspects are analyzed with particular attention to the sources that spoke on camera and the viewpoints expressed by those who were chosen for interviews in stories that made references to Islam. The analysis does not aim to measure these references in terms of their frequency of occurrence but instead the goal is to convey the complex and diverse interpretations of Islam and Muslims presented on network news after 9/11 and how those interpretations relate to official ideological framing of the Middle East and Islam.

The fifth chapter, Arabs on Network News, describes how specific countries in the Middle East were depicted by network reporters and anchors. It begins with an analysis of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia as traditional allies of the United States. A great deal of attention is devoted
to determining the differences between what the officials said and what the people on the ‘Arab street’ said on network news. Interviews with Egyptian and Jordanian leaders, diplomats and citizens are analyzed for the messages that they conveyed on network news and how their political alliances with the US were framed by network anchors and reporters.

Network coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict post-9/11 is also analyzed by comparing what citizens said on camera in stories filed from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to what Israeli and Palestinian officials said in live interviews with network anchors.

In the weeks following 9/11, Iraq was in the news, since there was fair amount of speculation as to whether Iraq would be a target in the subsequent war on terror. Framing of Iraq by network news is discussed, in terms of how administration officials were immediately trying to establish a link between the September 11th attacks and the Iraqi regime. The chapter ends with a discussion of the inclusion of Arab-American representatives as experts, which is a trend that represents a shift from earlier coverage of Arabs, when it was more difficult to find independent Arab voices on the news.

The sixth and final chapter summarizes and reiterates the main findings of chapters four and five. It is a discussion of the portrayal and treatment of Arabs and Muslims on network news and how this study
relates to previous literature in this field. The research questions are addressed, followed by recommendations for future research.
Chapter 1: Literature Review

To help select a method for this study and determine previous representations, the following chapter catalogues how scholars have approached the analysis of Arabs and Muslims in American media. Analyses with wide-ranging methodologies have shed different degrees of light on the nature of this portrayal. This chapter aims to review and examine what these studies reveal, which media outlets they analyzed and the methods they used to answer their research questions. It is an effort to assess their individual and collective contributions to understanding how American media have interpreted Arabs and Muslims prior to the 9/11 attacks. It begins with a summary of how Islam became associated with evil, violence and threats to Western interests after the Cold War; and the ritual highlighting of these traits in American news. Militant Islam is closely linked to the political struggle against globalization, therefore the history and motivations of Islamic militancy are also explained.
The Islamic Threat: News after the Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union left an American foreign policy vacuum, which was filled by terrorism as the ‘Islamic Threat’ emerged as the replacement propaganda theme of the ‘90s (Lueg, 1995). Prompted by the foreign policy organs of the Bush and Clinton administrations, the American prestige press heralded Islamic resurgence as the latest menace to democracy and freedom, as exemplified by the *New York Times* headline “The Red Menace is Gone, but Here’s Islam.” (Sciolino, 1995).

When the Cold War ended, American foreign policy shifted to accommodate the next big menace: Islamic fundamentalism. Salame (1993) argues that Western attacks on Islam and negative media stereotypes of Muslims only confirm Islamist views about Western hegemony. Before September 11th, Muslims, for the most part, have been misunderstood in the West, particularly in the United States. The American media played a major role in this distortion, since their reporting of Islam often fuels stereotypes, hysterical fear and violence, and focuses on crisis coverage (Said, 1997, Sheikh, 1995, Adnan, 1989).
During the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, news about Islam mainly focused on the Iranian revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis, which set the precedent for Islam’s media association with terrorism (Adnan, 1989). The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran prompted a frame shift of Islam in the American press that evolved past the romantic visions of the Arabian sheikh, belly dancers and the desert savage into the image of the religious fanatic. Media coverage of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan cast Islam in a Cold War framework where the Muslim Mujahideen were fighting the Soviets, therefore they were allies, and subsequently they received not only funding and training from the US, but also favorable media coverage. In addition, Islam on American TV news is often focused on countries associated with oil reserves, due to their geographic location in the Persian Gulf and their importance to American strategy in the Middle East. In the ‘80s, Islamic-inspired groups such as Hamas and Iranian-financed Hizbollah were consistently reported on from a Western vantage point which interpreted them as terrorist organizations, not as groups violently struggling against Israeli occupation (Said, 1997).

The cultural gap between Muslims and Western journalists became more pronounced after the Gulf War. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of terrorism committed by fanatic ‘America-hating’ Muslims intensified without an adequate explanation from the media of the
political goals of the Islamic-inspired groups. All over the Middle East, Islamic groups face an internal struggle to be recognized and granted legitimacy by their own governments (Salame, 1993). Hashem (1997) also notes this trend of reporting on the rise of Islamic radicalism in early '90s coverage of *Time* and *Newsweek*. Exceptions to this coverage, while they do exist, were found to be rare. Islam was handled carefully in '90-'91, and there was often sympathy from US media due to the plight of Muslims in Somalia and Bosnia. However, there are few ‘positive’ accounts of Muslims in the Middle East, because American correspondents are more likely to focus on the radical and sensationalist elements of Islamic activism, thus disregarding the context needed to paint a complete picture (Mortimer, 1981).

**Militant Islam: The Political Struggle against Globalization**

To a certain extent, religious revivalism can be viewed as an adverse reaction to the economic, political and cultural by-products of globalization. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism has been interpreted as a form of rebellion against global economic inequality, as well as the prevalence of American media as a global cultural product. Scholars of Islam and the globalization process as well as American policymakers
have argued that the advent of religious revivalism is a side-effect of the modernization process. Islamic groups thrive in the disproportionate economic and social conditions that result from Arab and Muslim governments struggling to keep up with the fast and competitive pace of the world capitalist economy (Beyer, 1997, Hudson, 1996, Gerges, 1997, Sidahmed, 1996). These conditions led to broad economic disparities between rich and the poor and the frustration resulting from this situation is exploited by the agendas of extremist groups.

Islamic groups arose as part of a widespread anti-imperialist force that swept the Middle East in the latter half of the 20th century. More recently, these organizations are opposed to what they view as corrupt local regimes, as well as forces of Western political domination. Military and economic reliance on the West, as particularly demonstrated during the Gulf War, is strongly resented by Islamist groups. In most Arab countries, the nationalist, secular regimes have ostracized the religious elements of the anti-Western struggle and implemented market-economy policies required by global economic institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. This has led to Arab populations that have increasing levels of education, unemployment and frustration.

The global-capitalist economy is based on an absolute separation of religion from politics, a separation exceeding that of secularism
occurring within an individual state (George, 1996). The geographically
diverse Islamic resurgence movement, which Al Qaeda wants to unify by
military means, is a staunch opponent of this secularization. They regard a
secular political system as the road to moral and cultural corruption by the
West, and that to preserve the Islamic way of life Muslims should reject
modernity and revitalize a national identity buried under years of
colonialism and post-colonial imperialism. Islamist movements including Al
Qaeda feel compelled to attract worldwide attention because they oppose
the presence of American forces in the holy land of Saudi Arabia, and the
harsh occupation conditions under which the Palestinians live.

Islamic activists share the neo-Marxist view of globalization and
global media markets as a guise for American cultural, political and
economic repression of national and religious identity. One version of
political Islam rejects Western hegemony in the political, social, moral,
economic, cultural and media realms. Some also reject the secularism of
the existing Arab regimes. But in terms of the West, some reject American
political hegemony in the Middle East, reinforced by American media, as
exemplified by: (1) Gulf War, (2) stagnant peace process and continued
oppression and killing of Palestinians, and (3) American double standards
of foreign policy: sanctions on Iraq, along with strong support of Israel.
Before the Gulf War, US foreign policy in the Middle East had a "holy
trinity" of American interests: Israel, oil and anti-communism (Hudson, 1996). The only change to this trinity is the replacement of anti-communism with anti-Islamic political groups. Islamic resurgence is an increasingly popular grassroots movement that has extended well beyond North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula and spread further East to Indonesia, Chechnya, Pakistan and China. The US faces the dilemma of wanting to promote democracy, freedom and human rights in all of those countries, but is concerned that doing so would topple existing autocratic regimes and lead to the realization of an anti-globalization Islamic government.

**Literature on Media Coverage of Arabs and Muslims**

Both broadcast and print outlets have been studied for their portrayals of Arabs and Muslims in American media, with a notable dearth of studies about the Internet. Television studies of the ‘70s and ‘80s have examined the three national networks (CBS, NBC and ABC) with the addition of CNN beginning in 1990, following the Gulf War. Most of these studies have looked at nightly news reports, while others in this literature survey (Shaheen, 1981) examined network documentaries on the Middle East. NPR transcripts have been analyzed for their portrayal of Iraq
(Abunimah & Masri, 2000) and there are research projects examining PBS coverage of the Middle East (Ghareeb, 1983, Hersham, 1981, Khouri, 1998, Lichter 1981). Print studies, on the other hand, have been far more extensive including national and local newspapers as well as newsmagazines. *The New York Times* is the most popular focus of analysis, but the literature also looks at Arabs in the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Chicago Sun Times* and the *Detroit Free Press*. Magazines studied for their portrayal of Arabs and Muslims include *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, *US News and World Report*, *Life*, *The Nation* and *The New Republic*. While a majority of these print studies analyzed news coverage, some are centered exclusively on editorials and op-ed pieces (Khoury, 1998, Batarfi, 1997, Daugherty, 1979) while others examine Arabs in editorial cartoons (Palmer, 1997, Betz, 1988, Lendenmann, 1983).

The list of studies is extensive and covers the three main communication domains of production, content and effects. They range from content analyses, opinion polls and surveys on the quantitative end of the research spectrum extending to qualitative textual analysis, auto-ethnographies and in-depth interviews, as well as critical studies and political economy structural perspectives. Notably, many of the studies in
this review used a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. In terms of quantity, an informal analysis of the methodologies used in the literature (total of 52 studies) shows content analysis used in 36% of the studies reviewed, 16% used content analysis combined with textual readings, 32% used rhetorical analysis of text and visuals, 10% analyzed public opinion polls and 6% conducted surveys.

Mousa (1984) content analyzed the New York Times between 1917 and 1947. He found that the Times’ coverage was mostly conflict-oriented and unfavorable to Arabs. Military, political and economic stories dominated the ‘30s and ‘40s, in contrast with the more cultural and educational stories of the ‘20s. This trend is described by Mousa as the process of ‘de-romanticizing’ the Arab image. More Arab and American sources, as opposed to British or French, were being cited in the 1940s, however, Western sources were cited more often than Arabs. The study concludes that Arabs were not presented as fighting for independence from colonial rule during this period; instead coverage was limited, distorted and presented from a colonial viewpoint.

Mousa’s analysis is particularly valuable because it demonstrates the dominance of Western colonial interpretations of Eastern culture in academic discourse that Edward Said describes as Orientalism (Said, 1978). Mousa also analyzes 30 years of coverage, an exception to other
studies with shorter time frames. Studies with limited time frames have the advantage of contrasting between newspapers and other media formats, such as broadcast television news. Another noteworthy aspect of this study is its examination of sources. The use of Western sources more frequently than Arab ones is a trend that emerges in other quantitative studies (Batarfi, 1997, Suleiman, 1988).

Evensen's content analysis of the New York Times from November 1947 to May 1948 outlines the interpretive framework that the newspaper used to explain the creation of the state of Israel during this period. The analysis uses primary historical sources including documents from the Truman Library, poll data covering the winter of ’47-'48, and letters penned by editorial writers at the Times. (Evensen, 1990). The value of this study lies in its examination of the role of the Times towards mobilizing public support for the creation of Israel. With support from the United States, the United Nations voted in favor of establishing a Jewish state in November 1947. A few months later Truman changed his mind, and decided instead to support a UN trusteeship over Palestine. This move by Truman was framed by the New York Times’ editorials as cowardly, weak and indicative of the president’s lack of leadership skills at the outset of the Cold War.
Ideally, more historical research examining coverage of Middle East issues needs to be conducted. If congressional records and presidential diaries are contrasted against what the press was advocating, further research could further examine the ideological relationship between the media and the official foreign policy establishment. This research could also contribute to the wealth of literature on how the press relates to the formation of foreign policy in the Middle East (Chomsky, 1983, Speigel, 1985, Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998, Bennet, 1990).

Suleiman (1988,) and Batarfi (1997) look at historical periods of conflict in the Middle East, the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 Six-Day Arab-Israeli war, the 1973 War (Yom Kippur) as well as the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. These are particularly interesting and valid periods of study since news reports on the Middle East intensified by default during those years. Due to the violent conflicts between Arab countries and Israel, there are numerous media texts to analyze. These studies contrasted more than one medium, and found similar results. Suleiman’s content analysis included seven American print outlets, both newspaper and magazines: the New York Times’ News of the Week in Review, U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, Time, Life, The Nation and the New Republic. Batarfi’s analysis covered the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. They both found that Arab perspectives
were not presented fairly and objectively, albeit less so in 1973. Meanwhile, Israel was revered by the press in 1956 and 1967.

In 1956, Arabs were described in the elite press as backwards, dishonest, unreliable, undemocratic, with low standards of education and living. Israelis, on the other hand, were described as having high levels of education and living standards, highlighting that they are democratic and Western. The Arabs were presented as the aggressors against peace-loving Israelis, and when Israel attacked its neighboring countries, these attacks were framed as retaliatory (Suleiman, 1988). In 1967 their data again show a clear pro-Israel and anti-Arab reporting slant. The Cold-War dominant ideology played a significant role in this representation of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He was viewed by the American press as a pawn of Soviet regional power in the Middle East, playing a dangerous game of pitting East against West. Sources most frequently quoted in reporting the conflict were mostly American, followed by Israeli sources, then Europeans, with a low proportion of Arab sources.

Studies of television portrayals of the Middle East began in the 1970s, particularly since by that decade broadcast television had emerged as a primary source of news. During the ‘70s, the Middle East featured prominently in headlines and evening newscasts across America (Adams, 1981). 1973 was the point at which coverage began to balance out. ‘Good
qualities' of Arabs, their achievements and views were increasingly reported in newsmagazines surveyed with the exception of the *Nation* and *New Republic*. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the oil embargo, President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and the Iranian hostage crisis were all major events that prompted a wide academic interest in studying the portrayal of Arabs and Israelis in American media.

By conducting a content analysis of network broadcasts from 1972 to 1980, Adams and Heyl (1981) found that in 1972, an average of 30 seconds a weeknight was devoted to the Middle East. The 1973 war and the oil embargo were the turning points for media attention, with coverage of the region tripling after the October war. Middle East news decreased in 1975 and 1976. With Carter’s diplomatic efforts towards the Camp David peace accords, coverage of the region further increased in 1977, and through the end of 1980 the Middle East was a frequent feature of TV coverage of international affairs.

Adams and Heyl also contrasted their results with public opinion polls and found a positive change in direction and intensity of public opinion during television coverage of Egypt and Sadat. In the late ‘70s, despite the networks’ increasing criticism of Israel, public opinion did not adopt the frames conveyed in television coverage. Gallup polls show virtually no change towards public support for Israel from 1976 to 1980. In
direct contrast, there was a shift in public perception of Israel, whose popularity remained high despite the changed tenor of television news coverage. In 1980, network news was dominated by the hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, thus marginalizing the Arab-Israeli conflict on all three networks.

Adams and Heyl found that between 1972 and 1974, ABC had the most Middle East news, while CBS took the lead in 1976 through 1978, but ABC again had the most Middle East news from 1979 to 1980. NBC consistently broadcast the least amount of Middle East coverage of the three networks, instead focusing on domestic stories. The value of the Adams study lies in its numbers, which indicate the quantity of Middle East news during the ‘70s on each network. However, these data do not provide information about the quality or characteristics of the ‘70s coverage. The authors did not code for tone or direction, and instead focused on quantifying news from the region.

Bagneid and Schneider (1981) qualitatively analyzed 1970s network coverage of the Middle East. They conducted a visual analysis of network broadcasts of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem to determine how he fared against Menachem Begin. They found that Sadat was shown smiling twice as often as Begin, and concluded that the Egyptian president was portrayed as more friendly and outgoing. This was determined by counting
the number of times he appeared on camera talking to people, shaking hands and being social.

Asi (1981) conducted a time-series content analysis of network TV broadcasts before, during and after Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem. Results indicated that coverage of Egypt and the PLO was more favorable (and conversely coverage of Israel was less favorable) in 1979 than earlier in the decade. By 1979, Egypt was receiving more favorable coverage than Israel. While other Arab countries received slightly more negative coverage by 1979, most stories in all three periods were coded as neutral. The significant changes in the coverage of Egypt and the PLO did not carry over to the rest of the Arab states. The author argues that Arabs distancing themselves from Sadat reinforced their villainous status and accounted for continual unfavorable coverage. Reporting in 1979 was far from being pro-Arab, but it represented a shift from the pro-Israeli approach of previous years.

Asi’s research demonstrates an important aspect of Middle East coverage by American media that has been sustained throughout the years: favorable coverage of an Arab nation will be invariably linked with the extent of its diplomatic ties with Israel. Peace with Israel on its terms will invariably lead to more favorable coverage of Arab countries by American journalists. Arab unity, the struggle for occupied lands, and
opposition to Israeli policies are frowned upon by the American administration and consequently the media. Sadat’s example shows how an Arab can dress in a Western suit, charm the media and gain their favor by understanding how they operate. However, Sadat’s charm was not universal. Leon Hadar (1980), a former Israeli press secretary and journalist accused Sadat of manipulating the media, particularly the *New York Times*. He called Sadat an actor who understood the media’s need for exclusives and scoops, and he argued that unlike Begin, Sadat knew that the media prefers the news to be devoid of complexity, instead condensed into simplistic ideas and slogans (Hadar, 1980).

Beyond the daily news routine, documentary work has been analyzed for content regarding the Middle East. Palestinians in particular have been the subject of both insightful and superficial network documentaries. In May 1974, a *60 Minutes* segment showed a Palestinian mother with a gun and a child in army training camp, Yasser Arafat disheveled and unshaven, and military attacks on Lebanon were described as retaliation for terrorist attacks. Casualties of the Israeli civilian deaths in Maalot and Quarat Shemona were highlighted, while no Arab casualties at the hands of the Israelis were shown (Shaheen, 1981). Conversely, Howard Stringer’s June ’74 CBS documentary *The Palestinians* (which won the Overseas Press Club award for best
documentary on foreign affairs) explains that only extreme fringes of Palestinian society were behind the massacre at Maalot. Stringer’s documentary includes interviews with Palestinian and Lebanese-Palestinian families from a wide socio-economic spectrum, and points out that they too are fighting for a promised land. He refers to the militant Palestinians as guerrillas, not terrorists. Historical context is provided, and the program documents both Israeli and Palestinian viewpoints, presenting a complex and diverse picture of the economic, social and political conditions of the region.

Another even-handed network documentary about Palestinians, according to Shaheen, is Malcolm Clarke’s *Terror in the Promised Land*, broadcast in October 1978. The issues are seen through the eyes of young Palestinians who volunteer for suicide squads. The program explains their rationale by describing their passion for a homeland. The narrator interviews the widow of Palestinian intellectual Ghassan Kanafani, and lists other civilian intellectuals killed by Israelis. The program also discusses human rights issues, as well as Palestinian torture and beatings at the hands of Israelis. Shaheen’s in-depth interviews with the producers of *Terror* reveal that ABC received a large amount of hate mail after the documentary aired. The Arabs are not easily explained in two-minute news broadcasts, according to Shaheen. Despite its limited
proven effects on public opinion, the documentary format can provide a necessary balance of context, history and insight on the Middle East.

Daugherty and Warden (1979) analyzed editorial pages of the *New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal* and the *Christian Science Monitor* between Jan. 1, 1967 to Dec. 31, 1977. Results show that in terms of quantity, the *New York Times* published the most editorials about the Middle East, followed by the *Post* and the *Monitor*. The *Wall Street Journal* published the fewest editorials about the Middle East. The *Christian Science Monitor* had the largest proportion of neutral stories, but it published the highest number of pro-Arab editorials. The *Post* was found to be the most frequently critical of Arab nations, and the least likely to publish neutral editorials on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The number of anti-Arab *New York Times* editorials outnumbered the ones supportive of Israel by a ratio of three to one. If there are any themes emerging from the analysis of 1970s coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the authors argue, it is that the editorials of the prestige press are overwhelmingly neutral; they support negotiations, peace settlements and criticized belligerency on both sides. Daugherty and Warden also found that the prestige press did not present a monolith of opinion and there were significant differences between publications.
This is an important observation that is often underscored in studies of the portrayal of Arabs in American media. Studies indicate that when conducting a content analysis, the majority of stories and editorials were coded as neutral. Of the ones that take sides, these are more likely to legitimize the Israeli position, and marginalize Arab opinion. The fact that there is a tremendous diversity of coverage is also largely ignored.

A content analysis of the New York Times, Washington Post, LA Times and Chicago Tribune as well as CBS transcripts was conducted for three constructed weeks in 1971 (Mishra, 1979). The Middle East made up an average of five percent of all stories in these media. In terms of quantity, the Middle East made up an average of five percent of all stories in all the above media. Content of the stories were 66% hard news, 15% background stories, and 4% opinions, editorials and letters to the editor. The New York Times and Washington Post had the most Middle East hard news coverage, while the LA Times had the most interpretive, background feature stories. The New York Times had the most pictures and editorials, while the Post had more opinion columns. The Tribune had the most letters to the editor dealing with the Middle East. Coverage in all the media analyzed concentrated on Israel, Egypt and Iran. Other Arab countries received coverage ranging from 1-4% of all Middle East news. Sources of Middle East news ranged from about 18% coming from the papers’ foreign
correspondents and staff writers, while the rest came from the three main wire services: UPI, AP and Reuters. The wire service most frequently used was the American Associated Press. As in Batarfi’s (1997) study, the *LA Times* emerges as the American newspaper with the most context provided on the Middle East, while the Times and Post lead in hard news.

In 1982 Israel invaded southern Lebanon. Subsequently, Israel was more frequently portrayed by the *Times, Post and LA Times* as aggressive and reporting on peace keeping was even-handed (Batarfi, 1997). His study finds that the press justified Israel’s actions twice as much as the Arabs. Batarfi found eight frames in the coverage he analyzed: aggression, intransigence, peace seeking, terrorism, land legitimacy, action justification and competence/incompetence. The *New York Times* aligned with Israel more often than the Post, and the *LA Times* was the least critical of Arabs.

By analyzing headlines and coding for the countries of the each story’s primary and secondary focus for two six-month periods in 1976 and 1984, Barranco and Shyles (1988) found that the *Times* mentioned Israel and the United States more frequently than ten Arab nations combined. The authors argue that due to Israel’s close cultural, ideological and political ties to the United States, news about Israel is likely to be more salient to both the press and public than news from Arab countries.
Gilboa (1989) and Griffin (1990) both conduct similar comparative analyses of network television and the *New York Times* between December 1987 and June 1988. Griffin finds that Israeli press restrictions resulted in a decline in coverage of the Intifada, while American public opinion supported Israel’s handling of the popular uprising. Gilboa finds that despite print and broadcast media’s sharp criticism of Israeli policy towards the Palestinians during the uprising, public opinion remained strongly and clearly in favor of Israel over the Palestinians. His content analysis revealed that *New York Times* reports placed equal blame for the violence on Israelis and Palestinians and its editorials squarely placed the blame on Israel. Despite this coverage, the public placed blame for the conflict mostly on the PLO and Palestinians.

Strong public support of Israel could be related to a shared Judeo-Christian tradition, common values and political institutions, and is magnified by negative media portrayals of Arabs, Gilboa argues. Therefore, cultural and historic interpretations of the Middle East may have far stronger and more durable effects on American public opinion than the media alone.

Shaheen’s early research (1981) qualitatively examines network documentary portrayal of Saudis and Palestinians. While television news is confined to superficiality by organizational constraints such as time and
deadline pressures, newsmagazine producers often have the luxury of months of careful preparation, planning and research. Thus, newsmagazines provide a valuable opportunity to convey context and meaning to international conflicts, particularly in the Middle East. But they often flounder. Shaheen finds that the Saudis are often stereotypically associated with oil, wealth and extravagance. This affluence was the subject of what Shaheen described as a very negative and stereotypical 60 Minutes segment. NBC’s White Paper documentary about Saudi Arabia also describes the country in derogatory and ethnocentric terms. Images of gas lines in America are followed by commentary about the tribal nature of Saudi society. On the other hand, there are insightful documentaries as well. He cites Saudi Arabia, a CBS report aired in October 1980 that thoughtfully analyzes Saudi society and culture. The documentary respects the nation’s history and Islamic religion, it also stresses that the Saudis share modernity with their traditions. Saudis are shown as people, human beings, whose society is different, not better or worse. Saudi women, both veiled and unveiled were interviewed for the program, and they are shown playing volleyball, joking and studying.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, Islam became the new global threat that replaced communism as the enemy of the West in the following decade. Sheikh et al. (1995) were concerned with
researching the image of Islam as a religion, separate from connotations involving the Middle East. They analyzed randomly selected articles using a Lexis-Nexis search with the keywords ‘Islam’ and ‘Moslem’. Articles were sampled from the Times of London, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Detroit Free Press from 1988 to 1992. The Detroit Free Press was expected to be more sensitive in its reporting on Islam due to the large Muslim population in the Detroit area.

Results showed that a majority of articles about Muslims involved events, groups and individuals from the Middle East. Topics were mostly centered on crises, conflicts and wars. Coverage of Islam was for the most part, international. References to Muslim groups and organizations lacked specificity. A clear majority of stories did not distinguish between the various branches of Islam. As for negativity and bias, the authors found weak support for their hypothesis that a high level of negative tone would be detected. Overall, coverage was slightly more negative than positive, but the majority of stories were neutral in tone. The Detroit Free Press was not significantly different in its coverage than the other papers analyzed, with the exception that the Detroit paper was less likely to describe Muslims in derogatory terms. This finding becomes more relevant when contrasted against the New York Times’ trend of justifying Israeli actions.
possibly due to the consideration of their significant Jewish readership in New York (Batarfi, 1997).

In *Covering Islam*, Said (1997) analyses the British documentary *Death of a Princess* and the American-produced *Jihad in America* both aired on PBS. He laments the lack of Muslim sources in both programs, and cites the programs as examples of the media exacerbating the divide between ‘us and them’. Documentary analysis is an important research methodology because it describes stereotypes of Arabs that are manifest in documentary content, despite the time and resources in documentary production that are normatively more conducive to analysis and discussion.

Hashem (1997) drew systematic samples from *Time* and *Newsweek* between 1990 and 1993. He found that *Time* covered slightly more articles on the Arab countries than *Newsweek*. Iraq was the most mentioned Arab country, followed by Palestine, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf States. The coverage was mostly negative for both magazines during the first two years 1990 and 1991, but naturally so, he says, because of the Gulf war. However, his results did show a trend towards more neutral or positive coverage over the four-year period. Hashem constructs recurring themes in both magazines: a Middle East economic decline, growth of the fundamentalist Islamic movement, lack of
democracy, the myth of Arab unity, Arabs live in the past, slavery still exists in the Middle East and finally, the changing political climate in terms of the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians.

In her analysis of editorials in the New York Times, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times, as well as an analysis of television news talk shows on ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN and PBS between October 1997 and February 1998, Ghada Khouri (1998) uses both content analysis and in-depth interviews to determine that the mainstream press marginalized Arab and Western voices who advocated sanctions removal and opposed further military assaults on Iraq. According to her study, the LA Times editorial pages carried eight anti-war pieces, and 10 editorials in favor of bombing Iraq. The Post’s op-ed pages published 23 editorials in favor of bombing Iraq, and eight against, with 44 neutral ones. Of a total of 75 articles, 2 were written by Arabs, and 14 expressed concern for civilians. The Times published no Arab voices in its 59 editorials, one anti-war piece and 19 pro-war op-ed pieces. As for broadcast news, an analysis of the guests chosen to appear on debate format talk shows reveals that of five networks studied, they all featured guests who represented the US government line. Iraqi officials were the only Arab voices. The networks excluded independent Arab-American voices, and none of the shows discussed the suffering of the Iraqi people in detail.
Khouri also highlighted several themes the press adopted towards its late ‘90s coverage of Iraq with supporting quotes from network TV and various American newspapers: Iraqi deaths as propaganda, Arab lives do not count, Arabs as irrational and violent. She describes the press reaction to the possible bombing as sensationalist and hypocritical due to the dismissal of Arab observations that American policies towards Iraq constituted a double standard, given its staunch support for Israeli policies. The media reinforcement of pro-war Administration policy was followed by a public backlash against the Arab-American community. Hateful mail, racial slurs, discrimination cases and hate crimes towards Arab-Americans all increased after the US-Iraqi standoff (Khouri et. al, 1992, 1996, 1998).

Using Lexis-Nexis, Abunimeh and Masri (2000) analyzed elite newspapers for their coverage of Iraq during December 1998 and August-October 1999. Using the keyword Iraq, they found over a thousand articles, but adding the keywords ‘civilians’, ‘sanctions’ or ‘Unicef’ the search results were far more limited, leading the authors to conclude that coverage of Iraq was mainly centered around the bombing, and did not pay much attention to reports of suffering by Iraqi civilians. They also analyzed transcripts from the television networks, as well as CNN and NPR, finding that CNN and NPR were the only media outlets that reported
on the effect of UN and US sanctions on the Iraqi people. They outlined seven themes of the press during this period, using qualitatively extracted examples to illustrate their observations. The media analyzed ignored or downplayed the sanctions’ effects on the Iraqi civilian population, discredited or ignored reports of civilian victims of the bombings, and personified Iraq as Saddam Hussein. The media analyzed also created an artificial balance of coverage by relying exclusively on Iraqi sources instead of including independent, non-governmental viewpoints. According to the authors, journalists were towing the government line, exaggerating the threat of Iraqi weapons and using a narrow selection of ‘experts’ as sources.

While the above studies examine content, they don’t reveal much about why journalists report the way they do on the Middle East. This is achieved by researchers exploring the production realm, using research tools such as in-depth interviews with reporters and surveys of their attitudes and experiences. Research projects like Ghareeb’s (1983) extended interviews with prominent journalists covering the Middle East need to be replicated, updated and compared with his original observations. Through 17 in-depth interviews with reporters, columnists, foreign correspondents, editors and State Department correspondents covering the Middle East, Ghareeb sheds light on the type of insight about
Arab depictions that quantitative studies lack by default. Subjects interviewed worked for various prestige press: the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, PBS, the three networks, the *Christian Science Monitor*, *LA Times*, Knight-Ridder chain, the *National Observer*, and the *Chicago Daily News*. The questions were mainly concerned with whether or not the subjects thought there was a bias against Arabs in American news, and the reasons for the existence of any bias. Questions were also asked about the influence of the Israeli lobby in America and the differences between Israeli and Arab information and public relations efforts.

Most of the subjects agreed there was a clear bias against Arabs in their media that significantly improved after the 1973 War, and the oil embargo. Nevertheless, a few of the journalists interviewed strongly defended their professions and did not acknowledge the presence of bias. Reasons attributed to slanted coverage included the weakness of the Arab information system, as well as heavy censorship from the Israeli and Arab governments and militaries. Many of the subjects complained about access and described how difficult it was to talk to any Arab officials, whether in the region, or through Washington embassies due to cumbersome bureaucracy. On the other hand, the Israeli government facilitates reporting for correspondents, via a sophisticated public relations system in place both in Israel and the United States, which is more likely
to be available to journalists. A vicious cycle emerges, whereby information from the Arab side is difficult to get, which slants content, which then leads to Arab government and public suspicion of Western reporters’ intentions, resulting in limited cooperation and access to information. The journalists also point to a lack of pressure from Arab-American groups on the media when bias is present, and a lack of praise from these communities when the coverage is balanced or positive, versus the press activity of strongly vocal Jewish communities.

Ghareeb cites several reasons for an anti-Arab bias, and his logic is supported by the interviews. The first is cultural. Since Israel is a Western-style democracy formed after World War II by European Jews, Americans are more likely to identify with it, as opposed to the Arab and Islamic cultures, which are alien to most Americans. This cultural bias stems from ignorance of the history, culture and politics of the Middle East manifest in both societies at large and members of the media, a contention supported by Said (1997). A determined and sophisticated Israeli lobby and active Jewish media watchdogs are contrasted against a disorganized Arab information strategy, as well as Arab failure to understand how American media works. Ghareeb also cites the nature of the media as a problem, especially the ‘pack journalism’ phenomenon.
In addition to the type of production issues American journalists face covering the Middle East, which qualitative research is more likely to reveal clearly rather than infer from data, surveys convey a great deal of insight as well. Lichter’s (1981) survey of American journalists is frequently cited by Arab researchers as proof that American media are staunch supporters of Israel. Lichter finds 72 percent of the media members surveyed agree that America has a moral obligation to prevent the destruction of Israel, of which 34 percent indicated strong agreement. Of the 28% who disagreed, 8% strongly disagreed. Therefore, Lichter concludes, the vast majority of America’s leading journalists are strong defenders of Israel. In Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda model, influential political and business entities use legal and public pressure to scare editors and reporters away from content deemed hostile to their interests and contrary to the ideologies and entities they support. The results of Lichter’s survey could be very worrying for the portrayal of Arabs, given the increasingly corporate structure of the media today, and its shrinking ownership in the hands of a few business elites, who were also found by Lichter to be stronger supporters of Israel than the general public.

Other surveys have targeted foreign correspondents in the Middle East, and these studies are also worthy of replication. Sreebny (1979)
surveyed American correspondents in the Middle East covering the region since 1973. When asked about the major problems they face, they highlighted censorship and restrictions, cultural gaps between foreign correspondents and Arabs, biased coverage of the region by US news media, and distrust of American reporters in the region. Many of them called for correspondents to learn Arabic and to undergo regional studies prior to their dispatch to the Middle East.

This type of information is vital to understanding how journalists operate and how perceptions of their jobs can affect coverage. Linking this data with content can lead to an overall better picture of why negative depictions of Arabs exist, and how this coverage can become more balanced. Arab countries have not sufficiently improved their levels of media access over the years for foreign journalists; despite warnings from scholars that access is a major setback for their image. Arab-American groups are more actively critical of the press twenty years after Ghareeb’s work was published, and they have also become more commonly used as sources.

In 1974, Suleiman surveyed high school teachers’ attitudes towards Israel and Arabs, as well as public opinion poll analysis. His opinion poll data covering 1930-1980 shows strong support for Israel and very low support of Arabs, although a significant percentage expressed indifference
or no opinion. His main contribution to the study of Arabs in American media lies in his conclusion on the poll analysis: American attitudes towards Israel are clearly influenced by American-Israeli relations.

Half of the world history teachers Suleiman surveyed had not taken a course on the Middle East, but those that did were more likely to sympathize with Arabs. Among those surveyed, most were neutral on the Middle East, but those with an opinion were more likely to support Israel and hold negative attitudes about Arabs and Palestinians. Contrasting public opinion polls with content analysis of the same period can help determine how media portrayals filter to public attitudes towards the Middle East.

Unlike studies that focus on American public opinion of Arabs (DeBoer, 1983, Erksine, 1979, Lipset 1978, Moughrabi, 1988), studies that present data on media coverage along with poll data to discern correlations between the two (Griffin, 1990, Gilboa, 1989) are more effective at determining the effects of negative press portrayals on Arab stereotyping among the American public. In addition to the above mentioned poll studies, Slade’s (1980) poll analysis tells us that the Knowledge Gap theory may apply in America’s perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict. She found that images of Arabs are significantly better among college-educated and higher income bracket Americans. Approval
of Palestinians and the PLO is higher among low-income non-college educated African-Americans.

One of the strengths of public opinion poll analysis lies in its value for determining the effects of news, popular culture, film, literature and television programs on public perception of Arabs. Often, regardless of media criticism of Israeli policies, public opinion remains strongly in favor of Israel and unsupportive of Arabs. News is not the only factor affecting popular negative stereotypes of Arabs held among the American population. The popular culture factor is highly significant. *The TV Arab* (Shaheen, 1984) is an unparalleled qualitative analysis of Hollywood entertainment output, coupled with in-depth interviews with producers, directors and industry executives. Shaheen’s popular culture research reveals three categories of the Arab stereotype in movies and television: the belly dancer, billionaire and bomber. Studies that discuss Arab stereotypes in popular literature and negative Arab representation in popular culture include Terry (1985), Sabbagh (1990) Christison (1987) and Michalak (1985).

There have been few studies that directly address the media effects of Middle East coverage on American society. While there have been studies that correlate media coverage and opinion polls, to the knowledge of this researcher no focus groups research in this field has been
published. There are hate crime reports, but nothing linking those hate crimes to specific media coverage. The Anti-Arab Discrimination Committee (ADC), publishes annual hate crime reports which document the heightened prejudice against Arabs and Muslims during times of political, military and economic crisis.

In a series of ADC reports on hate crimes against Arabs, which reached unprecedented levels right after the Gulf War, thousands of incidents of violence against Arabs living in the United States (Khouri & Wingfield, 1992, 1996, 1998) are documented. These incidents include job discrimination, attacks on homes and private property, threatening letters, phone calls and e-mails, bomb threats, assault and battery, vandalism, arson and even murder. Arab-American children have been subjected to physical and verbal harassment, and also have to endure stereotypes of the Arab and Islamic world that trickle down through children’s books and cartoons (Shaheen, 1980).

Consequences of the negative portrayals of Arabs in the news are also far-reaching. Derogatory depictions of Arabs in American media could lead to further erosion of American press credibility in the Arab world. It can also lead to increased resentment of the West, which is already present due to political, economic and military policies. Kai Hafez (2000) discusses the globalization of American media and how its stereotypes
and negative coverage will impact the rest of the world, since America is the global leader of the export of information, entertainment and news.

**Summary:**

This chapter has attempted to chronicle research findings on the portrayal of Arabs in US media. These results lead to a more comprehensive understanding of how Arabs have been portrayed and possible explanations for this coverage. Overall, more content analysis of recent media, as well as updated qualitative data, would make valuable contributions to research in this field. Current research on the production of media content, interviewing journalists, editors, reporters and producers, as well as surveying foreign correspondents is necessary. Focusing on visual media such as cartoons or photographs of Arabs is an integral part of the whole framework of representation, and their qualitative study should continue. News organizations and media outlets with global reach such as news websites remain un-chartered territory for Arab depiction analysis. American international radio transcripts such as those of the Voice of America have yet to be examined for their portrayal of Arabs and Muslims.
What this literature reveals is that there is a need for framing analysis to be applied to the question of how Arabs and Muslims are represented in media content. More recent research is needed on networks news coverage in particular, and more qualitative research needs to be done to investigate these representations further. Also, qualitative work with focus groups could contribute a great deal to research on consequences and effects of representation of these groups. In my view, the studies that utilized research methods such as textual analysis and in-depth interviews were more revealing and had richer observations of the patterns that emerge in the texts. Framing research is not a popular theoretical background of studies involving the Middle East, but as the next chapter illustrates, scholars of media coverage of terrorism have found useful applications of framing theory to analyze the way news reports interpret and explain terrorist events and crisis coverage in the Middle East.

Some of the observations made by the research chronicled in this chapter are reflected in network coverage of Arabs and Muslims following 9/11. These will be further elaborated upon in the concluding chapter, but before that, the next chapter discusses framing theory and how it has been used by scholars of terrorism media coverage.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundation: Framing Research

A framing analysis of network news is a necessary step towards moving beyond the simplistic notions of bias in the news. Bias is a reductive way of categorizing interpretations of reality into black and white, when reality is often gray. Forcing content into categories of positive, negative and neutral has been a traditional social science research method of determining bias in media coverage. As the studies in the previous chapter reveal, this has been done repeatedly in the literature on portrayal of Arabs and Muslims, where the representations are described as being favorable/unfavorable, positive/negative or fair/unfair. I believe that qualitative analysis shares more information about why a particular depiction is positive or negative and I believe there needs to be a more careful analysis of what those categories mean. Why are particular stories positive or negative and can quantitative analysis alone definitively determine that slant? I would argue that it is easy to manipulate numbers and train coders towards a particular result; therefore qualitative approaches such as close readings can provide a more nuanced understanding of why a particular story is accurate or not, depending on the aspects that it highlights and obscures. This is why framing research is personally appealing.
Framing considers the relationship of content to ideological structures and institutions. Framing research, which originates in sociological approaches to media studies, attempts to understand how journalists as well as their editors and/or producers, organize and explain events and issues (Reese, 2001). The process of framing, in my interpretation, involves the construction of meaning through structured discourse. Analyzing this discourse helps media scholars understand how messages are packaged and disseminated. Framing research incorporates questions about the various levels of influence on media content and how those influences are manifest within media texts.

The functions of media frames, as Entman posits, is to,

"define problems-determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values, diagnose causes – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – offer and justify treatments for the problems and present their likely effects." (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

While performing the above functions, media frames also highlight certain aspects of reality while obfuscating others, thus limiting the boundaries of discourse on selected issues. For this particular study, Entman’s functions of media frames are a helpful way to analyze how the sources appearing on network news helped to define the problem of terrorism, and how the blame, or responsibility for the attacks was determined. The reasons given
by these sources for causes behind the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington will be of particular interest. How the official sources comprised of current and former government representatives and experts framed responses to the problem of terrorism will be a crucial part of the analysis.

Undoubtedly, there are other influences on journalists that go well beyond source selection and the frame emergence phase. The process of frame construction begins in the wider culture at large and its impact on reporter perceptions, as well as the level of background on the subject at hand. The frame is then influenced by who chooses the story, whether it is the journalist or an editor of higher rank. What the journalist may have more control over is the narrative structure of the news script: the voice over and stand-up, words, pictures, talking heads and anchor introductions that are the basic ingredients of any broadcast package. These elements are all devices used for framing news stories for television. Other more specific devices are key rhetorical features of news discourse including metaphors, catchphrases, exemplars depictions and visual images (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).

Framing research refines and replaces the more loaded term, 'bias' which implies lack of objectivity. Framing goes beyond mere bias and delves into the reasons why journalists include certain facts and depictions
of events while excluding others. Framing is a complex concept that transcends the unsophisticated positive/negative measurement strategies used in previous literature. In my view, given my own reporting experience the very nature of a journalist’s job is to strive to make sense of the world for their audiences by wading through vast amounts of information. The reporter’s job is to distill only the most relevant facts and events, and by doing this job, distinct choices are made. It is these choices that negate the need to discuss media depictions in black and white terms of ‘biased’ and ‘objective’ because it is the choices of sources and language that are the basis of the construction of a particular frame.

The interdisciplinary theoretical nature of framing research has the potential to link the critical, qualitative, ideological, and behavioral aspects of media scholarship. Framing looks at how the journalists, their sources, their cultural background, values, and specific interests can combine to produce a way of comprehending events and defining the news. Instead of asking whether a particular story was biased, the framing model asks how the relationships between power, institutions and the journalist combine to produce a certain frame, or way of explaining the events and issues. It basically moves beyond an obsession with bias to a more fruitful examination of the ideologies permeating news. Questions about power influencing news should not be undermined, which makes framing an
appealing, inclusive theoretical base from which to examine not only media content for this case study, but also its production and effects in future research.

Framing theory is not merely focused on media content, it also acknowledges questions of power and ideology, as well as social and institutional interests. Gitlin details how frames are used by the New York Times and CBS to adopt dominant ideology which trivialized and marginalized the new left movement. He maintains that through the ‘objective’ routines of journalism reporters,

“Systematically frame the news to be compatible with the main institutional arrangements of the society. Journalists thus sustain the dominant frames through the banal, everyday momentum of their routines. Their autonomy keeps within the boundaries of the hegemonic system” (Gitlin, 1980 p.269)

To a certain extent, aspects of the propaganda model can be tested using a framing approach, particularly the filter of news supplied by government, business and ‘experts’ used as sources that end up sustaining and endorsing the elite power structure. Government and corporate representatives have the advantage of carrying credible weight by virtue of their status and prestige. Official sources as well as a wide array of elite experts exploit the media into adopting particular agendas and frames. Herman and Chomsky’s analysis of ‘terrorism experts’ on
PBS finds that most of them were either current former or foreign government officials, followed by think tanks, academics and journalists (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). The appeal of framing research lies in its flexibility of methodological approaches, as well as the inclusion within framing literature of several established media theories and models, such as agenda setting, hierarchy of influences, political economy, schema theory and effects. Framing research in this sense is also an interdisciplinary form of analysis, which ties together critical, ideological and behavioral approaches.

**Framing & Terrorism Analysis**

September 11th was not America’s first experience with terrorism, nor will it be the last. Since the 1970s, there have been numerous terrorist incidents involving American citizens around the world. Every President from Carter to George W. Bush dealt with some form of terrorism, global or domestic. Until the 1990s, most of these hijackings, bombings, kidnappings and hostage-taking took place outside America’s borders, and were considered international terrorist acts. The Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 put Carter’s political standing in jeopardy during the 1980 election and may have contributed to electing Reagan to the White House. The
1983 bombing of military barracks in Beirut, June 1985 TWA hijacking, Pan Am 103 bombed over Lockerbie in 1988, World Trade Center attack in 1993, US embassy blasts in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Twin Towers and Pentagon in September 2001 are just a few milestones in the seemingly endless string of attempts by various terrorist organizations to attract attention. The goals of these organizations, as summarized by Bassiouni (1981), are:

1. Demonstrating the vulnerability and impotence of the government.
2. Attracting broader public sympathy by the choice of carefully selected targets that may be publicly rationalized.
3. Causing polarization and radicalization among the public.
4. Goading the government into repressive action likely to discredit it.
5. Presenting the violent acts in a manner that makes them appear heroic.

The extent to which the media help terrorists achieve these goals is subject to a wide debate among scholars of terrorism. Whether the media are instruments of terrorist propaganda, or serve to propagate institutional power varies according to the ideology of the observer (Weimann & Winn, 1994). How and why the media label acts as terrorism is crucial to understanding which interpretation the audience is supposed to distill from explanations and categorizations of terrorism on television.
“Terrorism plays on our most basic fears of the unknown and of dying; calling an act a terrorist one heightens our apprehension and fear of the perpetrator. It does not further our understanding of the causes of the act or the motivation of the actors.” (Dobkin, 1992, p. 41).

The way media frame terrorists and their organizations is likely influenced by years of previous experience and the very existence of this debate. If journalists with the intent of being objective, report on the grievances of the terrorists, they are then risking accusations of supplying the ‘oxygen of publicity,’ as the Thatcher government put it when it decided to ban the British media from interviewing Sinn Fein representatives (Paletz & Schmid, 1992). It then follows that, as research (Iyengar, 1991, Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) indicates, television reporters are more likely to promote the status quo by casting terrorism in predominantly episodic frames that highlight individual occurrences of violence and specific events. This is done instead of framing terrorism as a political problem by the use of thematic frames which emphasize analytical, contextual and historic coverage. This is due to the structural constraints unique to television, particularly the limited time TV reporters have to tell a story (1-3 minutes) and the use of video, or images that dictate the script. The reality of the TV news situation is that analysis and history are not necessarily conducive to the two-minute report.
Iyengar looked at the framing of five main issues on network news: crime, poverty, terrorism, unemployment and racial inequality. He found that almost three quarters of all stories about terrorism on the national networks between 1981 and 1986 were episodic, with only 26% thematic (Iyengar, 1991). He also argues that the networks' focus on episodic not thematic frames affects audience judgments of responsibility. Episodic frames implied individual responsibility, whereas thematic frames point to systemic causes for the social problem. He measured how the public framed who was responsible for a group of issues after they watched both news formats. Attribution of responsibility strongly correlated with the type of frame used by the network news segment. The development and continuation of Iyengar's work on episodic and thematic frames is essential. This study will not measure the effect of network television frames on audiences. However, this will definitely serve as a goal for future development of research to build upon the findings of this project.

Distinctions have been made in terrorism research between institutional terror and grievance terror (Wittebols, 1992, Herman, 1982) based on relationships of the terrorism to power. Grievance terror challenges power and generally is characterized by a precipitating incident, frequently depicted within a crisis mode. Institutional terror, however, seeks to maintain existing power relationships.
“By virtue of its links to institutional power, media is less apt to critically or fully examine instances of institutional terror that emanate from political or institutional authorities to whom these media are linked. On the other hand, grievance terrorism committed against institutions to which media are linked receives full and critical coverage in the media” (Wittebols, 1992 p. 268).

Institutional terror is comparable to what Herman calls state terror, which is often referred to as human rights abuses when committed by allies of the United States (Herman, 1982). Taking these theoretical perspectives of terrorism into account, the coverage of Sept. 11th in this study will be examined in terms of how foreign policy of the United States influenced the language choices of journalists and their interpretations of institutional power as they relate to terrorism.

Weimann and Winn (1994) highlighted the differences in portrayals of terrorism across national and international newspapers and American network television from 1968 to 1986. They found that motives of the terrorists were mentioned more frequently in the New York Times than on the national networks and that both newspapers and television tended to regard some groups’ motives as more important than others, with the distribution skewed towards the Middle East and away from Latin America.

The role of news sources in terrorism coverage has been examined in various case studies of the Iran hostage crisis, TWA hijacking, the
Achille Lauro hijacking and the first World Trade Center bombing. Nacos (1994) argues that when the media cover global incidents of terrorism, they are more likely to include dissenting views of terrorists and their supporters, as well as sources directly affected by the terrorist act such as families of victims and critics of the political establishment. But, when terror strikes within the country, officials rush to provide explanations and the media adopt government and institutional frames to restore public confidence and promote feelings of safety and order. This trend is also observed in other terrorism studies such as Schmid & Graaf (1982) and Paletz, Ayanian and Fozzard. (1982).

Dobkin (1992) studied terrorist acts committed between 1981 and 1986. He examined transcripts and video of ABC World News Tonight, as well as government documents. His analysis revealed that government frames in conjunction with news frames of terrorism serve to reproduce an ideology of military strength and intervention. This system of ideological consent, he argues, duplicates an ideology of counterterrorism that ends up justifying violent responses to terrorism.

"By reinforcing and legitimizing official constructions of terrorism, television news contributes to a cycle of responses that may ultimately serve the cause of the terrorist." (Dobkin, 1992, p. 9).

To arrive at this conclusion, Dobkin examined the narrative structure of television news using semiotic analysis of the verbal and
visual cues used in the construction and encoding of ideology into news. Examples of framing devices, he argues, are used in television by constructing certain narrative structures like the video postcard from the terror victims, or portraying the Reagan administration as the protagonist and ‘paper tiger’, as criticism of the administration’s handling of terrorism became evident in ABC’s coverage. Dobkin’s methodology is enlightening because it is rich in its detail and illustrative examples of narrative framing at work. His qualitative approach made for a refreshing and informative study of terrorism news frames, which inspired the qualitative method that will be used in this study.

To summarize, there are numerous advantages to using the framing approach in the study of terrorism and the media. Pervious literature demonstrates how media, particularly television news frames terrorism and how official ideology seeps into the narrative structure of stories. But the next question is how to detect official ideology in news frames, which will be discussed in the following chapter, which addresses the issue of how to measure frames, and the method used to analyze the framing of Islam, Muslims and Arabs on network news.
Chapter 3: Methodology

This chapter illustrates the methodological choices made by the researcher to answer the specified research questions. Since framing theory and ideological critique are the primary theoretical influences on this study, the methods used include discourse analysis and a close examination of sources. Understanding how dominant ideology can be manifest in the news requires a research project that is based on a theoretical approach, like framing theory, which takes into account the influence of institutional power structures on media content. Examining the role sources play in frame construction of the 9/11 attacks can help further understanding of media performance during times of crisis.

Analysis of network news coverage of September 11th is a relevant case study because it is worth finding out to what extent an elite consensus was conveyed to the public at a time when there was heightened attention towards TV news. Critically examining the initial two-week crisis period of Sept. 11th through Sept. 25th will evaluate the reaction of network news towards their responsibility of not only defining the problem of terrorism, but addressing its causes and suggesting remedies.
Research Questions:

A. Islam on Network News after September 11th:

1. Which visual and verbal frames were used to describe Islam within and outside the United States?
2. Which aspects of the religion were highlighted or obscured?
3. How closely did frames of Islam concur with the ideology of officials?

B. Arabs on Network News after September 11th:

1. How were Arab countries interpreted and explained to the American public?
2. How different were the Arab official statements different from the sentiments expressed on the streets?

Sample:

The sample used for this case study included transcripts and video of network evening newscasts on the three national networks, ABC, CBS and NBC for the first 14 days after the attacks on New York and Washington DC, i.e. September 11th through September 25th, 2001. During the week of September 11th to the 15th (Tuesday to Friday), when
the news coverage was extended beyond regular programming, the sample for this study covers the morning, afternoon and extended evening new broadcast time period. When regular half-hour evening newscasts resumed the following week (Monday the 17th through Tuesday the 25th), those half-hour programs (5:30-6:00 p.m. CST) were analyzed.

**Research Design:**

Choosing sources and their sound bites is a framing mechanism used by network television to convey information and views the American public about the attacks in New York and Washington. An examination of sources can be viewed as a measurement tool for framing analysis. The statements and observations made by network reporters and anchors will be closely examined and this chapter explains the methods used in this analysis.

The statements made by reporters and their interview subjects were analyzed for their interpretations of Arabs and Muslims. How the Arab countries of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq were framed on network news is discerned by an ideological critique of the references made to those countries’ political and diplomatic alliances with the United
States. Framing of Islam will also be examined through the statements made by sources and journalists, as well as anchor introductions in stories that refer to Islam and/or the Middle East.

Stories that referred to Arabs or Muslims are examined for potential patterns of discourse. As this chapter discusses, textual analysis of the representation of ethnic and religious groups provides a more comprehensive approach to framing research, which has traditionally inspired studies that use narrow and insufficient methods of measuring the frames within media texts.

Frame Measurement

Media frames can be measured using both qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches. Each comes with its set of pros and cons, because after all, “framing is an elusive concept to measure” (Maher, 2001, p. 84). The construction of meaning may be evident in manifest content, or buried deeply within the ideology of the journalists and the system in which they operate. Various ways of measuring frames can function as tools to expose this process of meaning construction. While quantifying frames by counting how many times they appear in a media text may be regarded as a more precise form of measurement,
frames can also be discerned using qualitative tools of analysis that don’t necessarily involve counting, but instead elaborate more on the construction of meaning by analyzing the use of narrative structure, language choices and visual cues.

Critical approaches that incorporate elements of visual interpretation can be helpful when trying to discern the larger ideological context of promoting hegemonic messages, especially when television coverage is examined. Stein (2001) effectively used critical, rhetorical and visual analysis in her reading of several episodes of 60 Minutes, to demonstrate how visual imagery, camera angles and editing choices elevate the status of the show’s anchors and promotes the dominant ideology of American liberal capitalism.

Frame measurement presents the challenge of going beyond manifest content and trying to discern what kinds of arguments, perspectives and frames are not apparent because they have been marginalized, trivialized or otherwise rendered irrelevant by the individual reporter as well as the ideological, organizational and extra-media influences that shape media content. This requires that the researcher should be in a position to recognize what was included, what was excluded and why. This approach to measurement is far more informative than the hackneyed categories of positive, negative and neutral. Ideology
is difficult though not impossible to quantitatively measure, but the issues are further explored when qualitative analysis is also included in the study. Mumby and Spitzack (1983) used critical, metaphoric analysis in their study of ideology in television news. Metaphors, in their view, structure experience and issues are linguistically framed by journalists constructing their views of reality.

Entman (1991) measured frames by closely examining the narrative structure and moral judgment of stories about two international case studies, the KAL and Air Iran incidents. He found that by focusing on adjectives, different frames emerged from texts about the incidents. The language used to tell the story of the Soviets shooting down the Korean airplane described the incident as an ‘outrage’ and ‘criminal evil’ that caused 269 deaths. But when the United States shot down an Iranian flight carrying almost 290 passengers who all died, it was framed as an accident, emphasizing America’s innocence. He also took into account the question of ‘who speaks’ in the news narratives, and classifies the sources into legitimate (American officials and experts of the political elite) and illegitimate sources (Iran, Libya and the Soviet Union). “News frames are constructed from and embodied in the keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and visual images emphasized in a news narrative. By providing, repeating and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference
some ideas and not others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so – and others entirely invisible.” (Entman, 1991, p. 7).

Qualitative, critical interpretive methods take into account implicit content and the ideological discourse in media texts. But, as Reese (2001) argues, there is the risk that patterns may not emerge from long-winded descriptions. While qualitative metaphorical analysis of content may be scrupulous and detailed, it doesn’t necessarily perform the functions of reducing a large amount of information into themes that are substantial and easily presented. However, that reduction may not necessarily be the only goal of framing research. Framing theorists are concerned with exploring the environment outside the reporter’s message, like ideological and organizational influences that may be difficult to quantify. The questions that are asked in a framing study are not only what, but how and why media coverage presents and/or ignores competing explanations of what factors are causing a political, economic or social problem, and what solutions might be possible. There are certain basic attributes of media coverage that are simple and relevant to quantify, like story topic, location, prominence in newscast and type of source. But when it comes to trying to understand how those elements contribute to the construction of a frame,
those measurements can seem superficial and are unlikely to provide a comprehensive picture of the framing process.

Cases have been made for a more systematic method of measuring frames, because such an approach would discourage the subjectivity of defining frames from an individual researcher's interpretation (Tankard, 2001). Tankard’s list of frames approach calls for explicit instructions in the design of a framing study, whereby each frame is defined by specific keywords, catchphrases and images. While he makes a valid argument for the importance of empirical validation via inter-coder reliability in content framing research, he also acknowledges that word counting may not be a sufficient method to employ if one is trying to understand the orientation and meaning of the text. This makes a stronger case for a multi-dimensional methodological approach.

This goal has been admirably achieved by Watkins (2001) in his framing analysis of the Million Man March. His sample of 12 network newscasts covering the march was coded for story length, placement as well as thematic and demographic characteristics of sources. This constituted his quantitative data, which was then supplemented by a critical, textual framing analysis which examined the dominant framing practices of problem definition, rhetorical devices and the use of sources and images.
It is misleading to assume that content analysis is objective because it requires more precise standards of measuring evidence. Content analysis emphasizes repetition as the main measurement of significance, while qualitative approaches like literary, rhetorical and textual analyses report patterns that indicate latent meaning (Hall, 1975). Gitlin’s approach to news analysis uses both methodological categories for content, as well as a closer analysis of examples that illustrate political significance.

“Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies rely on preliminary interrogations of the material, interrogations which proceed, at least implicitly, from ‘intuitive’ assumptions about what matters in the content, what needs to be either analyzed or counted.” (Gitlin, 1980 p.304).

Method: Close Reading

The epistemological position of this researcher is that there is no such thing as objectivity in social science methods, or in media discourse. Network newscast analysis should involve more sophisticated value judgments when trying to determine the relationship of source statements to ideological views. A qualitative approach is more conducive to achieving the particular research goals of this study and answering the
specific questions posed about the frames used to represent Arabs and Muslims.

Framing theory is in agreement with the assumptions of qualitative media research, namely that cultural symbols interact with journalists in the process of constructing meaning. Journalists construct rather than reflect reality and those symbolic acts are conducted in the public and social sphere (Pauly, 1991). The role of the researcher is also important in qualitative research projects, whereby the texts are analyzed by an interpretive subject, in this case, an Arab, Muslim female former journalist. This subjective interpretation allows for a more in-depth analysis of the frames that emerge in the texts which specifically address issues relating to the Middle East and Islam.

A ‘close reading’ is inspired by methods from studies that used discourse analysis, which in itself is a form of textual analysis. These methods are all tools which aid the interpretation of latent meanings in media content. A close reading of what discourse the source statements contributed to will look for the ideological assumptions embedded in the combination of words, pictures and visual information on network television. Discourse analysis assumes that news is a representation of events which endorses values which are structured in the linguistic choices that reporters make. Differences in representation are distinctions
between ideological positions (Fowler, 1991). Latent ideology and relationships of power can be identified by examining textual structures of news content.

“Discourse analysis specifically aims to show how the cognitive, social, historical, cultural or political contexts of language use and communication impinge on the contents, meanings, structures or strategies of text or dialogue.” (Van Dijk, 1991, p. 45).

In the examination of media texts, discourse analysis shows how social or political structures can be manifested, and how those texts contribute to legitimating elite power, particularly regarding racial or ethnic issues in the press. Discourse analysis is rooted in semiology, the study of how meanings are generated in media texts. Semiotic approaches to media content evaluate the encoded messages of journalists who generated the texts, which reveals their ideological assumptions. It is a study of how meaning is constructed, and how the functions of those meanings are signified. In terms of television, messages can be presented with particularly preferred meanings which reflect the ideology of the dominant class in society, and those messages can be interpreted differently according how they are received by members of the audience (Fiske & Hartley, 1978).

These tools of analysis, when used to describe and interpret the network newscasts will yield separate yet related discussions of the
pattern of frames that are manifest and latent in the structure of meaning. The construction of reality will be determined by examining the selection of story topics and sources, as well as analyzing how those statements relate to the ideological underpinnings of the political and military elite. These goals require diverse methods, and as the following section details, and an examination of the role sources play in the construction of ideological consent.

The Study of Reporters and their Sources

Normative views of the media stress their responsibility to effectively inform the public by including a wide range of voices and opinions on public policy. The democratic assumption upon which Altschull bases his mission of the American press is that media are supposed to be autonomous vessels of information functioning to provide independent information, free of constraints of power interests in order to help citizens make informed decisions on issues of national and international concern. But, as he argues,

“We fail to recognize that the news media are agencies of someone else’s power.” (Altschull, 1995, p. 5).
Journalists need to put facts in historical, political and social context so the public can make sense of current events, especially when those events involve expressions of rebellion against the status quo. But how well are journalists performing these normative functions?

History has shown that in the Gulf War, political elites confined political debates in the media over what was an appropriate way to punish Iraq. These elites achieved this objective within a narrow range of discourse (Bennet & Paletz, 1994). Punishing the terrorists that ignited another kind of war ten years later may have produced similar frames. Those who argue that the media are the vulnerable party being manipulated and spoon-fed by policymakers cite the Gulf War as a classic example (Hess, 1996, Kalb, 1994, Bennett & Paletz, 1994). During Desert Storm the media were tools used by a well-organized government public relations campaign. Without much protest, the media accepted the military’s restrictions and press-pooling, went along with the American side of the story while effectively marginalizing the Iraqi position as well as critiques of US policy. The public was fed images, statements, press releases and information received from the White House, Pentagon, State Department and other US and Allied sources. The news management effort by the Bush Administration proved so sophisticated that it overcame the initial reluctance from the public and Congress after winning over the
media and using them to reach out to the nation and eventually, the world, through the exploding commercial success of CNN and the reach of global satellites.

The Gulf War is just one outstanding case of numerous examples of American media blindly supporting US foreign policy. Zaller and Chiu (1996) use Bennett's concept of indexing to examine the way that reporters "rally around the flag" and follow foreign policies the US government adopts. Herman and Chomsky (1988) cite American media coverage of Latin America as further proof of this legitimization of US political hegemony and the framing of political groups as worthy or unworthy in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. When examining news coverage of the War on Terror, it is important to describe the range of voices and parameters of debate on national television, to determine how open network television is to the inclusion of critical, independent views.

Asking the question, "who speaks?" is crucial to understanding the scope of media discourse about terrorism, within the context of this case study. Sigal (1973) analyzed the Washington Post and New York Times for sources that they quoted, which were classified as official and private citizen sources, American, foreign, state and local. He found that most sources were the political elite of official sources, which dominated the
routine channels of newsgathering. Using officials as routine channels for newsgathering basically forms the mechanism for official dominance of national and foreign news in the elite press. However, Sigal’s study did not evaluate what the sources said.

“Officials in the U.S. government, as the most important sources of news in the eyes of the foreign and national staff at the Times and the Post, are in a position to exert considerable influence over news content. That content is largely determined by the flow of information between newsmen and their sources.” (Sigal, 1973, p. 60).

Different sources develop their own frames of an issue based on their ideological principles and institutionally specified roles (Pan & Kosicki, 2001). Therefore, sources, who they are and what they say, are key to measuring how ideology is reflected in the news, despite the objectivity that journalists invoke to assert that they do not allow ideology to permeate their coverage. When dissenting opinions on foreign policy are aired, Lee & Soloman (1991) argue that leaders and elites of non-U.S. countries are the ones who commonly get invited on the news to share their views, not members of popular American movements, whose positions are often cast as anti-American.

“The choice of official experts frames the debate in a biased manner. A U.S. audience is likely to be more receptive of American officials who are
pitted in debates against leaders of ‘enemy states’” (Lee & Solomon, 1991, p. 44).

An emphasis on sources is by no means intended to undermine the instrumental role played by the journalists themselves. They are key participants in the construction of the frames through their selection and emphasis of certain sources over others. Entman and Rojecki (1993) examined how reporters use framing judgments about the anti-nuclear movement that are then infused into the news. These judgments include evaluations of rationality, expertise, partisanship, public support, unity, extremism and power. These choices are influenced by elite sources and the journalist’s professional ideology. They define elites as the president, members of Congress, experts and executive branch officials. Their analysis revealed that criticism of elites was rare in the New York Times and Time magazine, and that the front page of the NYT was mostly a record of elite views of the marginalized movement.

To arrive at this conclusion, Entman and Rojecki used qualitative and quantitative measures of the frames constructed by official sources. Their findings were presented in tables representing overall trends, as well as quotes from the texts to provide specific detailed concrete examples of the choices and judgments made by journalists covering the nuclear freeze movement. But journalists’ decisions are constrained by
organizational influences and the routines of news making. For many reporters, an editor determines the assignment of a story, and there are newsroom policies as well as unspoken rules of the management structure.

Reese & Grant (1994) studied sources that appeared on network news and public affairs programs. They demonstrated how the range of discourse is delineated by the selection and salience of sources. Their structural analysis supports the "elite" model of how television reporters express their views through the emphasis on powerful sources. They found that television news depends heavily on Washington officials, experts and journalists themselves, who collectively contribute to the formation of public consent.

"By relying on a common and often narrow network of sources – newsmakers, experts and commentators the news media contribute to this systemic convergence on the conventional wisdom, the largely unquestioned consensus views held by journalists, power holders and many audience members." (p.85).

The main analytical limitation of their study is their focus on who was speaking without referring to how what they were saying influenced the consensus making process.

This shortcoming is addressed by Hutcheson, et al. in their content and rhetorical analysis of Time and Newsweek for five weeks after
September 11th. The authors found that not only did official elite government sources consistently emphasize American core values and themes of U.S. strength and power, the enemy was successfully demonized. Another important feature of the newsmagazine coverage was that nationalistic and patriotic themes were also emphasized by the average citizens that were quoted as sources, as well as the statements made by journalists themselves while weaving their stories (Hutcheson et al., 2002). Their method considered the source as the primary unit of analysis. The sources were divided into categories and then evaluated based on the presence of national identity related themes such as attribution of blame, treatment of the enemy, references to American values, strength, history and public sentiment. Indeed, it is an innovative methodological approach which includes demonstrative examples from the sources and journalists which added depth and insight that would be missing from a purely quantitative study.

An ambitious survey of network news conducted by FAIR measured the political party affiliation, race, gender and type of sources quoted on the three national networks evening news broadcasts for the entire year of 2001. Their findings indicate that in 2001, Washington’s elite politicians were the dominant sources of opinion on the network evening news, making up one in three Americans - and more than one in four of all
sources - who were quoted on all topics throughout the year (Howard, 2002). While the FAIR study provides a crucially important survey of how gender, political affiliation and race were distributed, it is difficult to make any sweeping conclusions about how those numbers relate to the manufacturing of consensus by the power elite because there is no analysis of what sources said.

Through a close reading of the discourse and meanings represented by sources, this research project aims to understand how reporters explained the historic events of September 11th to America. Close textual analysis of the television stories will hopefully yield a more comprehensive, critical assessment of how Arabs and Muslims were framed by these national media during a time of crisis.
Chapter 4: ISLAM ON NETWORK NEWS

After September 11th, 2001 academics and critics who spent their entire careers trying to downplay the activities of radical Islamic groups as a media stereotype afflicting the majority of peace-loving Muslims were abruptly faced with the reality that America had been attacked by Arab Muslims. The atrocities were carried out in the name of Islam, and in the minds of the hijackers, on behalf of all Muslims around the world. As the perpetrators’ identity and motives became evident, there was a collective cringe as Muslims realized that this was the nightmare scenario, they would now have to endure political and social hatred of their religious beliefs. Indeed, after 9/11, there was a significant backlash against Muslim communities in the United States, Europe, the former Soviet Union and Asia.

While the Muslim faith was under intense scrutiny in American media immediately after Sept. 11th, Islam’s image battle in the US was fought with the overwhelmingly strong support of civil rights leaders, the progressive left and Americans from all walks of life. There was a popular rejection of the demonization of Islam, which became more pronounced after the initiation of the official campaign to get along with Muslims. This campaign came straight from the White House, and the press quickly
followed suit with sympathetic stories condemning hate crimes. Anchors repeated official statements reminding the public not to discriminate against Arabs or Muslims. Network news after 9/11 represented a dichotomy of disapproving representation of Islam, along with stories that highlighted Islam as an integral part of American life. At the same time this campaign was being promoted, strong rhetoric was coming from the White House about going to war against terrorists, who seemed to be defined by reporters as anybody who threatens American interests. David Martin, CBS Pentagon correspondent said on September 15th, “This is a war against all terrorists who threaten American interests.”

This chapter aims to find out which aspects of Islam were highlighted or obscured within coverage of the religion both from within and outside the United States. There are competing frames within the coverage, where the Islam practiced in the US is legitimate while Islam outside the US is illegitimate. The coverage of internal (US-based) Islam is inclusive to other religions and the faith is mostly described as a religion of peace. On the other hand, external (non-US) coverage of Islam is associated with violence, suicide and Jihad. The nature of external Islam as practiced in Pakistan, Arab countries, Afghanistan and Iran is framed as violent while internal Islam is suspicious, but mostly peaceful and inclusive. This dichotomy of television coverage emerged as a reaction to
the internal and external events happening at the time. These included hate crimes against Muslims and non-Muslims in America, and at the same time increasing coverage of the anti-US sentiment in Muslim countries represented by public demonstrations and harsh reactions to the attacks coming from Muslims on the street in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. After Sept. 11th, coverage of Islam on network news closely resembled the stark divide that President Bush had defined shortly after the attacks: with us or against us. The Muslims living in the US were loyal to America, while the Muslims outside the US were opposed to its policies, particularly the imminent war with Afghanistan. Those external Muslims were therefore framed as against the US and thus, inherently violent. The following table summarizes the framing of Islam covered in this chapter, by delineating the representation according to the internal vs. external placement of Muslims.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Islam</th>
<th>Inherently Peaceful Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loyalty of American Muslims to the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity of Islam with Other Religions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Islam</th>
<th>Inherently Violent Faith</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associated with Suicides, Jihad &amp; Past Global Crises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disloyalty of non-American Muslims to the US</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Internal Islam: Within the US a Mainly Peaceful Religion

In the aftermath of September 11th, America was sharply divided on how to make sense of a religion that they had heard about for over 30 years on network news, mainly in a crisis-reporting context. Many mainstream columnists, who have traditionally been at odds with Arabs and Muslims, did not see any strategic value to being polite about religious inclusiveness after September 11th, and their views are notably absent from network news coverage, due to their general aversion to commentary reporting.

Islam was in the news everywhere from the opinion columns of the elite and populist American press as well as network television reports. There was some angry condemnation towards the politically correct efforts of the White House and Muslim moderates that were also trying to promote tolerance and point to systemic reasons behind the attacks. But most conservative views were not given significant airtime on network news during the first two weeks after the attacks. These more opinionated views were more likely to be found on the cable networks, where talking heads proliferated. However, the official frame of cooperating with Muslims was prominent on the networks, verbally and visually supported by reporters and anchors alike.
Despite the widespread campaign to promote the slogan ‘Islam is a religion of peace’, Islam was still occasionally disparaged on television by high-ranking officials from the Justice Department, Congress and Senate. These incidents were isolated for the most part, and did not represent the majority of official views. However, political correctness was not on Georgia Congressman Charles Norwood’s agenda, as he gave his vocal support to racial profiling of Muslim men, justifying his views with inaccuracies. He mistakenly blamed Arabs for the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Iran in 1979, and said the Taliban are almost universally made up of Arab men (Ibish, 2002). On September 17, 2001, Representative John Cooksey (R-LA) told Louisiana radio stations,

"If I see someone come in that's got a diaper on his head, and a fan belt wrapped around that diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over."

His public apology was aired by ABC later that week.

The commentary about Islam and the perceived threat it poses to American society extended to the religious right, and network television was the stage for evangelical Christian leaders like Rev. Jerry Falwell to voice their disapproval of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. This rasied heated discourse that was exploited and widely reported in the Middle East and beyond, further infuriating Muslim audiences. On 60 Minutes Rev. Falwell said, "I think Mohammed was a terrorist. I've read enough of
the history of his life written by both Muslims and non-Muslims, that he was a violent man, a man of war.” On NBC’s Nightly News, Rev. Franklin Graham proclaimed the stark divide between Islam and Christianity by separating the deity that Muslims and Christians worship.

“We're not attacking Islam, but Islam has attacked us. The God of Islam is not the same God. He's not the son of God of the Christian of Judeo-Christian faith. It's a different God and I believe it is a very evil and wicked religion” (Ibish, 2002).

It would be a distortion to claim that the above examples were the rule rather than the exception, but those who espoused extreme anti-Arab racist views had their say in mainstream media, even if they eventually retracted their statements. Apologies after the fact indicated that in American public discourse, it is becoming increasingly unacceptable to incite any type of ethnic or religious hatred. Racist statements like those made by several Christian evangelists fundamentally disrespect the guiding American values that normatively defend freedom of worship and racial equality. What is noteworthy is those who pointed this out seem to be doing so from a marginalized position, much like the few analysts featured on network newscasts whom asserted that unjust policies of the US in the Middle East were the root of the terrorism problem.

There was varied coverage of Islam in the weeks following the attacks, meaning that in the same newscast it was typical to find vastly
different representations of the religion, with the tone of coverage extending from acceptance and tolerance to disparaging and condescending as a reaction to the attacks. The primary concern for domestic coverage was the hate crimes, and these prompted a sympathetic view of Islam.

Response to Hate Crimes: Witch-Hunt Reporting & Sympathy to Muslims in America

Coverage of Muslim communities within the US prior to the attacks was not particularly high on the news agenda, with the possible exception of cities with concentrated Arab and Muslim populations like Detroit, Chicago and Los Angeles. But in the weeks following September 11th, there was a disturbing trend of hate crimes against American Muslims and non-Muslims of Southeast Asian descent that transformed that agenda. The victims were from diverse ethnic backgrounds including Arabs, Sikhs, African-Americans and Southeast Asians. The Bush administration reacted with strong condemnation by strongly denouncing the violent crimes happening all over the country. In the weeks after September 11th, network news frequently covered American Muslims, particularly after the president had directly related to their collective distress.
The Department of Justice was conducting the largest investigation of Islamic groups that the country had ever witnessed. Mosques, Islamic schools and Muslims were all under intense national scrutiny. Since the terrorists had successfully blended into American society, the hijackers had lived unnoticed by the authorities while they attended flight schools, rented houses and trained at gyms in Florida. Subsequently, Muslims all over the United States became potential suspects, and the retaliation from a small minority of deranged, angry militant Americans varied from murder to harassments and threats at school, work and home (Ibish, 2002).

Numerous government officials condemned the hate crimes that were sweeping the country. But, at the same time, law enforcement officers were telling America the enemy lives among them. CBS reported on the Saudi-born doctor, Badr Al Hazmi, who was arrested in San Antonio as a terror suspect, then released a few weeks later free of charges. The reinforced emphasis of the story was that suspects were everywhere and they were difficult to detect, even by the Muslim community itself.

Bob McNAMARA: Tension remains at the mosque Al-Hazmi attended. And if he was a terrorist mole in their midst, he masked it.

Mr. MOHAMMED CHOUDRAMY (Islamic Center): It's mind boggling, but you never can tell. And if he is one of them, we should prosecute him.
The Islamic Center representative clearly supports prosecution of terrorists, which was a trend supported by the majority of Muslims quoted by the networks in America. Following the attacks, American Muslims were not in a position to publicly object to racial or religious profiling, and thus they wanted to prevent further attacks by conforming to the national need for heightened security. Hussein Ibish of the American Arab Anti Discrimination Committee (ADC) was interviewed by CBS the weekend after the attacks and his sound bites were used in two different versions of the same story, which aired both on Saturday the 15th and Sunday the 16th. He was sympathetic towards the tense situation in the first story and warns against using perceptions of Arabs and Muslims that have accumulated in ‘our collective cultural imagination’ in the second.

WHITAKER (9/15/01): Fear of neighbors is making Americans think what just last week many found unthinkable.

Mr. WILLIAM COHEN (Former Secretary of Defense): Do we resort to racial or ethnic profiling, something that we have resisted and should resist very strongly in a democratic society?

WHITAKER: Surprisingly, major Arab American groups say they understand the intensified scrutiny.

Mr. HUSSEIN IBISH (Anti-Discrimination Committee): There needs to be a period of heightened forbearance and of patience. We're not going to be as sensitive as we might be under other circumstances.

WHITAKER (9/16/01): So far, Arab American groups say they understand increased scrutiny.

Unidentified Man 4: I'm American like anyone else, so I really don't think I'll take it in a bad way.
Mr. HUSSEIN IBISH (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee): And a reliance on our--our collective cultural imagination about what baddies look like, you know, is just going to get us into trouble.

In a personal interview with Ibish, he pointed to the fact that the weeks immediately following the attacks were extremely sensitive for Arab and Muslim communities as well as national organizations that represent them in the media. He said,

"In the instances when there were witch-hunt stories, there were a lot of reporters who deliberately fed into scare tactics with regard to this notion that Arab or Muslim communities are hotbeds for Al Qaeda terrorism. These people exist but the community isn’t full of them, as some of the extreme reporting suggests. But to give the journalists credit, they were trying to figure out a complex situation, and we can demonstrate that they were responsible" (Ibish, 2003).

In a September 13th NBC story, reporter Fred Francis quotes anonymous officials saying that the planning and support cells behind the terrorist attacks were for the most part US residents from Islamic nations. This statement is not misleading or far from the truth, but the danger is of all law-abiding Arab and Muslim citizens are being implicated by default, leading to the overall suspicion and public resentment of their communities. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the McCarthy era, when
communists were living in America, and while they may appear to be model citizens, they are in fact the enemy living in sleeper cells.

This witch-hunt type of reporting was inevitable due to the investigation, which revealed that the hijackers operated within the US, therefore to a large extent the hate crimes were probably a by-product of the terrorists’ planning, not the media’s reporting. Nevertheless, after the attacks, any Muslim or Arab was a potential suspect, cities with large Middle Eastern communities were combed for suspects, and activity around Islamic centers was closely monitored. This CBS report from September 20th reinforces suspicion of Jersey City Arab and Muslim residents, while providing the justification that earlier terrorist acts had been planned there by Islamic militants.

RANDALL PINKSTON While the ruins of the World Trade Center still smolder, investigators are following a familiar trail across the Hudson River. This is the heavily Muslim community of Jersey City where Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman masterminded the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Law enforcement experts are not surprised that terrorists may have again operated from here to finish the job they began eight years ago.

Mr. SKIP BRANDON (Former FBI Agent): It's certainly possible that people could have remained in--in the Jersey City area. For example, there's a Middle Eastern community there, language is not a problem. People can just kind of blend in.

In an earlier CBS story, which aired on the 17th, questioned whether Arab grocery stores or mosques could be contributing funds to Islamic militants. Even though the expert interviewed doubted that possibility, the
moral at the end of the story is that regardless of whether they provide funding or not, they are still suspicious.

AXELROD: Actually, suspicion moved to this neighborhood years ago, here where Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman operated a store-front mosque, the cleric convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. The kind of suspicion that creates a question: Could these mosques and Arab groceries play any part in funding terror?

Unidentified Man 2: How much they collect every week? Millions? Look for the million and the million and the million overseas could bring it to the terrorism.

AXELROD: The money's overseas?

Unidentified Man 2: The money's overseas.

Ms. JULIETTE KAYYEM (Terrorism Expert): I think he is right.

AXELROD: Juliette Kayyem, a former member of the National Commission on Terrorism, says plenty of terrorists could be living in places like Jersey City and contributing locally, but most of the money comes from elsewhere.

Ms. KAYYEM: The kind of money we're talking about to sustain the kind of terrorist enterprise out there is more than the quarters put in a mosque collecting dish.

AXELROD: Perhaps. But chances are that won't chase away the fear in this neighborhood, nor the suspicion. Jim Axelrod, CBS News, Jersey City.

In the above story, the expert tries to alleviate suspicion of Muslim communities, but at the end of the story, fear and suspicion of Muslims remains. Many Muslim-owned businesses were regarded as suspect, and when the FBI arrested people working at InfoCom, a Dallas based technology company, which had ties to the Holy Land Foundation, Muslim charity funds became associated with funding suicide bombings. This affected Islamic charities within the US who do not overtly support violence but appeal to Arabs and Muslims living in America to donate
money, toys and clothing to children around the world. After 9/11, charity, one of the five pillars of Islam, was a suspect activity if the cause was not determined to be legitimate by the US authorities.

Another CBS story, filed by Bill Whitaker from Los Angeles on Sunday, September 16th also encapsulates the mistrust that had overcome many Americans about Muslims and Arabs as terror suspects, emphasizing that neighbors could be the enemy. While the overwhelming majority of Americans showed compassion and support for the Muslim and Arab communities in their midst, there was an angry minority who acted upon this information, and took their own preemptive action, as Whitaker reports.


Mr. MUSTAfA NAZARY (Hate Crime Victim): You could just see people talking about--watch for your neighbors right now. Your Afghan neighbor might be the next hijacker.

WHITAKER: Here in Los Angeles, a Syrian American store is sprayed with gunfire. In Seattle, mosques are vandalized and Muslims threatened.

Unidentified Man 1 (From radio broadcast) I think we have accepted traitors into our midst.

WHITAKER: As the FBI searches for more Muslim terrorists, many Americans are growing fearful of anyone who resembles the enemy. At the San Diego apartments where two of the hijackers lived, hiding in plain sight, behavior common in diverse California now is suspicious.

Unidentified Woman: They didn't talk English at all around us.

Unidentified Teen: Your next-door neighbor could be anything.
While the above report chronicled the hate crimes, the focus was more on the anger within American society that was targeting Muslim victims. There was little mention of the Americans that thought hate crimes against Muslims were unacceptable. That assumption was built-in to the frame of the story. While there are aspects of the witch-hunt in those stories, it reveals an overall sympathetic view of the way Muslims were being treated after the attacks, which was repeated several times during the first weeks after the attacks.

As this next ABC report demonstrates, the internal coverage of Islam within the US was more inclusive towards Muslim women than the external stories. The use of Muslim women as primary sources was mainly confined to Muslim women that embraced the values of the US. The female perspective is systematically neglected in the coverage analyzed in this study, and this example is clearly a welcome exception to this rule. In the following story, which aired on September 20th, the fact that Muslims perished in the World Trade Center was the highlight of the story. In addition to including women as sources, the story made it clear that Islam does not condone violence, and it also condemned the hate crimes that were spreading across the country. Tom Brokaw introduces Jim Avila’s story by referring to the hate crimes as ‘one of the ugliest homegrown legacies of this crisis’.
AVILA: Tom, those two buildings truly were World Trade Centers. More than 1700 workers of Islamic heritage, Muslims, now victims of both hate and terror. Brooklyn's Atlantic Avenue where New York's Arab-Americans look east to Mecca and west to Manhattan's gutted southern tip; terrorism at the hands of suspected Islamic extremists most Muslims neither condone nor understand.

Ms. SHEKAIBA WAKILI (Women for Afghan Women): It doesn't say anywhere in Islam to go blow up 5,000 innocent people.

AVILA: Signs posted today offering help for Muslims afraid to leave their homes because of hate crimes. The Justice Department reports 55 open investigations, including allegations of three murders, arson, shootings and vandalism.

Ms. FARIBA NAWA: (Reading) I'm hiding in my house in the heart of an Arab neighborhood in Brooklyn.

AVILA: Fariba Nawa, an Afghan-American student, wrote an essay about her fears, feeling under attack by terrorists and Americans.

Ms. NAWA: We unite as Americans, but that's the dark side of unity. We sort of need a face and a group to hate.

AVILA: How bad is it? Congressman John Cooksey, Republican from Louisiana, apologized today for this remark.

Republican JOHN COOKSEY (Republican, Louisiana): (On radio) If I see someone that comes in that's got a diaper on his head and a fan belt around his diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over and checked.

AVILA: And Muslims are not just hate victims. Nearly a thousand are among the dead and missing.

Ms. TAHiRA KANN (Taimour Kahn's Mother): I'm a mother and I'm suffering very much.

AVILA: Taimour Kahn, 29-year-old Pakistani-American bond trader, still missing from his 92nd-floor office at the World Trade Center.

Ms. KAHN: This is a time of pain and sorrow and hurt for America, not only the ones who have lost, but for everyone else.

AVILA: In Boston, Rahma Salie and her husband, Michael, confirmed dead, passengers aboard hijacked American Airlines Flight 11. She was seven months pregnant.

Ms. HALEEMA SALIE (Rahma Salie's Mother): I would like everyone to know that she was a Muslim--she is a Muslim--and we are victims, too, of this tragic incident.

AVILA: Here at the rescue and recovery center, at the site itself, we've seen both the best of America, and now because of hate, begin to see some of the worst.
The network news anchors fully endorsed what the officials were saying about the need for public calm, and to prevent hate crimes from spreading. On September 11th, on the 6:00 newscast, ABC broadcast a live press conference with New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, who immediately began warning the public not to display anger or hatred towards Muslim and Arab communities.

Giuliani: A tragedy like this instills lots of feelings of anger and hatred. And I'd ask the people of this city not to have those feelings right now or ever. I mean, the reality is that hatred and insanity and prejudice caused this situation, probably, and we have a lot of people in this city of all different backgrounds and all diverse religions. And they're not responsible for this.

Later in the same newscast, Peter Jennings reiterates Giuliani’s message, reaffirming that hate crimes were unacceptable, and that New Yorkers should not resort to violence and racism. It was a message that Jennings in particular repeated throughout the week.

JENNINGS (9/11/01): He's [Giuliani] urged people in New York City tonight not to feel any hate and anger. He said that prejudice actually caused this and he went on to say the United States government will find out what happened. But now it is up to the people of New York City to put their best on, behave like New Yorkers.

DEAN REYNOLDS (9/12/01): Elected officials across the country continue to call for calm and some, including Illinois Governor George Ryan are warning people not to take matters into their own hands. Ryan issued that warning in light of reports that several mosques in this area have received threatening phone calls. Dean Reynolds, ABC News, Chicago.

JENNINGS: Thank you Dean. As the mayor of New York said there's no accounting for prejudice and bigotry at a time like this, and people's passions have boiled over and so has their prejudice and bigotry on occasion. And that, mayor, mayor of Chicago, local and state officials all across the country have quite sensibly reminded people that terrorism is not automatically associated with Islam.
JENNINGS (9/13/01): From many public officials today, including the president, we have heard, 'Be respectful of your fellow citizens from the Middle East and from South Asia.' They are the ones under the greatest pressure. They're the ones who have had difficulty in the country today. Now, any number of officials have asked the country to shape up.

ABC Washington reporter John Donvan showed that the Arab and Muslim community in the capital city were concerned American citizens who are suffering along with everyone else in the wounded nation. He used the powerful images of blood donation, Muslims carrying American flags and expressing their patriotism, and the overall frame of the story was that the kind of hatred and bigotry expressed by people who wanted revenge against Arab and Muslim communities is unacceptable.

DONVAN: In fact, Muslims have been giving blood, along with everyone else these last two days. And presumably, Americans who are Muslims will be burying family members side by side with fellow Americans who went to work yesterday and died like everyone else as victims of terrorism.

DONVAN And then there are some of the postings to our own ABC News message board: "The Muslims are a bunch of savages that should be nuked off the face of the earth." "The Islamic way of life, their nations, their culture must be eradicated." "We should deport them and make it illegal for Arabs to live here until terrorism is completely eliminated." And if you're an American who is a Muslim, or see anyone of Middle Eastern appearance, how are you supposed to feel? Osama Sablani edits that Detroit newspaper.

SABLANI We are part of America and we are part of the victims, not of the perpetrators.

NBC covered the hate crimes throughout the first two weeks by humanizing the fear in Muslim communities through highlighting their allegiance to the American flag. In Chicago, a young Muslim girl is shown cowering from the public, and a Muslim cab driver waves an American
flag. These images visually explain that Muslims who are part of America should not be harmed. As long as the Muslims conform to the American way of life, they should be protected and treated with dignity and humanity. On the other hand, the visuals of violent, gun-carrying Muslims do not evoke any sympathy, which is how television news distinguishes between the cultural understanding of these two distinct groups of Muslims. The images of violence were reserved for the external Muslims, those who do not live in America and express no allegiance to its flag. On the contrary, external Muslims were shown burning the American flag. But Muslims in America were clearly framed as victims of violence.

ROGER O'NEIL (NBC 9/13/01): In suburban Chicago, police broke up an angry mob of 300 outside a Mosque. Today, 14-year-old Alia Suliman hides behind closed curtains and locked doors. She saw those ugly Americans.

Ms. ALIA SULIMAN: I was scared they were going to hit me with the flag pole, beat me with my own flag.

NEAL KARLINSKY (ABC 9/14/01) This man is the leader of a mosque that has received anti-Arab threats all week and was attacked by a man threatening arson last night.

UNIDENTIFIED MAN: I am a Muslim. I am American. I love America. God bless America.

DAN LOTHIAN (9/17): There are more than six million Muslims in this country, about half of them of Arab descent. The president himself has condemned bigotry, and his administration is vowing to prosecute those who take their anger out on innocent people like the Aburia family, who share the same soil with their fellow Americans, pledge allegiance to the same flag and feel the same sorrow.

Mr. ABURIA: We are like, you know, a normal family--American family. We're being shocked.

LOTHIAN: Yet still under suspicion because of their faith. Dan Lothian, NBC News.
The framing of the story reiterated at the end of Lothian’s report is still that Muslims are still considered suspects because of their faith and the focus of the story is on the love that internal Muslims have for America. This type of reporting may appear to absolve network reporting from its witch-hunt stories, especially since they also included stories from the Arab and Muslim point of view. In an report that aired on the 17th, Lothian ends with a different framing of the story: Arabs and Muslims in America are afraid.

TOM BROKAW: Just as the attack has brought out the best in this country, it has also unleashed some of the worst. Hate crimes against Arabs, Muslims or people mistaken for them are on the rise across the country. An ugly development that President Bush today spoke out against. More on that story now from NBC's Dan Lothian.

DAN LOTHIAN: For some Americans, anger turning to hate. The ugly face of vengeance; Muslims and Arab Americans the latest victims of last week's attack.

Unidentified Man 1: By any standards this is a terrorist act.

LOTHIAN: In Mesa, Arizona, an Indian immigrant gunned down outside his gas station. Targeted, authorities say, because of his race.

Unidentified Man 2: He just walked up to--walked up to the fellow that was shot and killed and put the gun in his back and fired.

LOTHIAN: South of Cleveland, Ohio, the target this time a mosque. A 29-year-old suspect, allegedly driven by hate, plows his car at 80 miles an hour through the building’s entrance; $100,000 damage there. And in Houston, Texas, a Pakistani Muslim gets threats.

Mr. NICK RIAZ (Hate Crime Victim): "The way you burn us, I'm going to burn you. And I'm going to burn your place."

LOTHIAN: Then someone apparently delivers, setting a fire that gutted his auto and tire shop. Since Tuesday's attacks, the FBI reports 40 hate crimes; suspected retaliation, including two deaths. And there have been thousands of complaints of harassment against Muslims and Arab-Americans. Law enforcement vows to aggressively attack offenders.
Mr. ROBERT MUELLER (FBI Director): Vigilante attacks and threats against Arab-Americans will not be tolerated.

LOTHIAN: A Web site and phone hotline now in place at the US Commission on Civil Rights to track complaints. In Chicago today, this cab driver waving his flag.

Mr. SYED MANNAN (Chicago Cab Driver): I’m part of the people, same like they are. We are—we are human beings.

LOTHIAN: But some of his Arab colleagues too afraid to work. As many as 30 percent of them in the city staying home.

The terrorist attacks have united much of America, but some Arab-Americans are feeling left out, fearful they could become the next target if misguided anger. Dan Lothian, NBC News, Chicago.

The language choices used by both NBC and ABC are of particular interest, and they point to an underlying assumption in their reporting, i.e. Americans cannot be referred to as terrorists. The journalists called the people committing the hate crimes vigilantes, in other words, members of a self-appointed group for keeping order. These angry Americans were terrorizing Arab and Muslim communities across the nation, yet they were not described as terrorists. If a self-appointed group of Arabs were opening fire at businesses, firebombing churches, harassing and looting people all over the US, they could easily be referred to as terrorists. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of attention devoted to the hate crimes, and despite these linguistic issues, there was sympathy for the hate crime victims on network news.

PETER JENNINGS: This is a difficult time for Americans of Middle Eastern descent; Muslims and Christians and many others from east of the Mediterranean, too. That is
why many political leaders have gone out of their way to emphasize that bigotry has no place in American life. Here's ABC's Dan Harris.

DAN HARRIS: Across the country, vigilantes have been targeting mosques. They marched on a mosque outside Chicago, firebombed one in Texas and threw blood on another in San Francisco. Early this morning, a man drove his car through the front door of a mosque in Cleveland. Now, police say the vigilantes are also apparently targeting people. In Dallas Saturday night, a Pakistani/Muslim store owner was shot. Concerned about the apparent backlash, President Bush today visited an Islamic center.

BUSH That should not and will not stand in America.

HARRIS Leading Muslims, including Muhammad Ali who issued a written statement today, say Americans should know that Islam is a "religion of peace."

NIHAD AWAD, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS The hard work that we have been doing for the past years to build bridges of understanding are being bombed now with hysteria.

HARRIS The harassment is not only directed at Muslims but also at Sikhs. Their turbans and beards apparently remind some of Osama bin Laden. But Sikhs are neither Muslim nor Arab. Sikhs and Muslims say the problem isn't only vigilantes but also police, who they say are engaging in racial profiling. Cher Sing says he was targeted by police on board a train in Rhode Island because of his looks.

SING Americans are hurting Americans.

ROBERT MUELLER, FBI DIRECTOR We have not, will not target people based solely on their ethnicity, period.

HARRIS It has been argued that under the current circumstances, a measure of racial profiling is inevitable. Muslims and Sikhs say violating civil liberties in pursuit of justice robs us of both. Dan Harris, ABC News, New York.

As demonstrated above, there were sympathetic stories about the scrutiny that the communities were under, and many stories of their suffering due to hate crimes. But these types of stories turn into morality plays for the viewer, in which they are supposed to get the moral of the story at the end. One set of concerns is about the terrorists in ‘our’ midst,
these make good stories, the other set of concerns involve hate crimes. It is inevitable that these two topics would be covered, given the structure if news organizations, the nature of the profession, and the ideology of news, which prefers ‘good stories’. Both the witch-hunt and the hate crimes qualified as good stories. The level of suspicion created by the media was balanced out by the fact that the view from Arabs and Muslims was adequately represented. This framing became far more pronounced following President Bush’s efforts to soften the blow of hate crimes. As reported by the networks, the President's reaction aimed to restore internal harmony between American Muslims and the rest of American society, and appease external Muslim allies.

**Internal & External Placating of Muslims:**

**Islam as a Peaceful, Inclusive Religion**

The major problem with media coverage of Islam before 9/11 was the association of the religion with its more radical followers, thus marginalizing or excluding voices advocating tolerance. But after the attacks in New York and Washington, America wanted to make amends with the internal and external Muslim communities whose support was crucial to the military campaign that was about to begin in Afghanistan.
Muslim allies were a key strategic necessity for the US, not only to maintain the loyalties of Muslim countries in Central Asia, but also in the Arab world, where tensions were mounting against America for its complacency towards the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Friday Sept. 14th, 2001 was declared by President Bush as a national day of prayer. CBS Evening News opens with the story of President Bush’s public gesture of religious goodwill. Chief White House correspondent John Roberts describes how the president expressed the grief and anguish of a stunned nation from the National Cathedral in Washington. The report credits the White House with insisting that the service should include diverse denominations and faiths, and Roberts contextualizes the event by pointing out that Bush's implicit message was that America and the rest of the world was touched by this tragedy. A representative from the Islamic Society of North America, Mr. Imam Muzammil Siddiqi, is shown on camera offering his prayers. “Keep our country strong for the sake of the good and righteousness, and protect us, our Lord, from all evil,” he says in front of a national audience, thereby communicating that Muslims were also feeling the pain and loss that America shared.
Sunday the 16\textsuperscript{th} was also a national day of prayer. CBS's John Roberts describes Bush's speech at the mosque as a religious sermon, and the metaphor used here alludes to the president as a religious authority.

Roberts: Mr. Bush also moved today to address a series of troubling bias crimes across the country since last Tuesday, visiting a local mosque in Washington preaching the gospel of tolerance and unity.

Pres. BUSH: Those who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens to take out their anger don't represent the best of America. They represent the worst of humankind.

The Bush administration repeated public demonstrations of religious unity, as exemplified by his speech at the Islamic Center of Greater DC on September 17\textsuperscript{th}, 2001.

“We don't view this as a war of religion in any way, shape or form. As a matter of fact, Islam preaches peace. The Muslim faith is a peaceful faith. And there are millions of good Americans who practice the Muslim faith who love their country as much as I love the country, who salute the flag as strongly as I salute the flag. For those who try to pit religion against religion, our great nation will stand up and reject that kind of thought. We're gonna lead the world to fight for freedom, and we'll have Muslim and Jew and Christian side by side with us.”

There was a conscious effort among public religious figures to include Islam in the interfaith ceremonies that were held to honor the victims of 9/11. On Sunday, Sept. 23\textsuperscript{rd}, Colin Powell appeared on Meet the Press (NBC) and stressed that the terrorists were distorting their own faith.
MR. RUSSERT: Before you go, why do they hate us so much? And how do we offer those young Muslim boys and girls around the world a competing destiny that says, "America is not bad. Our capitalist system is not bad. Christianity and Judaism is not bad." Because the leaders of Osama bin Laden's group are fueling within them this rabid hate for our country and our way of life.

SEC'Y POWELL: For reasons that are very complex, they hate our value system. They hate our presence in parts of the world that they think we should not be in. But let me make this point: Go to any American city and you will find many proud American Muslims, proud American Muslims who came to this country because they wanted to be a part of this society, who came to this country for the opportunities we presented, who came to this country proud of their Muslim heritage but at the same time wanting to be an American, just as my parents came to this country and your grandparents came to this country. And so while we are looking at the Muslims who, through a false application of their faith, are doing this, let's look at those Muslims who understand the power of the democratic system, who understand the power of the free enterprise system, and let's celebrate the Muslims who have come to this country to become Americans and to share in the values of this nation.

This inclusion in religious ceremonies was highlighted in several reports. Muslim moderates were reaching out to members of other faiths and making their point that Islam also condemns senseless violence and targeting of civilians. Heavyweight boxing champion Mohammed Ali issued a public statement condemning the attacks and stressing that Islam was a peaceful religion.

BROKAW: Muhammad Ali may be our best-known Muslim man in this country, and he sent me a note the other day saying that he condemned these attacks, and if these people were acting in the name of Islam, he said they have a very twisted idea of what Islam is all about.

Prayer was for all religious denominations that particular week, and there were frequent references to the prayer services. The networks stressed that Muslims shared in the sorrow and grief of the tragedy.

DAN HARRIS (ABC) However, many religious leaders told their flocks this is a time for sorrow not hate. At the Crystal Cathedral in Los Angeles, a local Muslim leader was invited to speak to the congregation.

SAYED MOUSTAFA AL-QUAZWINI, ISLAMIC EDUCATION CENTER OF ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA I came here on behalf of the positive believers in the Islamic
faith to share the sorrow, the pain, and the anguish with our brothers and sisters in the Christian faith.

NORAH O’DONNELL (NBC): Tens of thousands came together, making this ballpark a cathedral, temple, a mosque. While tears were shed here, the message: a pledge to rebuild the city’s skyline and to repair the nation’s sense of safety, damaged by the assault. Faiths standing together, Catholic, Jewish, Sheikh, Muslim, Greek Orthodox, offering shared prayers.

From Muslim-Americans, public sorrow that suspected terrorists would claim their religion.

Unidentified Man: We condemn them and their acts, their cowardly acts.

DAN HARRIS (ABC) In a stadium filled with anguish, prayers were offered by Catholics, Muslims, Sikhs and Jews.

RABBI ARTHUR SCHNEIER, PARK EAST SYNAGOGUE We saw terrorism bring the World Trade Center to ground zero, but we saw heroism bring ground zero into the heavens.

RON ALLEN (NBC-ISLAMABAD) Throughout the Muslim world, prayers for unity. Many worshipers condemning terrorism, insisting Islam is a religion of peace and fearful of widespread suffering if America punishes Afghanistan.

Unidentified Man: Yes, we are concerned. We are concerned because there are innocent people, understand there’s innocent people there.

BILL BLAKEMORE (ABC) The different races of America, Nathan Backster is the dean of the National Cathedral.

BLAKEMORE There was unity among religions, the Muslim...

1ST MAN If any who seek for glory and power, to God belong all glory and power, to him mound all words of purity. He exalts all righteous deeds. But those that lay—that lay the blocks of evil, for them is the finality terrible, and the plotting of such shall not abide. Goodness and evil are not equal. (Unintelligible)...evil with the good.

BLAKEMORE...and the Jew.

2ND MAN We, as Americans, reaffirm our faith and our hope that security and peace will be fully restored in our country.

DAN HARRIS (ABC): Leading Muslims, including Muhammad Ali who issued a written statement today, say Americans should know that Islam is a "religion of peace."
The rationale behind this peaceful, inclusive framing was briefly mentioned by CBS’s Allen Pizzey, reporting from Islamabad, who reminds the audience on September 18th that appeasing Muslims is strategically important because of the cooperation necessary from Muslim countries. President Bush couldn’t afford to alienate allies that he would need to fight a war in Afghanistan, and his religious rhetoric was offending Muslim countries. The State Department quickly realized the language Bush was using was inflammatory. The word ‘crusade’ translates as Campaign of the Cross in Arabic, which evokes images of the historic Crusades, and Western perceptions of Islam during this period of history. On September 16th, CBS reported on Bush’s crusade against the terrorists.

BILL PLANTE: Mr. Bush also said bin Laden’s organization thrived in many countries, but that leaders in Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia had all offered their support, calling what happened in New York and Washington a new kind of evil the president promised to crusade to stamp it out.

Pres. BUSH: We’ve never seen this kind of evil before, but the evildoers have never seen the American people in action before either and they’re about to find out.

The President was disseminating mixed messages, while on the one hand he wanted the world to know that Islam was a religion of peace, at the same time he was making statements that threatened any challengers to the United States and its interests. Secretary of State Colin Powell was interviewed on Al Jazeera the same day to correct the President’s inflammatory choice of words and make the message more
palatable. The Islamic world, according to Powell and reinforced by Pizzey, was just getting the wrong idea. It was a perilous misunderstanding between two cultures, neither of which had exerted any tangible effort to understand each other.

PIZZEY: A dangerous example of misunderstanding was President Bush's reference to the hunt for bin Laden as a 'crusade.' The concept so incenses Muslims that a cleric here warned that Pakistanis might launch their own jihad against America. Secretary of State Colin Powell went on an Arabic TV network to do damage control.

Secretary COLIN POWELL (State Department): (From Al Jazeera satellite) The best description of what we're doing is to launch a campaign--a campaign that everybody can be a part of.

PIZZEY: Placating Muslims is essential if American troops use Pakistan as a staging post.

Here we see the journalist putting Secretary Powell's words into context, boiling them down to the core of the message: Bush was being cautious in his approach to the Muslim governments and people in Pakistan and Afghanistan, in order to smooth over relations before the war in Afghanistan. As this next CBS report explains, Bush was simply trying to avoid a religious war and ‘clash of civilizations’.

JOHN ROBERTS: At every opportunity, the president has moved to blunt what national security experts say is an attempt by the terrorists to ignite a religious war.

Mr. JIM STEINBERG (Former Deputy National Security Advisor): From their point of view, the best thing that could happen is in--in our response is somehow for us to allow this to become converted into a clash of civilizations. That need not happen.
Another attempt to appease the offended Muslims was calling the first plan of attack in Afghanistan ‘Operation Infinite Justice’. The use of such catchy logos for military missions in the Middle East has been around for decades. However, this particular slogan was not a good choice, since American diplomats in Southeast Asia and the Arab world were busy trying to gain Muslim allies for the war on terror. The networks made it a point to mention that Muslims believe infinite justice comes only from God, but failed to mention that this belief is also shared by Christianity and Judaism.

CBS 9/20  DAVID MARTIN: This operation was to have been called Infinite Justice, but that's being reconsidered now that US officials have been told it offends Muslims who believe Allah is the only one who can dispense infinite justice.  Dan.

NBC 9/24TOM BROKAW: At the same time, military planners at the Pentagon continue their buildup, all the while monitoring the developments in Afghanistan. They're now calling it Operation Enduring Freedom, dropping Infinite Justice because Muslims believe only Allah is capable of delivering that.

NBC 9/20 TOM BROKAW: At the Pentagon, they have now dropped the name Operation Infinite Justice for this military attack. Muslims believe that only Allah is capable of providing infinite justice, and Washington is determined not to offend the millions of law-abiding faithful Muslims.

There was determination, in the Bush administration discourse, to win support for its military campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq, as the next chapter discusses. Muslim sensibilities were acknowledged, albeit after the fact, but there was a clear reference to ‘millions of law-abiding faithful Muslims’ whose approval of President Bush’s policies was the key to military success. Changing the name of the mission did not change its
objectives, which Muslims were concerned about. It was eventually called Operation Enduring Freedom, alluding to America’s fight to defend and protect its freedoms, a frame firmly cast by high-ranking officials as they explained why America was going to war in Afghanistan.

The stories that adopt the frame of Islam as a religion of peace seem to be conveying the message that Islam can get along with the West and patriotic Muslims deserve the same treatment as everyone else in America. There are prominent Muslim Americans, like Mohammed Ali, whose public words defending Islam could have significant impact on Americans, due to his well-known national and international status as a highly respected heavyweight champion. President Bush publicly denounced prejudice against Islam, and reporters followed his strategy to placate Muslims in exchange for political, intelligence and military support. This strategy might have remained implicit, but it was openly discussed and commended by a few network journalists, thus demonstrating that network reporters can occasionally cut through public relations efforts and spell out what the nation’s leadership was really trying to achieve.

This frame of Islam as a religion of peace was present alongside the representation of Islam as a violent threat. It is important to note that the representation of Islam on network news following the 9/11 attacks is not monolithic. There is a spectrum of frames and representations,
ranging from peaceful to violent. Only a nuanced, detailed study of the
different depictions reveals this complexity of interpretations. The
overriding observation remains that there is a striking difference in the way
that Muslims who live in the US are framed as those who are 'with us' and
those living outside the US are 'against us.' There is no doubt that
President Bush wanted to deflect further internal and external conflict by
publicizing his message that Islam was a peaceful religion. There is an
inherent tension between the messages disseminated by the White
House, and this tension was conveyed in network news reports. The
networks closely followed official guidelines by reflecting official frames of
Islam in their coverage, while at the same time promoting messages of
peace and tolerance to internal Muslim communities after they
experienced discrimination. The next section discusses the framing of
mainly external Muslims, which is on the other end of the spectrum as the
peaceful representations reserved for Muslims that are loyal to the US.
Despite the peaceful unifying frames, the analysis would not be complete
without analyzing certain aspects of Islam that were highlighted by
network news, but mostly used to describe external Muslim communities.
One of the problems that persisted after September 11th was that network news categorized political grievances as Muslim crises. This is consistent with previous findings that Islam is a religion associated with violence and bloodshed. One of the most prominent examples of this type of framing occurred on Monday, Sept. 17th. CBS News broadcast a story about hate crimes in the US, questioning whether racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims was appropriate. Reporter Bill Whitaker reminded the audience,

"Muslims are fighting 30 years cast as America's bad guys, from the Munich Olympics to the Iran hostage crisis, Pan Am Flight 103, the Gulf War, the embassy bombings and now this, leaving a growing number of Americans saying forget political correctness."

As he is saying this, a graphic appears on the screen, giving an historical perspective of the crises associated with Muslims, even though the examples cited were about completely different political agendas. Palestinian self-determination, the presence of US troops in the Arabian Gulf, and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein are all cited as examples of Muslims as the enemy. The graphic provides a distorted frame through which to view terrorist acts with a much more diverse political range of objectives than sheer defense of the Islamic religion. The problem with
casting these events in a reductive frame, which is defined by the title of the graphic, is that it obscures the wide spectrum of terrorism that did not qualify as Muslim crises. Instead, they represent a pattern of political and economic protest of US policies in the region, from all over the Middle East, with varying levels of violence, provoked by distinct reasons.

MUSLIM CRISES
1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS
1973 OIL EMBARGO
1979 IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS
1983 MARINE BARRACKS IN BEIRUT
1985 TWA HIJACKING IN BEIRUT
1985 CRUISE SHIP ACHILLE LAURO
1988 PAN AM FLIGHT 103
1991 GULF WAR
1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING
1998 EMBASSY BOMBINGS
2000 U.S.S. COLE
2001 WTC & PENTAGON ATTACK

At least four of these incidents were directly related to the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. The Munich Olympics, the Achille Lauro ship, the Beirut hijacking and the killing of US troops in Beirut were not acts that explicitly exploited religion as justification for their terrorism. They were deplorable crimes committed to attract international attention to the plight of Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. To group such diverse issues together could mislead the audience to believe that these events are somehow connected into a web of hatred towards the United States. What all of these events have in common with the
exception of the Gulf War and the Iran hostage crisis is that they were acts of protest against America’s strong alliance with Israel and its disregard of Palestinian rights. Categorizing these events as Muslim crises further exacerbates the divide between America and the Islamic global community. It erroneously equates Islam with political violence and attacks against innocent civilians, which leads to what Said refers to as, “engendering more fear and less knowledge about Islam.” (Said, 1997 p. 43). This graphic could arguably lead to the impression that Muslims are out to get America, and they have been at it a long time. In this reductive representation, Islam and its adherents are framed as terrorist deviants; Muslims are inevitably part of the ongoing political crisis. This representation is in stark contrast to the internal peaceful representation of the faith.

In certain network stories that were meant to be inclusive and sensitive to Muslims, there are also factual errors about Muslims; information that is distorted to generalize Muslim hatred for the West. In an NBC story about Arab-Americans and Muslims in America that aired on September 23rd, 2001, Dan Lothian correctly informs the audience that there are more than six million Muslims in America, but erroneously states that about half of them are of 'Arab descent'. According to the both State Department figures and the Council on American-Islamic Relations,
there are roughly 6-8 million Muslims in America, but in both estimates, no more than 25% of those Muslims are Arab.

“At the average mosque, 33 percent of members are of South Asian origin (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc.), 30 percent are African-American, and 25 percent are from the Arabic-speaking world. On average nearly 30 percent of mosque participants are converts. The average mosque has 16 conversions per year.” (CAIR, 2002)

The NBC reporter, in his commendable effort to educate his viewers about Islam in America and raise awareness of the hate crimes against them, didn't get the facts right, thus sacrificing accuracy. Since network newsrooms are probably devoid of editors who would have known that statistic was wrong, it aired as the truth. One of every two Muslims is an Arab is a very different statement from one of every four Muslims is an Arab. The reason this misrepresentation of the facts is serious is because it further perpetuates the confusion in American culture about Muslims and Arabs. Muslims who originally hail from Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Nigeria and the Philippines do not identify themselves as Arab, but because of their appearance or dress, may easily be mistaken for Arabs, and these are the majority of Muslims living in America.
External Muslim Violence & Jihad

After the September 11th attacks, Islam received significant media attention, once the religious affiliation of the hijackers became public knowledge. But this attention was neither detailed nor independent from the official Washington view. The White House crafted the frames for reporters to follow, and the 'Islam as a religion of peace' frame was not the only one publicized by American administration officials. The threat from Muslim radicals was also emphasized, but it was done in a more episodic rather than thematic format, to borrow Entman's terms

"As the hunt began for the 'Islamic terrorists' journalists' narratives failed to provide a nuanced and contextual understanding of Islam, Muslims, or the nature of the 'Islamic peril.'” (Karim, 2001).

The frame of the Islamic peril was especially evident when the Taliban, Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden were discussed in religious terms. In this NBC report filed by the State Department correspondent Andrea Mitchell on Sept. 13th, the audience is told that the threat comes from the medieval ferocity of Muslims waging a holy war with the US.

MITCHELL: Out of the ashes of disaster a US determination to wage a crusade against terror on every front. But the enemy is elusive, mysterious and dedicated. Leading the dispossessed of the Islamic world in a holy war against the United States with 21st century technology and medieval ferocity. It’s a hatred rooted in Osama bin Laden's fury after US troops rescued his native Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein. To bin Laden, the
American-led coalition and its western culture defiled the holiest sites in the Muslim world. Further enraged by American support for Israel, US indictments say bin Laden first targeted American troops in Somalia, then Saudi Arabia, Yemen and now suicide hijackings in the United States. How does a civilized nation, following the rule of law, win a fight with fanatics?

The civilized, law-abiding nation, i.e. the United States, is cast in a heroic frame of the benevolent country that liberated Saudi Arabia from Iraqi military advances during the Gulf War. It is this very frame that strongly provokes bin Laden, who offered the Saudi royal family his Mujahideen troops to defeat the Iraqis just as they had vanquished the Soviet Union. Bin Laden and his followers, as well as many purists in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Muslim world, would have preferred that Muslims defend the country that hosts the holiest sites in Islam. Given the region’s (and Islam’s) colonial history, rejection of Western troops on Islamic soil is a particularly sensitive issue. The emotions fury, hate and rage are used to describe bin Laden’s feelings towards the US, and Mitchell points out that he and his followers are not just elusive and determined, opposed to American support for Israel, but in the end, fanatics. They are indeed militant and uncompromising, but at every step they have made their grievances clear.

Mitchell cannot see how people whose country was ‘rescued’ by American troops could be so ungrateful, and at the same time resent America’s support for Israel. This explanation describes the extreme rage,
but doesn’t offer enough of a nuanced or contextual understanding of its roots, or explain why US troops would be interpreted as defiling Saudi Arabia. Mitchell also points out that militant Islamic groups are willing to incorporate the technology of the global communications revolution to achieve their goals, but are doing so with ‘medieval ferocity’. This reinforces the frame of the West being represented as modern, while the ‘dispossessed of the Islamic world’ who don’t live in the West or pledge their allegiance to it are portrayed as innately primitive and backward. This tendency has been well noted by Said, Karim and many other scholars of US media and Islam.

When the networks reported Osama bin Laden’s response to American war plans, they played up the fact that he was calling upon Muslims to fight, thus perpetuating the Islamic Threat frame. However, there were rare instances where lucid explanations of bin Laden’s demands were explicitly laid out: pull US troops out of the Arabian Gulf, work towards securing the Palestinian right to self-determination, and lift the sanctions imposed on the Iraqi people. These demands are expressions of protest against policies pursued by the US which are considered offensive by many in the Arab and Muslim global community. Bin Laden took advantage of the anti-colonial and revolutionary rhetoric
that permeated Islamist literature before 1952 to rally support for his struggle against 21st century Western domination.

There are atypical moments in the weeks after 9/11 when the question ‘why do they hate us?’ is addressed by network news, and bin Laden's grievances against the US are accurately recounted. After bin Laden's letter that called for ‘radical Muslims everywhere to kill’ was made public by Al Jazeera, CBS’s Richard Roth filed this report from Pakistan on September 24th.

ROTH: The letter faxed to a Gulf state TV station was signed by bin Laden, and urged Muslims to resist what it called ‘the American crusade.’ ‘We're on the path of jihad,’ holy war, it said, against what it called a 'new crusade and Jewish campaign led by America.' And the Taliban's mysterious Mullah Omar issued a threat of his own, saying America faces a 'vain and bloody war.' To end terrorism, he said, the US must 'withdraw its forces from the Gulf and end its bias in Palestine.'

In another story filed by ABC's Bob Woodruff in Islamabad, Jihad was also translated as a holy war. This inaccuracy has become a news convention. Most times when jihad is translated, its English counterpart is holy war.

BOB WOODRUFF: This is where the recruits begin their education, a collection of religious schools know as madrasas along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. There are thousands of them, paid for by either the government or private donations from abroad. The students, mostly poor, are given free education, food and clothing. In some there is no science or math or literature. They study the Koran and they learn about Jihad, or Holy War.

Jihad is not a holy war. It is a struggle to overcome the forces of evil, much like President Bush’s war on terror. Both Al Muwdudi and Al Banna, two of the most influential Muslim theologians describe Jihad as a
struggle between the forces of God and Satan, good and evil, darkness or ignorance and light. The concept of Jihad has been abused by both bin Laden and his followers, as well as network news. The translation ‘holy war’ does not convey how diversely the term is interpreted by Muslims, and how common the use of its principles is to the Islamic faith. It is the core of the Islamic faith, and also of the Christian and Jewish faiths, to struggle against evil. But when Jihad is commonly understood to mean ‘holy war’ with all of that term’s violent connotations, it conveys the impression that since Islam requires jihad of all Muslims, it therefore follows that Islam must be a violent and confrontational religion, as this example from ABC’s John Miller demonstrates. This analysis aired in the early evening of September 11th.

MILLER: Today, the Central Intelligence Agency calls him, “The most immediate and serious threat to US security.” Bin Laden says the Jihad against the United States and killing of Americans is the core of his faith.

If one takes this information seriously, as many Christian evangelists in America did, it is understandable why they interpreted Islam as inherently violent. John Miller, an expert on bin Laden, who personally interviewed him in 1998, tells America that according to bin Laden, killing Americans is the core of Islam. He says this with no qualifications whatsoever, at the risk of having his audience think that Muslims are
required to kill Americans. In many incidents, it is casually accepted as the truth, and it verifies the following observation made by Edward Said.

"Much of what one reads and sees in the media about Islam represents the aggression as coming from Islam because that is what ‘Islam’ is. Covering Islam is a one-sided activity that obscures what ‘we’ do, and highlights instead what Muslims and Arabs by their very flawed nature are.” (Said, 1997, p. xxii)

Jihad is clearly manipulated by the Islamic groups to signify a defense of Muslim land and honor, as exemplified by Saudi Arabia’s holy sites in Mecca and Medina and the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. Jihad does not have a doctrine that has always been unanimously accepted. Scholars of political Islam have argued that what is understood as requirements of the Quran and instructions from the prophet pertaining to Jihad have not remained static, but have evolved over time.

Jihad is a term historically used to refer to the Islamic struggle against colonialism. In *Unholy War*, John Esposito explains that the dependency of Muslim countries was perceived by some Muslims to be caused by a departure from the path of Islam, which encouraged the faithful to struggle, or *jihad* towards bringing the Muslim community (Ummah) back to the straight path. European colonialism sparked a new debate about the significance and meaning of Jihad.
“The Jihad (struggle) that became a central concept in describing the process of self transformation and political activism, both against European colonialism and later against corrupt un-Islamic Muslim states, was primarily one of reform, not violent revolution. Yet it did include the defense of the Muslim community and of Islam against colonialism and injustice.” (Esposito, 2002 p. 54).

Neo-colonialism and injustice in the Arabian Gulf, Iraq and Palestine are the answers to the question ‘why do they hate us?’ Neo-colonialism and injustice are why Osama bin Laden and untold numbers of Muslims around the world did not sympathize with the United States after it was attacked. Jihad in the form that was used by network news was distorted, and it was a purely Western interpretation of the Muslim concept. Jihad was used by network news to equate Islam with violence and fanaticism, thus detracting from larger issues such as American policies towards Muslim countries.

**Suicide Bombings & Islam**

Suicide in the form that it took on September 11th was an insult to the principles of Islam and the glorification of suicide has caused nothing but more grief for Muslims around the world. It is a disputable issue within Muslim societies, especially when it is used as a weapon. Mainstream orthodox Islam forbids it, teaching that taking one’s own life effectively
damns Muslims to eternal hell. However, suicide bombings are on the rise, and have escalated drastically particularly in Israel and the Occupied Territories. The drama of suicide was so potent that on ABC, Peter Jennings paused to reflect on the ‘spectacular’ suicide angle of the WTC and Pentagon attacks three days later on September 14th. A terrorism expert had pointed out earlier in the story that it was a suicide mission.

VINCE CANNISTRARO This was a terrorist spectacular. I mean, basically you had 19 people who committed suicide.

Jennings: there's that one sound bite in there that gives it a slight dimension that we hadn't thought of as much because we're so focused on the victim. This was a terrorist spectacular. Nineteen people also committed suicide in this, the terrorists speaking to the intensity of their hatred for the United States.

By ending that story with his rumination on the spectacular aspect of the bombing, and the drama of suicide Jennings highlighted the sensational rather than reflecting on the context behind such intense hatred, which was the point of the story. This focus on the dramatic angle of the story deflected from the complex questions surrounding the motivations of the terrorists. Discussing the tactics rather than the cause was far less controversial for network news.

Suicide is often an appealing option for young men who want to have a tangible impact on political oppression in the Middle East. They are becoming increasingly willing to perform any dramatic stunt to attract
attention to their political and social conditions, but those conditions are obscured, while the dramatic tactics remain the focus of media attention.

“Growing up oppressed and under siege, facing a future with little hope, high unemployment and endemic poverty can produce an anger and desire for revenge against those responsible. Just as among inner city youth in the United States, some of those young people lose all hope. For others, religion holds the answer. For a small minority, suicide bombing seems a proud and powerful response.” (Esposito, 2002, p. 99).

On network news, suicide missions were in the spotlight of news from the Middle East. On September 12th, NBC’s Martin Fletcher filed this report from Tel Aviv, which informs the viewer that suicide bombers are motivated by hopelessness and the prospect of paradise and many Muslims do not support suicide as a legitimate form of political violence.

MARTIN FLETCHER: How does someone get to this full of hate, ready to massacre so many, and die in the process? Turning your body into a guided missile? Most experts agree suicide bombers are not lunatics. They’re usually rational idealists who are prepared to die for what they believe is the greater good of their society. A typical candidate, a young man from a religious home, first approached in the mosque, then recruited, tested and trained to be a walking bomb.

Unidentified Man #1: They are acting, in their view, with the approval of God.

Ms. MIRIAM el-KHOLI (Cairo Worker): The world makes you hard-hearted. They—death has become like a presence of daily life. They know that they’re going to lose someone.

FLETCHER: The second motivation for the bombers, a deep religious belief that a better life awaits in paradise. But Islam is divided on suicide bombers. The Koran, the Islamic holy book, forbids suicide, and many Muslims condemn the suicide bombers.

Unidentified Man #2: (Through translator) Islam has a philosophy that opposes attacks on civilians.

FLETCHER: But others see them as martyrs, warriors, committing not self-destruction but heroic acts. Every death in battle with Israel fuels Arab anger, much of it directed
against America, seen as Israel's chief ally, and in the minds of the bombers, both legitimate targets for terror.

The above story was also attempting to understand the motivations of a suicide bomber and correctly identified the angry hopelessness and constant reminders of death that is the Palestinian reality. The reporter also made it a point to speak to a Muslim expert, who did not support suicide bombings. This is a very rare occurrence on network television news for this period. However, in the reporter's final assessment, Israel's position remains justified and suicide bombers are revered by their peers as heroes.

The suicide angle of the story was a gruesome and chilling shock to America. The level of hatred communicated by people who were literally willing to sacrifice their lives to kill thousands of Americans was the worst the country had ever seen. The question was, if their faith made it acceptable for them to end their own lives, what kind of religion was it? External Islam was represented as an irrational religion, especially since suicide is unacceptable in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Therefore, the terrorists did not get their ultimate message of protest across effectively. Because their methods were fanatical, they rendered themselves absurd to the American people. When they used religious justifications for their actions, the whole faith was distorted.
Non-Arab Muslim Countries: Pakistan, Indonesia & Iran

External Muslim countries were divided into allies and enemies long before 9/11 but their status was further delineated, and consistently reiterated in the tragedy’s aftermath. Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria remained classified as enemies of America, while Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were its main allies, despite the fact that most of the hijackers hailed from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Most non-Arab Muslim countries, however, seemed for the most part excluded or marginalized in the short time frame of coverage examined, with the notable exception of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Those two countries were heavily featured in the weeks following the attacks due to their renewed strategic importance to the US.

The networks followed the lead of President Bush, describing President Musharraf as a friend to America, a brave man who supported American policy despite strong, vocal opposition from Islamic groups within his country. President Musharraf repeated almost the exact words that Bush used, as he told his people it was in Pakistan’s best interest to cooperate with America. On September 19th CBS reported that the Pakistani public had received the message. However, these statements were not convincing to the Islamist sympathizers who work for Pakistan’s intelligence service, the ISI, and many Pakistanis all over the country,
particularly those living on the border with Afghanistan were outraged at Musharraf’s announcement. Demonstrations soon became a daily routine in news coverage of the impending war.

ALLEN PIZZEY: In a nationally televised address, Pakistan's leader, General Pervaiz Musharraf, told his people they were joining a fight against terrorism and not against Islam or the people of Afghanistan. The country faced a grave crisis, he said, and siding with America was in Pakistan's best interest.

Indonesia’s President Megawati Sukarnoputri visited the White House days after the attacks, and President Bush wanted to reiterate his message to her that America was not deliberately targeting Muslims or the Islamic religion. There was no time on network news for Indonesia's president to discuss how Indonesia could help the US in its struggle against terrorism. Nor was there time for her to explain how moderate Islam can be successfully practiced and politically integrated. The message from the White House to all countries at that point was: you are either with us or against us. Indonesia, with its largest Muslim population in the world, was ‘on the train’, as ABC reported on September 14th.

ROBERTS: So sitting today with the president of Indonesia, the world's most populist Muslim nation, Mr. Bush again explained this is a war against terrorism, not Islam.

President BUSH: I've made it clear, Madam President, that the war against terrorism is not a war against Muslims. Nor is it a war against Arabs. It's a war against evil people who conduct crimes against innocent people.
The Iranian government and people extended their condolences to America soon after the attacks, but they were still officially regarded as supporters of terror, and subsequently referred to as such by network anchors and reporters.

DAN RATHER (9/19/01): The US-led war on terrorism is getting at least verbal support from some among a one-time adversary, Iran. In Tehran this week, demonstrators held a candlelight vigil for victims of the attacks in New York and Washington. And Iran's foreign minister was quoted today as saying his government wants those behind the attacks, quote, "tracked down and severely punished." Where Iran's controlling mullahs stand is unclear.

ANDREA MITCHELL (NBC 9/18/01) Finally, take a look at the rogue states, according to the US, at least. These are the states such as Iran and Sudan that we've always said sponsored terrorism. Iran represents a real threat, we believe--the US believes, at least--because of its support for Hizballah, another terror group. They are very encouraged by statements coming out of Iran, but they want to see something really delivered.

ANDREA MITCHELL (NBC 9/25/01) Today Britain's foreign secretary meets in Tehran with Iran's leaders looking for intelligence assistance for the US against the Taliban despite Iran's own record sponsoring terrorists.

Iran's record of sponsoring terrorists was the main frame that was used to describe Iran, in a world that had been divided into friends and foes of America. In Iran's case, its history of turbulent relations with the West labeled it as a state that supports terrorism constituted the schema of interpretation by the network reporters, even when Iran publicly denounced the 9/11 attacks as crimes against humanity.
Visual Representation of External and Internal Islam

Visually, external Islam was presented very differently from the faith as practiced by those living in America. In the weeks following 9/11, there were daily reports from Pakistan, where there were daily anti-American demonstrations and widespread public support for bin Laden. Video of aggressive demonstrators accompanied almost every package filed from Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta, on the Afghan border during the first two weeks after the attacks. The angry protestors were shown chanting loud condemnations of US policy, burning American flags and generally giving the viewer the impression that Pakistanis were violently opposed to President Musharraf’s military and intelligence cooperation with the US regarding the war in neighboring Afghanistan. The visuals of these protests were powerful, mainly of bearded men shouting in the streets, in some cases augmented with shots of Muslims praying, where the worshippers are seen simultaneously kneeling before God, which are indispensable images in stories about Islamic countries.

On September 21st, the networks were heavily covering Pakistan. It was in the first and primary block of the newscast, and the main angle of the story was the possibility of cooperation between the US and Pakistan despite the angry demonstrations and anti-American sentiment in the
country. Without providing context to the role of Pakistan in supporting the bin Laden network of militants, the three networks aired footage of loud, incensed Pakistanis, burning American flags, chanting insults at America and President Bush, while holding up signs supporting bin Laden and condemning US policies. Over the violent images, the audio voiceover from ABC’s Bob Woodruff focused on the hatred Pakistani Muslims had for the United States while emphasizing that Pakistan is a strategic war ally. CBS’s Alan Pizzey also referred to the threat of what he called an Islamic backlash against the US by Pakistan in his stories filed from Islamabad. NBC’s Ron Allen interviewed a young Pakistani, who pitched Islam against the US, and told him it is against his faith not to fight America.

WOODRUFF: ‘The US wants to take revenge on the Afghani people,’ this man said. ‘If America strikes, all Muslims will retaliate.’ There was anger all across Pakistan today. In this country, so critical to the US effort, thousands of people took to the streets in four different cities to protest against the United States and against their own government’s support of the United States. ‘Death to America,’ they chanted. ‘America’s graveyard: Afghanistan.’

PIZZEY: There is also a danger of an internal Islamic backlash. Riots broke out here after the US fired cruise missiles against bin Laden following the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa, and many of the more radical Islamic groups here look on the Taliban as allies.

ALLEN: Pakistan’s decision to help is through angry protests. Orthodox Muslims who say there’s no proof bin Laden was behind the attacks. Trying to force Afghanistan to hand him over, they say, is a betrayal of Islam.

Unidentified Muslim: We're going to assist them, America, against a Muslim country. Because we are Muslim it is against our faith and against our religion.
The judgment call for the reporter to use this particular choice of words from the Pakistani man makes the story appear to indicate that fighting the US is a requirement of Islam. What the young man may have been trying to say is that Muslims will feel compelled to defend each other against a non-Muslim aggressor because they identify with fellow Muslims. The association of Islam and its requirements with people who are visibly incensed about the bin Laden situation for their own reasons can lead to misunderstandings about the very core nature of Islam.

Other frequently repeated visuals most notably included pictures of Osama bin Laden, terrorist training videos, demonstrations in the West Bank and Gaza, and members of Hamas and Hezbollah. What all of these images had in common was the theme of angry Muslim men. It was quite common for the what some of the networks called "Islamic" men to be carrying heavy rifles, wearing either ski masks, the kuffiya (headdress) or other various religious emblems in cloth wrapped around their heads.

In a September 13th CBS report about Arab reactions to the attacks, two unmasked men were briefly shown carrying guns and shooting them off in the streets of Lebanon. The voice over referred to the men as “these Muslims in Lebanon.” The reporter's assumption was that these random men were Muslim. Lebanon is a country with a widely diverse patchwork of religions, including Catholic, Orthodox Christians,
Maronites, Shiite and Sunni Muslims. Many members of all of these groups carry guns, so what is the likelihood that these particular men who were captured on film shooting their guns, were Muslim? The fact that the reporter chose to represent Muslims visually by showing two men with guns is what contributes to the visual association of Islam with violence.

Visuals of Muslim women were few and far between. These pictures were sometimes used to represent Islam, as in the Sept. 17th CBS story about Jersey City and the suspicion surrounding many Arab neighborhoods. A veiled woman was shown to denote the Muslim population of Jersey. Women were most often used as examples of the harsh Taliban regime, and the oppression of women’s rights to education, work and freedom of mobility. Brief glimpses of Afghan women wearing their burkas helped rally women’s groups in the US in support of war with Afghanistan, to liberate the women, as this ABC report demonstrates.

CAROL SIMPSON (Anchor): Under the Taliban's vision of a perfect Islamic state, adulterers are executed in public. All forms of entertainment are banned. Girls are denied education. Women cannot work and often cannot get medical care.

HILLARY BROWN Hanifah, who was once a teacher, spent her life savings to get out of Kabul and across the border with her husband and five children. This is all she has left: thirty thousand Afghanis, that's 50 cents.

HANIFAH (Foreign language spoken) `Life is miserable in Kabul,' she says. `Both the Taliban and Osama bin Laden should be out of Afghanistan.'

Muslim women in the US appeared on network news more often than women in the Middle East, Pakistan or Afghanistan. Internal female
Muslim voices included those who had lost their sons in the World Trade Center, women who were afraid of leaving their homes because they were veiled, as well as unveiled, western-appearing Muslim women. All of the women interviewed in the US were articulate, whereas the women in Afghanistan were hesitant and mainly concerned about the survival of their families and their financial situation. On the other hand, internal Muslims, men and women, living in the US were often shown holding or waving the American flag, as visual confirmation of their patriotism.

The visual aspect of initial 9/11 coverage of Islam speaks volumes about how Islam is perceived by American culture. The religious practices that are shown on television are mostly different from the normal rituals of the Judeo-Christian tradition. When thousands of Muslims kneel in prayer simultaneously, the video easily matches a reporter audio track discussing Islam. The utilization of these visuals makes sense, because if the stories were about Christians or Jews, their worshipping rituals would match the words to the pictures, a television news convention. When pictures referencing Islam and terrorism consist of burning flags, bearded men, men with guns, chanting protestors, armed training videos, and women covered from head to toe, they reflect the lives of the pictured individuals, however the context is neglected, which may distort their meaning to the audience.
Pictures that convey Islam in America are quite different, although the common image of video taken of worshippers inside a mosque is also used to denote American Muslims. The image of young American girls wearing veils holding up the American flag was utilized as a visual symbol of tolerance towards Islam in a country striving to be peacefully multicultural. Muslim families and particularly their children were a repeated image in stories about Internal Muslims. Children represented the future of Islam, the fusion of Western education and their parents’ faith. They were the bridge between two cultures, the medieval and modern.

Summary

This chapter assessed how network news handled stories that included Islam and Muslims. The examples illustrate that there was a difference in the frames of internal and external stories about Muslims. Internally, Muslims were framed as an integral part of American life while external Muslims were violent and hated America.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Islam</th>
<th>Inherently Peaceful Religion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loyalty of American Muslims to the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity of Islam with Other Religions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Muslims living in America appeared on camera as patriotic and were framed mostly as victims of senseless violence in the form of hate crimes. The political correctness of American media did not allow for much demonization of the Islamic religion, since the hate crimes were such a big story internally there was fear that any further discriminatory television news coverage would perpetuate the already tense situation within American Muslim communities. However, it must be noted that the representation of Islam was inconsistent, both internally and externally. Internally, there were reports that highlighted communities with high Muslim populations, such as those in New Jersey and Detroit that emphasized the fact that behavior among Muslim and Arab communities might be considered suspect. These reports were based in reality, since the hijackers had blended themselves in and gone unnoticed by the authorities, therefore as a result of the precedent that the hijackers had set, suspicion of Muslim communities was inevitable to a certain degree.

Despite the problem of witch hunt reporting, when it came to stories about internal Muslim communities, network news was responsible and
made it a point to frame Islam in an inclusive, peaceful manner. Network news had learned a harsh lesson from its coverage of Muslim and Arab communities following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which prompted a national wave of hate crimes. After the September 11th attacks, the networks were careful not to be irresponsible in their reporting.

“As a consequence of the events of September 11th, government and media have shifted the issue of terrorism and Islam to center stage. The media will certainly play a central role in determining what is presented and how these messages are framed.” (Wicks, 2002 p. 6).

When officials such as New York Mayor Guliani and President Bush condemned the hate crimes and urged the American public not to lash out against Arabs and Muslims in America, sympathetic coverage of those communities increased. It was an unprecedented level of sympathy for Muslims in America. The networks were reaching out to those communities, making sure their voices were heard and that it was unacceptable that they were facing discrimination in their own country.

External to the United States, Muslims around the world were mostly framed by the networks as fanatic, irrational, America-hating, violent oppressors of women. The people on the streets of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Arab countries were viewed as a collective threat to American interests. The ‘Muslim Threat’ frame essentially reduces the
wide range of political grievances against the United States into an inherent conflict between Islam and the US, an ugly fulfillment of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations scenario.

Following the attacks, television news broadcast ubiquitous violent images of ‘Muslims’, often visually represented by Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda training videos, footage of random men with assault rifles in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon and angry Muslim demonstrators in Pakistan. When Muslims violently oppose American policy and express hatred towards the United States, they are framed as the enemy. To the politicians in power and thus the national networks, the combination of their religious views and militant tactics represents evil. But, as the findings of this chapter suggest, there is no single dominant frame, the representation of Islam depended on whether the Muslims were internal or external to America. Internally, the far more emphasized view, in this analysis, was that of ‘Islam as a religion of peace’, a reconciliatory media frame that was promoted by public officials and fully sanctioned by network reporters and anchors. When Islam was shown in association with the acceptance of Western values, it was mainly represented by Arab-Americans, American Muslims and leaders of what the US labels as "moderate" countries, who pledge their allegiance to the United States, and support the war on terror. These allies were crucial to maintain, as
demonstrated by the Bush administration political strategy, which emphasized the need to gain Muslim support as a strategic and diplomatic goal.

Internally, the attacks on American Muslim and Arab communities needed to be controlled and stability had to be reestablished in the US. Maintaining global allies and restoring civil order are two main policy goals behind placating the Muslims. This frame draws attention to the network news role as bearers and interpreters of official messages, not only to the American public, but also to countries with Muslim populations. Representations of non-Arab Islamic countries such as Iran, Turkey and Indonesia were excluded perspectives. Coverage of these countries was relatively scant, and the views of these Muslim nations appear virtually ignored by network news following the September 11th attacks.

The myriad representations of Islam indicates a shift from the findings of previous literature. As Chapter 1 details, most researchers found Islam to be represented as an angry, violent religion. The faith was mostly covered within the context of crises and violence. However, in September 2001 after the message that Islam was a religion of peace was publicly announced by the White House, framing of Islam shifted accordingly and became more positive and inclusive. More stories about Muslim life in America were broadcast on network news and Islam was
represented as a faith shared by millions of loyal, peaceful Americans who displayed their patriotism along with Jews and Christians. In addition, the coverage of Muslims by network news uncharacteristically extended beyond the Middle East to include Pakistan, Iran and other non-Arab countries, particularly Afghanistan and this represented yet another shift from previous literature. American officials went to great lengths to emphasize that the war on terrorism was not a war against Islam, and this global message was reflected in the framing of Islam on network news analyzed in this chapter, which describes the diverse frames that emerged after September 11th.

This research aims to provide a complete picture of the various frames used to represent Islam during this initial crisis period. The frames shifted according to what the officials said, whether internal or external. However general the statements made about the coverage of Muslim communities both in the United States and abroad, there were exceptions to each group of frames. It is misleading to claim that one representation of Islam was dominant over the other, instead the frames were part of a rapidly shifting discourse that adapted to the quickly unfolding domestic and international events.
Chapter 5: Arabs on Network News

Coverage of Islam and Arabs often are viewed as one and the same, yet in this study they are considered to be divergent issues. Framing of Muslims and Arabs, however, did share the common overriding frame set by the Bush administration: Arabs and Muslims were either with us or against us. Since not all Arabs are Muslims, nor all Muslims live in the Middle East, there must be distinctions made in how these communities were framed by network news. For some of the conclusions reached in the previous chapter, the same holds true for Arabs. Arab-Americans received the same treatment from network reporters as American Muslims did: they were framed as mostly peaceful, especially after the backlash that Arab-Americans experienced after the attacks.

But it is also interesting to note how Arab countries were framed by network news, in order to examine how allies and enemies of the US as defined by the White House were treated differently. The research questions are as follows for this chapter:

1. How were Arab countries interpreted and explained to the American public?

2. How different were the Arab official statements different from the sentiments expressed on the streets?
This chapter describes the ideological framing of several Arab countries by network news anchors and reporters. The distinct ways in which countries are classified as either enemies or friends of America is a recurring aspect of network coverage directly following 9/11. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were still portrayed as the traditional allies, despite the fact that the ringleader of the plot, Mohammed Atta, was Egyptian and 15 of the 19 hijackers were thought to be of Saudi origin. The networks took into account the increased diplomatic tension that would be created if they described Egypt and Saudi Arabia as terrorist states. Instead these facts were casually pointed out, but not exaggerated or sensationalized as they might have been if the hijackers were from Iraq, Iran, Syria or Libya.

The following sections of the chapter will discuss the main Arab countries that received the most coverage during this time period, namely Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. In addition, the role of Arab-American experts and spokespeople who were featured on network news newscasts is briefly discussed. The frames involved in reporting the reaction of Arab countries to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks are of particular interest to this study due to my own interest and expertise in the Middle East.

Arab countries tend to be classified into allies and enemies according to America's policy towards that country, much like the internal
and external Muslims. After 9/11, this distinction became even more closely defined. Subsequently, all countries Arab or otherwise – were considered, in the words of President Bush to be either, with us or against us. The networks continued framing Egypt and Saudi Arabia as allies or moderate countries, even though most of the Al Qaeda hijackers and coordinators were Egyptian and Saudi citizens. Osama bin Laden himself is a former Saudi and his right-hand man Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri is an experienced Egyptian terrorist who spent three years in prison for his involvement in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981.

An examination of the framing mechanisms used by network news to denote America’s policies towards Arab countries will be particularly noteworthy. In terms of voices represented on the evening network news, it is essential to investigate how views and emotions in Arab countries were expressed through various public and official sources. Frames of Arab countries and the Palestinians will hopefully become more evident after a close reading of references to their political and diplomatic alliances with the United States. Statements made by sources and journalists as well as anchor introductions in stories about the Middle East will be closely examined to look for patterns of discourse within these frames.
When President Bush declared that America was waging a war on terror, Arab countries immediately became highly concerned with the implications of this generic statement. Did Bush mean that all Arab countries with a history of terrorism would now be considered enemies of America? Would Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan be the next countries in line to be bombed after Afghanistan? In the months preceding the attacks, these allied countries had been trying in vain to convince the Bush administration to play a more visible role in promoting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. When the attacks happened, the renewed Intifada had been raging for a year; it had started a few months before the 2000 presidential election.

EGYPT

After the attacks, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak urged the US to reconsider its classification of Arab countries as ‘with us or against us’. Mubarak recognized that the diplomatic and military stakes had now been dramatically raised and that if it wanted to, the US now had what it believed was a justified pretext to attack any country that it deemed to be supporting terrorism.

As CBS reported on September 17th, Egypt warned the US not to overreact by causing thousands of civilian deaths in Afghanistan. Mubarak most likely anticipated how the war in Afghanistan would be portrayed in the Arab
media: a brutal, calculated attack on innocent Afghan civilians, leading to widespread death and destruction. The Arab countries allied with the US were particularly concerned that the war would ultimately further inflame radical sentiments against America and threaten their own regimes. At a time when the world was so horrified at the violence that had transpired in New York and Washington, most countries were willing to give ‘carte blanche’ to America to go after whomever they wanted in connection with the attacks, Egypt was urging restraint.

JOHN ROBERTS: But words of caution today from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who said it’s too early for talk of a coalition and warned the president against attacking an entire nation just to get one man.

On the evening news of September 11th, 2001, NBC aired their interview with the Egyptian president which had been conducted earlier that day in Cairo. President Mubarak achieved three goals: 1) Reaffirming Egypt’s military and diplomatic commitment to the US in its global war on terror, even if harsh tactics needed to be used; 2) Stressing the need to isolate countries that were not part of the US global coalition; and 3) There should be no jumping to conclusions or hasty action taken in response to the attacks. Mubarak was introduced by Keith Miller as a man who had been a victim and target of numerous terrorist attacks, then Miller reiterated that Egypt would help the US find and eradicate the terrorist cells behind the attacks.

MILLER: Mubarak did have this warning for us, Tom. He said that this is a battle that's going to take place on many, many fronts, saying that there are terrorist cells in a dozen, perhaps even more countries and
saying the Americans should not expect this battle to be over in a day. It will be the long haul. Tom:

BROKAW: All right, thanks very much, NBC's Keith Miller. You'll recall, of course, that President Sadat of Egypt was killed by Islamic radicals, and that's the reason that President Hosni Mubarak is now the president of that country. He had been the vice president, a former air force general trained in Russia. He, too, has been the target of assassination attempts. Tourists from the West have been attacked in Egypt by these fundamentalist radicals, and Egypt is a military client, in effect, of the United States. We have a very strong military relationship. That is, we have provided them with a great deal of military assistance.

To put this all into perspective and add context to the interview, Brokaw points out that there have been terrorist attacks in Egypt and adds the history of Sadat's assassination by fundamentalists. He correctly cites this event as the reason that Mubarak is in power, which gives the accurate impression that Egypt is not a country led by democratic rule. However, as Brokaw emphasizes, Egypt is a military client of the US and the two countries have a strong military relationship, which is an allusion to the billions of dollars a year Egypt receives in aid funds from America. Network anchors and reporters often frame countries by explaining to the audience how a particular country is relevant to the US. In Egypt's case, the ideological power structure of the relationship between America and Egypt is spelled out by the network anchor. This reference to US policy towards Egypt does not mention the reason behind this policy and its funding, which is basically that Egypt receives aid in return for its peace treaty status with Israel. This omission is also noticeable in Dan Rather's introduction to Mubarak's interview with CBS, which aired on September 24th in which he notes that Egypt receives American money, but does not explain why.

RATHER: President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, whose government receives more US aid than any but Israel's, joined the world in condemning the September 11th attacks. But he has his own
ideas about the most effective ways to fight terrorism. CBS' Tom Fenton spoke with Mubarak in Paris.

TOM FENTON: American officials say that their intelligence indicates that Osama bin Laden is behind these attacks. Do you agree?

President HOSNI MUBARAK (Egypt): According to the statements coming from bin Laden for quite a long time, I think he is maybe behind all this.

FENTON: If the United States goes after bin Laden in Afghanistan, will you support that?

Pres. MUBARAK: For sure we'll support the United States. And I think the United States will never do this unless it's sure that bin Laden is behind all this.

FENTON: One of Mubarak's complaints is that Western political freedom has allowed Egyptian terrorists to continue to operate in countries like Britain, while in Egypt they are dealt with harshly.

Pres. MUBARAK: I would to like to ask the human rights now: 'Is what happened in the World Trade Center fair?' You are looking for the human rights of those who killed over 6,000 people and destroyed the whole thing.

RATHER: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, with CBS' Tom Fenton.

This interview gives a clear indication of Egypt’s policy towards fighting terrorism, i.e. repression of human rights and political freedoms, which seem to lose relevance when it comes to Islamic political groups. Democratic principles, civil liberties and human rights are all compromised when a state makes fighting terror the top priority. The 1992 elections in Algeria were an example of this policy, when the Islamic party won and elections were cancelled by the military with full support of the US and Europe. The latent assumption is that democracy must be secular to be acceptably implemented. Mubarak's advice to America was to suspend political freedoms when dealing with terrorism. Ironically, this seems to be eerily reminiscent of Ashcroft’s strategy for protecting America, which started with the PATRIOT Act and continues to challenge the civil liberties
and political freedoms that are the very essence of America’s national character. Mubarak has been ruling Egypt under the Emergency Law of 1981, which bears a strikingly close resemblance to provisions of the PATRIOT Act: arbitrary arrests can be made, widespread surveillance is legal and due process can be suspended once terrorism is evoked as a pretext for such measures to be implemented.

Once again, Mubarak reiterates his country's support for the US in its war on terror, although in the CBS interview, his message does not include the need for caution. Instead, the message here is to expect an overall disregard for human rights when it comes to terrorism, and not to criticize countries that use repressive tactics to deal with religious groups that oppose their power. This is the official face of Egypt, one that differs significantly from the views on the street, as the next segment will discuss. The official frame is conveyed by leaders and diplomats like the Egyptian ambassador to the US, Nabil Fahmy, who was interviewed on NBC September 12th. Throughout the interview he condemns the attacks and voices full support for the US, and in Brokaw's introduction, Egypt is classified as a moderate state.

On the phone with us now is the ambassador from Egypt, Nabil Fahmy, who joins us. Egypt, of course, has been one of those moderate Arab states that has been closely aligned with the United States. We have a strong military relationship.

BROKAW: Our correspondent in Tel Aviv, Martin Fletcher, reported that within recent days the Egyptian government has been critical of the United States in the Middle East as the escalation of violence between Israel and the PLO began to take an ever higher toll. Has your government been critical of the United States?

Mr. FAHMY: Our relations with the US are strong and, frankly, quite constructive. Whether we
agree or disagree on issues, that does happen. But nevertheless, we've urged the US to play a more prominent, more high-profile role. That is one thing that does not justify in any way what we see here today.

BROKAW: Don't you think it's going to be more difficult for the United States to play that kind of role, if in fact we discover that these acts were committed by Islamic activists and radicals?

Mr. FAHMY: If, and I underline 'if' because, again, let's not forget that we've witnessed cases before where people have been accused of situations like this in Oklahoma and it has proved not to be the case. But if these were acts of terrorists, they are terrorists not reflected or represents the people of the region. I'm aware of no Arab government that has in any way said anything but a severe condemnation of what we see here today.

BROKAW: Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. And you're absolutely correct in that last declaration, all the governments in the Middle East have uniformly condemned this, including the Taliban government in Afghanistan, denying that Osama bin Laden played any role in these attacks in New York City and in Washington, DC.

In this interview, the ambassador seemed incapable of criticizing the US for its unequivocal support for Israel, an issue that was of paramount concern for the Egyptian government before the attacks. But it was neither the appropriate time nor place to raise that central issue in the weeks after September 11th. The ambassador did raise the issue of the Oklahoma City bombing and the hasty finger-pointing at Arab and Muslim communities in the US, but it was well known at that point that the hijackers were Arab and Muslim. Mr. Fahmy was simply conveying the Egyptian government’s policy of caution and restraint instead of jumping to conclusions. In the case of Egypt, as with every other country that is mentioned on network news, the role of the journalist was to make sure that the audience knew Egypt was an ally and military client state, and that it fully supported American policies on terrorism.

What about the people? In this CBS report filed from Cairo (one of only three reports filed from Arab countries by the networks in this two-week sample
period) on September 19th, the difference between the people and their rulers becomes evident. In the anchor introduction, the frame presented is that Egypt is not supportive of the US, since it refused to commit troops to the war in Afghanistan. The tone in which this lack of support was articulated was dismissive and impertinent. When it comes to Egypt, says Rather, ‘don’t look for much’. Tom Fenton, the correspondent, makes sure to remind Americans that they are the benefactors of this Middle Eastern country, implying that America should get its money’s worth in political and military support from Egypt in return. This colonialist discourse of the Western power sponsoring the very survival of the colonized country through the brandishing of America’s economic stronghold over Egypt exemplifies the power structure between the two countries as described by the language reporters use to frame the story to a mostly uninformed audience.

RATHER: The United States has not been making much headway in trying to persuade various countries in the Arab world to join President Bush’s declared war on terrorism. For example, CBS’ Tom Fenton is in Egypt in many ways the most important country in the Arab world and, he reports, don’t look for much.

TOM FENTON: As the United States tries to line up its Arab friends for a coalition against terrorism, it finds them sitting on a fence expressing sincere sympathy for America’s terrible loss, but unwilling to commit their troops to a battle. Egypt’s government, America’s chief ally in the Arab world, is doing a delicate balancing act between remaining faithful to the benefactor that gives it billions and remaining in power.

Mr. MOSTAFA A-FEKI (Egyptian Foreign Relations Committee): Egypt is not the United States of America. We have our commitments in the region. We have our problems with the neighbors. We have our own public opinion.

FENTON: And the message from the streets of Cairo is that we feel your pain but...

Unidentified Woman 1: You lost a lot of life but that doesn't mean that you just go hitting any country just because and not the Arabs and Muslims.
FENTON: It's not unanimous. Arab public opinion is as varied as the goods on offer in the old bazaar. Many Arabs despise the terrorists.

Unidentified Man 1: I don't think these people have--really having--brain which God has give them as how to use it, you know.

FENTON: But leave the camera rolling long enough and someone says what many feel in their hearts: they also despise American policy in the Middle East.

Unidentified Man 2: America is evil, Israel is evil, too.

FENTON: Egypt has its own problems with Islamic fundamentalism, severe problems. It's suffered from terrorism for years. Egyptian terrorists make up a large part of the network allied with Osama bin Laden, and recently Egypt has been warning the United States that its policies make it a tempting target. It's the daily headlines that millions of Arabs read and take to heart about Israelis attacking Palestinians, American planes bombing Iraq that fuel their growing resentment of American policy. Now America is asking for help and the response from the Arab world is cautious. Tom Fenton, CBS News. Cairo.

In the above report, there are a number of frames at work. It begins with a description of an ungrateful country that won't support the benefactor i.e. the United States, which gives Egypt a great deal of money. The Egyptian official tells CBS that the country has its own problems in the region, primarily its own public opinion, which impede it from supporting a US-led war in Afghanistan. If Egypt did unequivocally support a war that would kill thousands of Muslims; that support would further inflame an Egyptian public already frustrated by American and Israeli policies towards Palestinians and control of Islam’s holy sites in Jerusalem. While the reporter tells the audience that the Egyptians interviewed on the streets had opinions "as varied as the goods on offer in the old bazaar" the visuals were of crowded streets and chaotic markets, an example of the reporter writing to his video.
Here we begin to see some open criticism of America and Israel, but only coming from the Egyptian public and not from the leaders. American foreign policy is “despised” in the region, since Arabs are fed a daily diet of violence against the Palestinians by their media. Arab media do tend to portray the Palestinians as victims of violence and the Israelis as the aggressors. This is exactly what American media do in reverse, i.e. frame the Israelis as victims and the Palestinians as aggressors.

The fact that Arabs despise American policies in the Middle East is presented by CBS without any justification or agreement with their criticism. Here the reporter frames the Arab media as the problem, not the actual policies of Israel and the US. Again, this report attempts to touch briefly on the issue of anti-US sentiment among Arabs but does not adequately address the root of the problem. Instead, the real issues are completely avoided by crafting and reinforcing an ideological frame of interpretation that categorizes Egypt as either with us or against us. The frame of the above story was that America’s Arab friends are not going to be easily convinced to join the war on terror. It was about the low level of official and public support of American policies, public skepticism of US intentions, and that the people interviewed on the streets do not respect and show deference to American power in the region.

At the conclusion of the story, a man is shown saying that America and Israel are evil. This is a particularly interesting choice of words because that is
reminiscent of the good vs. evil rhetoric that President Bush uses to describe the terrorists and states who are perceived by the US to be harboring them. The same rhetorical framework is also used by people on the Arab street who take the precisely opposite view of what constitutes good and evil.

The third report filed from Cairo in the sample period was an interview with Mohammed Atta’s father, who was in deep denial about his son’s involvement in the planning and execution of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. The interview aired on NBC on September 18th, and in it Atta’s father keeps stressing that his son was a good Muslim who would never kill anyone because of his strong faith. He says it is America’s fault that the attacks happened, and that there must be a conspiracy involving Americans who stole his son’s passport. This report indicates that NBC had more than one correspondent in Cairo at the time, and they were doing better investigative work than the other networks. They took the time to get the family perspective from Egypt, and that was rarely done so quickly during this time of crisis.

BROKAW: There are some new glimpses into the life and mind of one of the suspected terrorists tonight. NBC’s Kevin Tibbles joins us now from Cairo, where today he spoke with the father of one of the two pilots who trained in Florida. Kevin:

TIBBLES: Tom, tonight I found and sat down with the father of one of the men accused of hijacking American Flight 11 and crashing it into the World Trade Center. But here in Cairo, the father of Mohammed Atta vehemently denies his son is responsible.

The stifling, crowded streets of Cairo are what Mohammed Atta called home. The 33-year-old described by neighbors as serious, a young man who had no friends.

Unidentified Man: Most of the time he was with his father, but I don't think he has friends. I didn't see friends.
TIBBLES: Now Atta is accused of being the pilot of the first hijacked jet to slam into the World Trade Center. Atta grew up here, in the densely packed middle-class suburbs, not far from the pyramids of Giza. He studied architectural engineering at the University of Cairo. His father is a successful lawyer. Today his father told NBC News that his son was not involved with Osama bin Laden. The father says he remembers when bin Laden blew up the US Embassies in Africa, and his son, Mohammed, saying he hated bin Laden because proper Muslims are not supposed to kill. Mohammed el-Amir Atta is 65. He has suffered three heart attacks. He explodes in fury when asked if his only son could be a terrorist. 'My son was not involved, his passport was stolen. This is an American plot.' He calls his son a child, incapable of evil, unable to fly a kite, let alone an airplane. Atta's parents are separated. His father lives alone on the 11th floor of this building. Atta's two sisters, both university-educated, live elsewhere. The father says he has heard from his son since the attack, but will not give any details as to what he said. Instead, he blames the United States and says it was America that brought the attack upon itself. The father insists his son has either been kidnapped or killed for the use of his passport. He says Mohammed was not a terrorist or a fanatic, but simply a good Muslim.

In this story, Cairo is visually and verbally described as a generally unappealing place to be, its streets are stifling and crowded and the middle-class suburbs are densely packed. Cairo does indeed have a serious overpopulation problem, and most Western visitors would probably describe Cairo similar terms. But when stifling is used instead of hot, and densely packed is used instead of busy, one can begin to get an idea of what the reporter's experience was like in Cairo. That tone was conveyed by the adjectives chosen to describe the city and the video used to portray Cairo.

References by Western observers to the hot weather and crowds that are characteristic of most formerly colonized countries can often reveal their attitudes towards their perceived level of civilization in these countries. Africans returning to Antilles from France, and expressing their distaste for the weather are described by Frantz Fanon as people who have forgot where they came from and adopted Western tastes.
"If the voyager tells his acquaintances, 'I am so happy to be back with you. Good Lord, it is hot in this country, I shall certainly not be able to endure it for very long,' they know: A European has got off the ship" (Fanon, 1967).

In the interview, Atta’s father insists that his son was a good Muslim while the American public was informed that he was one of the hijackers; he was even captured on video at Logan airport in Boston the morning of the attacks. The pictures NBC showed of Atta were mug-shots and airport video, visually implying that the father was clearly lying or in denial about his son’s ties to terrorism. This type of denial, as portrayed in this story, could potentially further perpetuate the mistrust of Arabs and Muslims among the typical American news consumer, since the above interview appears to confirm the stereotype of Arabs as conspiratorial and resentful of America.

Western correspondents in Cairo have long complained about this feeling of resentment and suspicion in Egypt. Egyptian authorities are not always supportive of the free press principle, and are chronically suspicious of Western motives. Egyptian officials do not have much tolerance for criticism from the correspondents.

"The suspicion many Egyptians (officials and non-officials) have of foreigners, especially Westerners, results from the fact that the "West" is associated in their minds with colonialism and foreign conspiracies to destroy the country's image. This widens the gap between the two sides" (Nawawy, 2001).
The above examples point to the differences between Egyptian public and official commentary on the events of September 11th. While the officials were more diplomatic and cautious in their approach, the public was vocal about their anger at US policies in the region, as well as Israeli policies towards the Palestinians. During the first two weeks following the attacks in New York and Washington, public opinion in Egypt was secondary to the official view. While there are no data in this study that support a generalization that this was typical, it is clear that in this particular case the official frames were far more prominent than the ones coming from the people. The network anchors and journalists were adhering to the American official framing of Egypt as an important, moderate Arab country that is a key ally since it receives tremendous amounts of military and economic aid from the United States. US support for Israel was assumed as accepted fact and its legitimacy was not questioned by the anchors or journalists.

These observations were similar in network news coverage of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, where diplomatic, military and economic ties were assumed to be more important than public opinion. Despite the Arab public view that America and Israel needed to change their policies in the region, in the final assessment, Egypt was with America. President Bush had crafted this frame for reporting that directly impacted coverage of any country outside the US as either part of the coalition or with the terrorists.
SAUDI ARABIA

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has long been a contentious country for American journalists to cover, mainly due to lack of reporter access within the country. In this section, only examples of the official Saudi view are analyzed, since denial of access to Saudi Arabia has traditionally prevented reporters from being able to interview members of the Saudi public. Post-9/11 coverage was no exception to this previously established trend. It remains particularly challenging to report from Saudi Arabia, in part due to intense suspicion of American film crews but mostly due to difficulty gaining access to the people and officials within the country.

“If one wants to explore the reasons why clichés about Saudi Arabia have persisted so long after other notions about the Middle East have been dispelled from the American conscience one needn’t go much further than this denial of access to the most important American news medium” (Hershman & Griggs, 1981).

One historical example of lack of access is the attempted coverage of the attack on Mecca’s Kaa’bah (Grand Mosque) in November 1979. The circumstances and causes of this event in Saudi Arabia’s political history have never been adequately explained in America, because journalists could not get in.
But over 20 years later, Saudi Arabian officials have made themselves more available to Western media. After the Gulf war, reporting from Saudi Arabia was still difficult, but it was easier than before. Many Western journalists maintained contact with local Saudi reporters and editors who had become emboldened by the war and began to liberalize the country’s media subtly. Select American television crews were granted permission to travel to Saudi Arabia to conduct interviews with its government officials. While satellite television and the Internet now facilitate Saudi Arabia’s views to be heard in the international community, during the two-week period directly after 9/11, there were no reports filed from Saudi Arabia, since there remain no network television correspondents based there.

Saudi officials were all quick to express their staunch support for the US; network reporters and anchors continued to frame the Saudi government as playing a crucial role in the fight against terror. In this September 20th CBS report, John Roberts implies that even though the Saudis are supportive, unless they go after groups that are opposed to Israel, their cooperation may not be considered valid to the US.

ROBERTS: Earlier at the White House, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister pledged his country's full support.

Prince SAUD AL-FAISAL (Saudi Foreign Minister): Everything that is within our capacity to fight this scourge of terrorism.
ROBERTS: The United States will press Saudi Arabia for more help with intelligence gathering and to choke off financing that still flows to bin Laden's network. But the Saudis say they will not go after groups that oppose Israel, which could significantly limit their cooperation down the road.

In a September 20th interview on ABC with US Secretary of State Colin Powell, he emphasized that the Saudis are "with us" and are "our friends," therefore the US is willing to overlook the potential Saudi connections with terrorism. He also explicitly denies any link between America's policies and the motivations behind the attacks. This interview provides an example of the frames that American officials used to explain and contextualize 9/11 to the American public through the media. Credit must be given here to Peter Jennings for asking useful questions, but in return he received a response from Powell that not only deftly avoided the root of the problem but also further divides East and West in terms of values and ideals.

JENNINGS: You have said that any nation which supports or harbors terrorists must be punished. Saudis have been involved in these acts in some cases and in financing these acts. What do you do about Saudi Arabia?

POWELL: There's a difference between Saudis being involved and the Saudi government. The Saudi government has been very supportive, and they have pledged full cooperation to root out terrorism. So we look forward to working closely with the Saudis.

JENNINGS: Do you believe that the United States policy in the Middle East and further to the east in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, has anything to do with the violence?

POWELL: This is a man who has a hatred of Western values and ideals. And he manifests that hatred against the United States of America. So if there was no Middle East peace problem right now, and we'd solved all of that, there would still be an Osama bin Laden and an al-Qaeda attacking US interests and our friends' interests.

As expressed by Powell, this official view of the problem became the standard frame that explained to America why the attacks had occurred. In
Powell’s mind and the minds of many other conservative officials and pundits was that bin Laden simply detested American values and ideals, and even if there was peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, attacks on America would continue. This spin on the issue of terrorism associated with fundamentalist Muslim groups like Al Qaida obscures the realities of widespread political grievances held by these groups against the US.

“The temptation for some government officials and political commentators was to condemn and dismiss, to explain away anti-Americanism as irrationality, ingratitude, jealousy of our success, or hatred for ‘our way of life’. Slogans to the effect that we are in a war between the civilized world and terrorists; a war between fundamentalists who hate Western democracy, capitalism and freedom; or a war against evil and merchants of death may reflect the rhetoric of some extremists and be emotionally satisfying, but they fail to get at deeper realities and long-term issues” (Esposito, 2002).

Another aspect of covering the Saudi Arabian angle of the story post-9/11 was the emphasis on economic assistance the Gulf country was providing. Shaheen observed three main stereotypes of Arabs that have prevailed throughout the 20th century included Arabs as billionaires, bombers and belly dancers. The 21st century Arab billionaire oil wealth archetype for the 9/11 story was Saudi Prince Al Waleed bin Talal, whose investments include ownership of billions of dollars worth of American stocks. A few weeks after 9/11, the Saudi prince handed a $10 million dollar check to New York mayor Rudy Guiliani to
assist the victims and their families. The money was rejected by Giuliani, perhaps suggesting that there was a strong public perception that Saudi money was tainted with the implication of ties to terrorism. However, this did not prevent the networks from making repeated references to Saudi Arabian money and oil.

NBC 9/17 RON INSANA: And there were some very prominent investors also who promised not to sell stocks, from Warren Buffett, whose stock portfolio totals in the tens of billions of dollars, to Prince Alwaleed of Saudi Arabia, who has a twenty-billion stock portfolio here in the United States.

NBC 9/17 ANDREA MITCHELL: NBC News has learned the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan were offered a huge sum of cash in US dollars from Saudi Arabia for the arrest of bin Laden and his network, an offer communicated secretly through Pakistan's President Musharraf. But today's decision by Afghanistan's Muslim clerics means so far no deal. Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, at the White House today, hints at their secret role.

Prince SAUD AL-FAISAL (Saudi Foreign Minister): There have been many efforts to persuade them in the past by Saudi Arabia that have not achieved the results.

MITCHELL: The Saudis are also giving Pakistan free oil and promising to flood the world market with oil, if necessary, to keep prices stable. But they say they no longer have any influence with the Taliban because bin Laden has told the Taliban not to trust Saudi Arabia.

Two weeks after 9/11, one of the top international stories was Saudi Arabia breaking its diplomatic ties with the Taliban. The networks highlighted the significance of Saudi Arabia in terms of its religious authority and legitimacy amongst Muslims and Islamic political regimes such as the Taliban. But to bin Laden and members of Al Qaida, Saudi Arabia’s monarchy was not perceived as a legitimate ruling power; on the contrary, Saudi Arabia’s rulers were considered traitors, apostates and colonial servants of the United States. Among Osama bin Laden’s most vocal grievances against the Saudi regime are their long-standing close military, economic and diplomatic ties to the United States, particularly
exemplified by the use of American military power for protection against Iraqi scud attacks during the Gulf War. American officials presumed that their relationship with Saudi Arabia would help grant them legitimacy among Muslims all over the world, as these NBC reports from September 22\textsuperscript{nd} and 25\textsuperscript{th} demonstrate.

\textbf{9/22 JIM MACEDA}: One flashpoint, Saudi Arabia, one of America's key allies in the Persian Gulf, but the birthplace of bin Laden as well, and a target for extremists like him, who say US military bases defile Saudi soil. In the mid-1990s: 24 US soldiers killed here by terrorists. Now, Saudis worry that President Bush's crackdown could backfire.

Prince SAUD AL-FAISAL (Saudi Foreign Minister): It should in no way follow the objectives of the terrorists themselves, in creating an unbridgeable gap between the Western world and the Islamic world.

\textbf{9/25 MITCHELL}: As keepers of the faith, Islam's holiest sites, the Saudis are also telling the Muslim world bin Laden is an appropriate target, and so are the Taliban if they protect him.

Prince SAUD: They're still hopeful that Taliban will accept the wisdom of handing over criminals to face justice.

BROKAW: The major diplomatic news of the day comes from the Middle East where Osama bin Laden's home country took a dramatic stand against him. Saudi Arabia, the powerful protectorate of Islam's holiest sites, broke diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. We'll begin tonight with NBC's chief foreign affairs correspondent Andrea Mitchell. Andrea:

ANDREA MITCHELL: Tom, the Saudi decision leaves the Taliban regime standing virtually alone diplomatically and no longer able to claim any legitimacy in the Islamic world.

Saudi Arabia, birthplace of Islam, today breaks relations with the Taliban, undermining any claim the Taliban can make to a holy war with the West. The Saudi government accuses the Taliban of harboring terrorists who, quote, “defame Islam and the reputation of Muslims around the world.”

Coverage of Saudi Arabia during the first two weeks after the 9/11 attacks reveals that the networks were closely in line with the official policy of categorizing countries as either with America or against it. Despite the fact that Osama bin Laden is a former Saudi citizen and many of the hijackers were also
from Saudi Arabia, the sympathetic diplomatic and financial frames constructed by American and Saudi officials prevailed. During the period directly after the attacks, there was no close examination of the nature of the Saudi regime or the litany of Al Qaeda grievances towards the Saudi monarchy. Public opinion in Saudi Arabia was not considered a priority for the networks during this period; issues of access seemed to inhibit any effort to include the views of non-official Saudis.

Access to Saudi Arabian expert or public views in the aftermath of 9/11 would probably not have been as challenging in 2001 as it was in earlier years. Numerous Saudi dissidents, professionals and regular citizens live in London and other European capitals, as well as in many cities in the United States, including New York and Washington. But their views were not considered relevant for inclusion on network news programming. The emphasis remained on how the White House defined its relationship with Saudi Arabia and how the country could assist in the fight against terror.

What was emphasized on network news was the official view. Saudi Arabia was cooperating with the US and it would provide monetary and political stability by controlling the price of oil during the war with Afghanistan and maintaining its investments in the American stock market. During this period, the stakes were too high for media criticism of Saudi Arabia, because of the need to placate Muslim allies in preparation for war. It was later in 2001 and the next
year, when the Saudi government was reluctant to host American military bases for strikes against ‘terror’, that the rhetoric used by journalists and anchors became increasingly critical and derogatory towards Saudi Arabia. However, for the specific period examined in this study, it appears that network news framing of Saudi Arabia was primarily that of a diplomatic, financial and religious friend and ally. Any potential threat from future bin Laden supporters in Saudi Arabia as well as the role the Kingdom played in financing Islamic educational institutions (madrasas) in Pakistan and Afghanistan (that often served as centers for dissemination of the fundamentalist Wahhabi version of Islam which inspired militant Islamic movements all over the world) was obscured.

JORDAN

Jordan’s coverage was not much different from that of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The same ideological categorization of Jordan as a moderate Arab country was employed by network anchors and reporters. However, the main difference was in the level of articulation of the younger, more Western appealing Jordanian leadership, King Abdallah. On the morning of September 11th, the Jordanian King was on a plane bound for Washington DC, to meet with the Bush administration in an attempt to persuade President Bush to take a more active role in ending the region’s violence. When King Abdallah received word of the
attacks on his plane, it turned around and flew him back to Amman. Immediately following the attacks, Abdallah gave several interviews on various network television news shows, to highlight what were essentially the same talking points that Mubarak conveyed in his network interviews: strong condemnation of the attacks, support for the US in the fight against terror, and a warning that the US should exercise caution when formulating their military and diplomatic strategy of response to the terrorist attacks. Amman had the same message that had been repeatedly conveyed by Cairo; the US needed to step in and take concrete action to facilitate a return by the Israelis and Palestinians to the negotiating table. On September 13th, King Abdallah spoke with Bryant Gumbel of NBC:

GUMBEL: Do you think Tuesday's attacks were in any way precipitated by the Bush administration's disengagement from Mideast peace efforts?

King ABDULLAH: Not at all. I believe that as long as you have unresolved issues in the Middle East, especially the core issue between the Palestinians and the Israelis, you're obviously going to give terrorists and extremists the upper hand. And so it's an ongoing process that we have to solve, and when we do solve it, obviously we sort of take the wind out of their sails, so to speak; and therefore, I think we need to move as quickly as possible to resolve the issues of this area.

King Abdallah was eloquent and compassionate in his tone of delivery during his interviews, an accomplishment that far surpassed the language skills and articulation of either President Mubarak or the Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal. Since King Abdallah is of a younger, more media-savvy generation than either of the other Arab spokesmen, in his interviews he was able to express sympathy with the US while cautioning against hasty action, all without sounding
too critical. His message provided an important counterweight to Colin Powell and Ehud Barak, who were both of the opinion that peace between Israelis and Palestinians was not a sufficient remedy to the problem of terrorism. King Abdallah, on the other hand, made it clear that a peaceful settlement that guaranteed the rights of Palestinians to their occupied land would negate Al Qaida’s mass legitimacy for the Arab street.

As with Egypt, Jordanian diplomats were also talking to the networks, providing the American public with eloquent sympathy and reassurance. The Jordanian ambassador Marwan Muasher was quick to respond. Brokaw also emphasizes that Jordan is classified as a moderate country, labeling it a US ally and friend.

BROKAW: We have on the phone now the Jordanian ambassador to the United States, Marwan Muasher. And Jordan, of course, is one of the moderate Arab states. It’s always had open lines of communications to this country. It has a new monarch since the death of King Hussein. There are going to be a lot of Americans, obviously Mr. Ambassador, who are upset by those scenes of some Palestinians on the West Bank who have been celebrating this day. What has been the official reaction of your government?

Mr. MARWAN MUASHER (Jordanian Ambassador): First of all, I’d like to express our condolences to the victims of the families, and our strong condemnation for the act. His Majesty King Abdullah just sent a message of condolence to the president, and the government has issued its strong condemnation of this heinous and senseless crime.

I need to say that the scenes that we’ve seen on TV are largely those of few kids on the streets. I cannot believe, and I do not think that there is anybody who would really condone such heinous crimes. And I have no doubt that the Palestinians, as the rest of the Arab world, joins the United States in condemning the attack and in, really, willing to do everything possible to help with all future moves.

Muasher was one of the first Arab sources interviewed that was publicly facing the task of explaining the jubilation shown by Palestinians following the attacks. The scenes were shown frequently throughout the
morning, afternoon and evening of September 11th, and many stunned Americans were horrified at the pictures of the few Palestinians celebrating an act of suicidal mass murder. The video featured children waving flags and adults clearly celebrating. But as the Reuters news clip played again and again, it signified the beginning of the end for Palestinian legitimacy in the United States. The Jordanian ambassador did an admirable job of focusing the broader Arab reaction to the attacks on condemnation of aggression and gestures of support.

Despite the similarity of the Jordanian official position to that of Egypt, the two countries have varying levels of censorship policies towards foreign correspondents. ABC ran a segment flied by Richard Gizbert in Amman on September 18th in which Jordanian censorship prevented any unsanctioned opinions from speaking on camera. The Arab public opinion instead was gathered in Cairo and selected from people who called in to Al Jazeera. Gizbert explicitly refers to the Jordanian restrictions placed on Western journalists. Although Egypt is generally open to press coverage, reporting about military bases, oil fields or the Libyan border are off-limits to foreign correspondents. Jordan is more difficult to cover because of internal travel restrictions and the fact that to film anything, the crews needed to obtain permission from the government beforehand. Network news crews can spend months trying to get visas to Jordan and Syria and when they finally get in the country, the reporters can only file a
few stories. Visas have also been a major access issue in Afghanistan, Iran, Morocco, Algeria, the Gulf States and Sudan (Hershman & Griggs, 1981).

GIZBERT: For all the expressions of sympathy, all the promises of support, this is what the US really wants from the Arab world, an alleged terrorist on trial in an Arab country. Rami Hijazi, an American-born Jordanian chanted, 'God is great,' yesterday, as he was accused of planning to bomb a hotel full of Westerners during millennium celebrations in Jordan. The prosecutors said Hijazi is part of Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'eda terror network. News cameras were allowed in the courtroom, a first for Jordan. The US has demanded Arab states arrest and prosecute terrorists, and Jordan is eager to show Washington it is on its side. However, there are some things Jordan does not want Americans to see or hear.

(OC) Such as the view from the street and the voice of the people. Like many Arab countries, Jordan does not allow us to sample public opinion here without first getting a permit from the government. And ever since the attacks on New York and Washington, the authorities here have refused all such permit requests from the media. And they have some very good reasons to do that.

(VO) They don't want the world to see scenes like this when a small crowd of Palestinians in the occupied territory celebrated the attacks on the US, creating the perception of a widespread anti-American feeling. Nor does Jordan want militants here to agitate its Palestinian population which makes up more than 50 percent of the country. It's a delicate time here. Opinions are easier to obtain in Egypt. And on the streets of Cairo today, some of the voices were radical.

Unidentified Man #4: (Through translator) The US deserved what happened, absolutely, and I support those who did it.

Unidentified Man #5: (Through translator) It was a military act targeting civilians. It was wrong and unlawful.

Unidentified Man #6: (Through translator) I do not say they deserve it. They are human beings.

GIZBERT: (VO) Another good way of measuring Muslim sentiment is through Al Jazeera TV based in Qatar. Tonight's phone-in show was beamed across the Arab world to a potential audience of 50 million. And some of the callers were almost incoherent with anger.

Unidentified Caller #1: (Through translator) US attacks must have been perpetrated by secret groups like the CIA to revive the US economy. This is an economy corporation, not against Islam, not against the Arabs.

Unidentified Caller #2: (Through translator) Israel is the one that hit America. Israel is behind these attacks. Israel is the only one officiating these attacks.

Unidentified Caller #3: If Americans want to enjoy their freedom and their security, let them give freedom and security to others. They must stop supporting this Zionist and the Jews in Palestine, or else what happened last Tuesday will happen again and in a bigger way.

GIZBERT: (VO) These sampling suggest Arab cooperation with the US in its war on terrorism will not be a sure thing. And if the US does manage to get their cooperation, it will find the Arab world will want something in return, beginning with what Arabs see as America's unwavering support of Israel.

Mr. GEORGE HAWATMEH (Chief Editor Al-Rai Newspaper): To restrain the Israelis for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, to look not only also at the Palestinian problem, but also at other frustrating problems in the area. Sanctions against Iraq, what will happen to them?

Mr. GEORGE JOFFE (University of London): They're not in the same situation they were 10 years ago after the invasion of Kuwait. On this occasion Arab support is going to be largely confined to rhetoric. And the
main reason for this is that they know that if they do, public opinion in the Arab world will react ferociously against it.

GIZBERT: (VO) Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Jordan's King Abdulla, Yasser Arafat, they were all talking about the attack today because it has implications for all of them. Finally, a reminder that it just wasn't an attack on America. Ramsey Durante (ph), a Jordanian accountant, American trained, employed by a US firm, one of the missing from the World Trade Center, is mourned by his family in Amman.

Unidentified Mother: He wanted me to go up and see the World from his floor.

GIZBERT: On what floor was he on?

Mother: The 100th floor. And he told me, 'You know, Mom, every morning I go and I spend a few minutes just looking down and it opens my heart.' You know, he used to tell me,'It would make me feel--I'm on top of everything.' He just loved the place.

GIZBERT: (VO) An Arab family united in grief with Americans, and like Americans, wondering what lies ahead.

The report is one of the rare ones filed during this period from the Middle East, particularly in countries other than Israel and the Occupied Territories. It ends with an angle that identifies Jordanian suffering with the victims of the World Trade Center attack. The conclusion here is one of peace, hope and unity among Arabs and Americans, both sharing their common grief at the human tragedy and loss of life. The majority of sources quoted are Arab, and the opinion is gathered not only from the streets of Cairo, but also from the open phone lines to Al Jazeera, a Qatar-based satellite channel which became a household name in America after the attacks.

Out of 10 total source statements, 9 were from Arabs and one was from a Caucasian British professor. There was one female and she was a victim, grieving for her son who died in the World Trade Center. The rest were men, and the three that called in to Al Jazeera were broadcast in low audio shouting with angry fervor about conspiracies, which is reminiscent of the representation of the
conspiratorial Arab, as previously seen with Mohammed Atta’s father in Cairo. The callers are convinced that the CIA and/or the Israelis had carried out the attacks, exhibiting complete denial about Arab involvement. One of the callers points to what he perceived as the double standard of US policy in the Middle East: if you want freedom and security, make it happen for others; i.e. the Palestinians and Iraqis.

Out of the comments about 9/11 the majority were explicitly anti-American and only one Arab man said that America didn’t deserve it and showed empathy towards the victims of the attacks. One of the opinions was an interesting mix of sentiments. He said it was wrong to attack civilians, thus condemning the attacks, but he also referred to them as a military attack. The military reference indicates that perhaps the attacks were necessary in principle; the US should be a target of military violence, but it should not have been a civilian target.

The expert opinions are provided by an Arab and an Englishman. Hawatmeh is the editor of Al-Rai, a Jordanian state-owned and operated newspaper, and Joffe is an academic specialist on terrorism and the Middle East at the University of London. However, there is a difference in the statements made by the two experts. Hawatmeh raises the issue of fairness for the Palestinians and lifting sanctions against Iraq, while Joffe offers his analysis of Arab support. He characterizes the leaders as, "confined to rhetoric" meaning there is no serious official support of the US, because that could undermine their
own positions if public opinion was inflamed. Joffe draws attention to the clear
distinction between Arab public opinion and the official Arab view as represented
by officials.

Even though his story ends with shared Jordanian-American grief, the
framing of Gizbert's survey was that in the Middle East, the number of America-
haters far outweighed moderate, sympathetic views. He thus evaluates the Arab
voices as "incoherent with anger" and radical, thus effectively marginalizing Arab
public opinion by shifting the balance towards fanaticism and hysteria. The Arab
street expressed their anger at America, and their reaction was very different
from the official statements. But in Jordan, public opinion was impossible to
measure, so instead the reporter chose to sample Arab views from a television
station. Thus, there was no evaluation of Jordanian opinions about the attacks,
once again due to access.

PALESTINIANS

Edward Said’s work highlights the cultural lenses through which American
reporters cover the Middle East and Islam (Said, 1997). He argues that
ethnocentrism among correspondents stems from a historically Euro-centric, or
an 'Orientalist' representation of Arabs and Islam which began with European
studies of the region in the 17th and 18th centuries (Said, 1979). Ethnocentrism
among American reporters is defined as a tendency to value American practices and way of life above all others, meaning that a country covered by a foreign correspondent is judged against an American standard. In the case of reporting about the Middle East, this ethnocentrism can lead to a conscious or unconscious leaning towards Israel. This intensifies cultural and historical ties to Israel, and can prompt American reporters to be more likely to identify with Israeli values, thereby categorizing Arab culture and values as alien.

After September 11th, Israelis were framed by network news as the most experienced experts on dealing with terrorism, and their tactics and security methods were evaluated as a prime example for America to follow. The two countries now shared a common purpose: eradicating terrorism by the use of force and security precautions. This frame was exemplified in reports filed from Israel that highlighted aspects of Israeli security, particularly in its airline industry. Both ABC and CBS aired similar stories about the high standards of security procedures adopted by the national Israeli airline carrier, El Al. Both stories quoted Israeli security experts, who stressed the need for interrogation of passengers, inspection of luggage and profiling of travelers to the Middle East.

This trend of consulting Israeli sources for their views on security measures was not only present in stories filed by correspondents, it was also noticeable in interviews conducted with Israeli officials. On
September 11th, Dan Rather asked Israeli ambassador Alon Pinkas about the main components of his country’s airline security, and was told that Israel "makes it extremely difficult for you from the minute you get into the airport until the minute you board the plane." The problem with this reliance on Israelis as security experts is that there is no explanation of why Israel needs to be so secure: they are putting these tight security measures in place because they are protecting themselves against the violent expression of political grievances by Palestinians, i.e. hijackings. While the reasons for increased security procedures may be shared by both countries, the Israeli policy of dealing with the threat of terrorism entails harassing travelers as well as continued political and military oppression of the Palestinians.

Despite the gravitation towards the Israeli worldview of handling terrorism, and the classification of Israel as security experts, the Palestinian viewpoint was present though marginalized on network news following 9/11. Yasser Arafat was shown expressing his shock at the attacks and sympathy for the American victims of violent terrorism. The next week was one of great trepidation in Israel, while both sides were trying to evaluate the impact of the attacks in New York and Washington on their political claims to legitimacy. Arafat realized that he would be equated with terrorism, and called upon Palestinian factions to declare a cease-fire. Meanwhile, the networks reported that Israel had temporarily halted
its military incursions into Palestinian territories, even though Jenin had already been placed under Israeli military siege following 9/11. But network reporters excluded events in Jenin, and chose instead to paint a picture of "relative calm" in the Middle East. On September 18\textsuperscript{th}, NBC reporters were cautiously optimistic about the situation in Israel and the occupied territories:

DAVID GREGORY: As the administration works to build an international coalition of support for the military campaign the US will launch, officials welcomed news from the Middle East, today, of easing tensions. Israel halted all offensive military operations after Yasser Arafat promised to unilaterally observe a cease-fire.

ANDREA MITCHELL Israel under pressure from the United States, beginning to withdraw after, of course, Yasser Arafat finally delivered that long-awaited statement in Arabic calling for a unilateral cease-fire. So some beginnings of Middle East diplomacy. That's what the Middle East moderate Arabs want.

While it may have appeared that diplomacy was taking precedence in the Middle East, the image that was most frequently associated with the Palestinians was of them celebrating and dancing in the streets upon hearing news of the attacks. These pictures were frequently repeated throughout the 24-hour news cycle of September 11\textsuperscript{th} and they were mostly judged to be irrational and hurtful by network reporters and anchors.

On September 12\textsuperscript{th}, as CBS was preparing to broadcast a live interview with King Abdallah, Ted Koppel told Diane Sawyer that he understood why these celebrations were taking place. It was a rare moment on network news when Koppel’s personal view of the Mideast
conflict helped balance out the negative connotations of the jubilant 
Palestinians. Koppel was in London when the attacks happened, and he 
spoke to Sawyer from there. He made it clear that his years of experience 
reporting on this particular conflict led him to a nuanced understanding of 
how frustrated the Palestinians and Arabs were about their situation with 
the Israelis. He cautioned against interpreting the sentiments of the 
Palestinians shown on camera as a general Arab reaction to the attacks.

SAWYER: I just wanted to get a sense from you of the perspective overseas. We all watched 
those scenes of Palestinians and in Nablus and other places cheering, celebrating, and it is a deep-
seated visceral reaction in this country. Give us your vantage point. What does it look like from 
there?

KOPPEL: Well, I must say on the one hand, and I hope this is not misunderstood, I almost 
understand what happened with some of those Palestinians, and I hope that that reaction is not just 
universally broadcast over the entire Arab world. There has been a feeling of such frustration in the 
Arab world for many years, particularly among Palestinians, that this gives them a sense of a 
greater power, perhaps, than they have ever known before. But is that reflected in the larger Arab 
world? I cannot believe that it is, and I'm sure if and when you speak to King Abdullah, that will be 
the point he wants to make above any and all others.

On September 11th, network reports from Israel set the tone for frames of 
Israeli and Palestinian reactions to the attacks. The Israeli people expressed 
sympathy towards American victims of violence, which was conveyed visually by 
pictures of flowers at the US embassy and the tears of Israelis, while the 
Palestinian quotes pointed out their grievances against US policies in the Middle 
East. The anchors again added context to the story in their introductions, like this 
one by Tom Brokaw, in which he summarizes the story by telling America about 
those who do not wish them well. In this story, the disparity between the views of
the Palestinian people and Palestinian leadership is evident; while the people express their anger at American sponsorship of the Israeli occupation, Yasser Arafat is shocked at news of the attacks. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon immediately framed the event as an attack on freedom and liberty, as he vowed that the good guys would overcome the forces of darkness. This frame of adopting the clash of civilizations doctrine was reinforced constantly by various Israeli officials interviewed by the networks following the attacks.

NBC 9/11 BROKAW: There are people around the world who do not wish America well. We know that as a result of today's attacks, but also on the basis of their reaction to what happened here today. Some of them are even celebrating. For that story here's NBC's Martin Fletcher in Tel Aviv.

FLETCHER: Tom, Israel's declaring a day of mourning tomorrow in solidarity with the United States. But not all reaction here has been so sympathetic. There's a sense here among some Palestinians that America had it coming.

These Palestinians in East Jerusalem today, delighted at the bombings and American loss of life, offering cakes and sweets, calling out 'God is great!' Thousands more celebrate in other West Bank towns until Palestinian police disperse them. The Palestinian leader, however, stunned and sympathetic.

Mr. YASSER ARAFAT (Palestinian Prime Minister): We are completely shocked, completely shocked. Unbelievable.

FLETCHER: But the voice of the street effects anger at America's role, especially in Israel and Iraq.

Unidentified Man: We should show America that they should learn and they should know what is to attack somebody like Iraq. It should be more.

FLETCHER: And many Arabs furious at American support for Israel. This man holds up an American-made bomb part fired by American-made aircraft used by Israel. American support for Israel, some believe, makes America a legitimate target for terrorism. Many also angry at years of almost daily American bomb attacks against Iraq which didn't stop with the end of the Gulf War a decade ago. And US troops still in Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden, a prime suspect in today's terror attacks, angry at American support for what he calls a tyrannical government of Saudi Arabia, his homeland, and for America's close ties with Israel.

In almost a year of unrest, more than a dozen Palestinian suicide bombers and other attackers have killed over 170 Israelis while Israel has killed more than 570 Palestinians. A conflict that always threatens to suck neighboring countries into the fighting. Israel tonight called for an international war against terrorism.

Mr. ARIEL SHARON (Israeli Prime Minister): The fight against terror is an international struggle of the free world against the forces of darkness, who seek to destroy our liberty and our way of life.
FLETCHER: Today, the leader of Hamas, the Islamic militants who send most suicide bombers against Israel, called on America to change its policies. Sheikh Yassin said America is behind injustices in many parts of the world. But then he said Hamas doesn't support attacks against civilians.

Tonight Israel closed its air space to foreign airlines and then closed its land borders to prevent any possible terrorist attacks. There's a sense here that Palestinian militants may try to take advantage of the confusion to kill more Israelis. Tom:

BROKAW: Thank you very much. NBC's Martin Fletcher. An already very complex and volatile situation in the Middle East is even more so tonight.

Fletcher lists the political grievances that the Palestinians and other Arabs hold against America; namely the Israeli occupation, US troops in the Arabian Gulf and sanctions imposed on the Iraqi people. However, the framing of his story is that there is a great deal of anger, which could manifest itself in the form of attacks against Israeli civilians by Palestinian militants. Israel sympathizes with the United States, while the Palestinians think America deserved to be attacked. Prime Minister Sharon’s interpretation of the events is similar to that of President Bush and the biblical reference to darkness and light in Sharon’s statement matched the numerous biblical references that Bush used to frame America’s response to the attacks. This highlighting of the shared Judeo-Christian tradition that justifies and legitimates Israel’s policies in America serves to further marginalize the Arab/Palestinian/Muslim position, which was framed as violent and angry according to the statements made by Palestinians to network correspondents.

In this next story filed on September 11th, NBC reporter Donna Freisen captures the variety of sentiments expressed by Arabs and Israelis with essentially the same framing outcome: Israelis equated the 9/11 attacks to the
activities of Palestinian militants, while Palestinians equated the terrorist attacks to America’s support of Israel’s military tactics suppressing their cause.

NBC 9/11 BROKAW: Let’s go to Tel Aviv now to Donna Freisen. That is an area, of course, that has gotten a lot of attention today. Palestinian youngsters were in the streets on the West Bank celebrating this attack on America, while Yasser Arafat was condemning it. Tell us—it’s now late there, obviously what the evening was like in the Middle East, Donna.

DONNA FRIESEN: Well, Tom, people here in Israel and in the Palestinian territories were glued to their television sets through the course of this day, stunned by events. TV stations with wall-to-wall coverage. This is, sadly, a place that is accustomed to almost daily terror attacks, but nothing, of course, on the scale, the magnitude of what we saw today in the United States. Leaders from throughout the region, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Libyan leader Moammar al-Qaddafi have condemned the attacks. Among the first to voice his horror was Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. However, as you said, there is a great deal of anti-American sentiment in this part of the world, and some of that was expressed here within hours of the attack.

Unidentified Man #6: They are helping the Jews to kill the Palestinian people.

Unidentified Reporter #3: How do you comment on the bombings in the United States?

Mr. YASSER ARAFAT: We are completely shocked. Completely shocked.

FRIESEN: Bin Laden, now prime suspect in the attacks, has called on his followers to fight until all Americans are driven out of Islamic countries. There’s long been fear the conflict in Israel could drag neighboring Arab countries into a wider war. Now this attack may further embolden enemies of Israel.

Unidentified Man #7: The ambitions of terrorist groups that fight against Israel will rise.

FRIESEN: The leader of Hamas, the Islamic extremist group responsible for many suicide bombings inside Israel, says he doesn’t support attacks against innocent people, but says the US must re-assess its position. It’s the cause of injustice in many parts of the world, he says. Tonight, Israel’s prime minister calling for an international war on terrorism.

Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON: I believe that together we can defeat these forces of evil.

FRIESEN: At the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, flowers of sympathy.

Unidentified Man #8: I think very few Americans now don’t understand how Israelis feel.

FRIESEN: And Israeli airspace closed tonight, as are the borders with Lebanon, with Egypt and with Jordan. All the checkpoints in and out of the West Bank and the Gaza strip are closed as well, as a precaution in case a terrorist tries to take advantage of the situation. Several US embassies in the Middle East have been closed indefinitely, in Yemen and Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Israel has also declared tomorrow a day of mourning in solidarity with the United States. And just one more note, Tom, Israel has sent rescue teams, experts in extricating people from rubble of buildings, to New York to assist in the search and recovery efforts, Tom:

BROKAW: Thank you very much. Donna Freisen who is in Tel Aviv tonight with a wrap-up of what’s going on in that troubled and volatile part of the world.
While the correspondents were in Israel reporting on the reactions there, network producers back in the United States were conducting live interviews with Palestinian and Israeli officials to get their perspective on the attacks. An analysis of these interviews reveals a number of interesting frames at work. Frames are determined in this analysis by examining the differences in how Palestinian and Israeli official sources defined the problem, diagnosed its causes, evaluated its effects and suggested remedies. In order to provide a sense of what the Israeli and Palestinian officials were saying, the following excerpts are included from network interviews broadcast during the first few days after the attacks, and organized according to the central messages that they convey.

The main trends that emerged from these official statements are that:

(1) Both Israeli and Palestinian spokespeople tried to identify their respective causes with the tragedy and suffering of the American people.

(2) The Israelis made frequent references to what they characterized as different civilizations: ours good, theirs bad.

(3) The Palestinians were struggling to control the damage to their image and legitimacy caused by the pictures of jubilant Palestinians.

(4) The Israelis attempted to disassociate the attacks of 9/11 from the conflict with the Palestinians, while linking bin Laden to Palestinian militant groups.

(5) The Israeli and Palestinian views about remedies to the problem of terrorism are different;
while Ehud Barak suggested targeted military retaliation, Hanan Ashrawi called for solving the root of the problem of terrorism through diplomacy.

**IDENTIFICATION WITH AMERICA AS VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE**

Mr. SHIMON PERES (Israeli Foreign Minister): Each of us feels today like an American. Our heart is with the families, with the victims. It's full of pain. But we know the United States is a great and a strong country, and as you've won so many wars and suffered so many agonies, again you and us, and all of us will emerge stronger and more hopeful.

ASHRAWI: I can tell you that every day I see Palestinians, children, men, women lighting candles, laying wreaths, going to the American Consulate. I saw people weeping. Yesterday, over a million Palestinian school children took two minutes of silence in grief and sorrow. Everyday there are marches, there are vigils, there is an overwhelming support, a sense of identification as well because Palestinians feel like they are victims as well.

**CLASH OF CIVILIZATION FRAME**

Ambassador ALON PINKAS (Israeli Consul General): There's a great divide between two civilizations: civilization of democracy and liberty, and the civilization of evil and violence. And there are many groups on the other side of that divide that could have done this.

PERES: I think that America is the only one that can save the world from this terrible terror and fight this terrible fight. There is nobody else that can lead us again to become a civilized society and not fall down to the laws and rules of the jungle.

**DISSASOCIATION OF ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT FROM 9/11**

RATHER: Mr. Consul General, to those Americans who may be thinking or may be even saying to one another, 'You know, we wouldn't be having this trouble if we hadn't supported Israel for more than half a century,' you say what?

Amb. PINKAS: I say something very simple. This is not about Israel. Let's delink. This is ridiculous to even link this. We have a political conflict in the Middle East. We have tried to resolve it last year at Camp David. The same people who rejected those offers at Camp David are the people who were singing in the streets and rejoicing yesterday when the news of what had happened in New York and Washington came through, while we, on the other hand, announced a day of national mourning today.

**PALESTINIAN DAMAGE CONTROL**

BROKAW: I'm sure that so many people have said to you that many Americans were stunned when they saw young Palestinians and others, grown-ups as well, celebrating in the West Bank when they got the news of these terrorist attacks on American targets. It certainly doesn't help your cause.

ASHRAWI: Yes. No, it certainly doesn't, but I would like to point out again that these people are in minority, they were a few. They do not represent the Palestinian people. It was a sort of knee-jerk reaction before the full import of what had happened became known. People acted without information. They were a very small minority and once they knew, again, they shared our shock and our grief.
LINKING 9/11 WITH PALESTINIANS

Mr. BENJAMIN NETANYAHU (Former Israeli Prime Minister): It’s important to understand that Yasser Arafat, PLO land, if you will, PLO authority and its territory, is simply a branch of this larger terrorist tree. There is a terrorist empire—a network of terrorists that includes, as Andrea Mitchell said, the Afghanistan and the Taliban part of it. It includes Iran. It includes Iraq, a few other Middle Eastern regimes. Arafat’s own Palestinian Authority which harbors groups that have cooperated—and cooperate today with the bin Laden fatwa; Arafat’s own movement, the Islamic Jihad, the Hamas terrorist movement and Hezbollah in Lebanon. This is what I may call the terror network.

REMEDIES TO THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM

KOPPEL: What are you saying the United States should do to Afghanistan, or any other government that has been involved?

Mr. BARAK: Put an end to it, put the people responsible under arrest. Send them to international bodies to be brought to justice, it will be OK. No one wants out of a kind of obsession to hit them.

We are protecting our very essence of way of life against terror and some terror cells under masks. And we have to unmask them, to expose them, to put them to accountability being either terrorist or rogue leaders. There is no other way.

This examination of Israeli and Palestinian source statements reveals that their positions were articulated by current and former officials, and demonstrates the messages that they both wanted to convey. Each side attempted to put their own spin, or impose their perspective on the events of September 11th, thus providing competing ways of explaining, organizing and interpreting how terrorism relates to their experiences and respective ideological relationships with America. These examples illustrate how spokespeople can be highly skilled at articulating their positions and manipulating the situation to their own advantage. However, the Israeli view appeared to receive more legitimacy than the Palestinian view in this news discourse. The convention of associating Palestinians
with violence strengthened Israeli stature, while the Palestinians were on the defensive after September 11th.

ATTACKING IRAQ

One of the main grievances that Osama bin Laden and many others in the Arab world have expressed regarding US policy in the Middle East are the sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War. But when it came to discussions of Iraq post-9/11, most of the references made to Iraq involved potential military strikes and attempts to link the Iraqi regime with the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. There were frequent direct references to attacking Iraq in the two weeks following the attacks. These references were made by administration officials as well as reporters, anchors and expert commentators. There were mentions of the unfinished business of the Gulf War, the brutality of Saddam Hussein, and the need to depose him.

DAN RATHER: At the Pentagon, planning is moving ahead for a war on terror. CBS' David Martin reports tonight some around President Bush believe now that it should include finishing what they see as the unfinished business of the Gulf War.

DAVID MARTIN: Dan, the first orders have been issued and the military buildup for the war against terrorism is beginning. But at the same time, there is a battle within the Bush administration over who the target should be. Everyone wants to go after Osama bin Laden, but some senior officials see this as a chance to finish off Saddam Hussein.

MARTIN: In fact, the administration is still trying to figure out what to do next. One option favored by some senior Pentagon officials calls for targeting not just Osama bin Laden, but Saddam Hussein, as well, going all the way to Baghdad and finishing the job that President Bush's father started in the Gulf War.
On September 13th, CBS aired a story about the decision by hawks in the Bush administration to go after the network of terror, which will include attacks well beyond Afghanistan. It was one of the earliest indications of future plans to attack Iraq. The week after the attacks, the networks were reporting that one of the hijackers allegedly met with an Iraqi official; this is when the attempt to link Iraq to 9/11 started. The data from network newscasts in September 2001 indicate that Iraq was indeed the second phase of the war Bush had declared against terror. The networks led their newscasts with the Iraqi connection on September 18th:

CBS 9/18 JIM STEWART: US officials have received a report that at least one of the dead hijackers met before the attacks with an Iraqi intelligence officer. They believe the report to be accurate. Officials say Mohamed Atta, the pilot of the first plane to crash into the World Trade towers, met early this year in Europe with the head of Saddam Hussein's European intelligence service. The meeting is not a smoking gun, officials say, but it is the first indication that a foreign state may have aided or at least had some knowledge of last Tuesday's attack.

NBC 9/18 JIM MIKLASZEWSKI: But other nations that sponsor terrorism, including Iraq, are on the list of potential targets in the US campaign to hunt down terrorists.

NBC 9/18 PETE WILLIAMS: Investigators learn more about the backgrounds of the hijackers. Officials tell NBC News that Mohamed Atta, among those on the plane that crashed into the north World Trade Center tower, met earlier this year in Europe with a midlevel Iraqi intelligence officer. US officials say the information is sketchy, and it's no proof Iraq had any role in last week's attacks.

Since all coverage was shaped by the Bush doctrine of "with us or against us" America's allies and enemies became even more delineated, and Iraq was labeled as an enemy that had to be dealt with. There was mass speculation about state sponsorship of the 9/11 attacks, and when the Iraqi president was not
on the list of Arab leaders who had condemned the attacks and expressed their sympathy towards the US, the speculation intensified.

9/15 TOM BROKAW: And today, Iraq's Saddam Hussein expressed very little sympathy for the victims of Tuesday's attack, saying, 'The United States should feel the pain it's inflicted on other countries.' The words of Saddam Hussein.

Network anchors wanted to know whether Iraq would bear the brunt of American anger and revenge for the attacks in New York and Washington. Representations of Iraq were vastly different than those of the moderate Arab allies Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. At a press conference on September 12th, Colin Powell was cautious about linking Iraq to 9/11, a position that evolved over the course of the next year to the other extreme: Powell addressing the UN with evidence of this link. On September 23rd, Powell once again alluded to Saddam’s evil nature on NBC, but refused to spell out a clear link between the Iraqi regime and the events of 9/11. He listed America’s grievances with Hussein, and alludes to a potential future attack. At the time, the administration decided to wait until US forces were done with Afghanistan before attacking Iraq.

TIM RUSSERT: How about Saddam Hussein in Iraq? Is there any evidence that he was involved in the attack on the World Trade Center or the Pentagon and is he currently harboring terrorists and, therefore, is someone that we would like to engage on this issue?

SEC’Y POWELL: Well, there are some reports of linkages, but not to the extent that I would say today there is a clear link. But we’re looking for links and we’re watching him very, very carefully. We have no illusions about Saddam Hussein. He means us no good. He means the region no good. He is, of course, trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. For 10 years, we have kept him contained and we’ll continue to keep him contained. And as you know, we always have the ability to strike if that seems to be the appropriate thing to do. And so we are taking no options off the table. And we always consider him to be a potential source of terrorist activity and to harbor terrorism, and terrorist activities. So we've got a good eye on the Iraqi regime.
ABC was more cautious when approaching the issue of attacking Iraq, and broadcast different sound bites from Colin Powell. Iraq would probably be attacked, but not until Afghanistan was cleared of its terrorists. On the 17th, 18th and 23rd of September, ABC’s Pentagon correspondent John McWethy reported on the debate within the administration about Iraq and pointed out that Washington had decided against taking any immediate action in Iraq due to concerns about losing the high level of international support America had received after the attacks.

MCWETHY Sources say Iraq is likely to be included in later strikes, not because of any direct tie to last week’s attacks, but because of Saddam Hussein’s longstanding support of terrorism. A decade ago, Iraq attempted to assassinate former President George Bush. There is also the question of Iraq’s continuing efforts to develop biological and chemical weapons.

MCWETHY The administration is now hotly debating whether it should limit its strikes to just Afghanistan or to hit a country like Iraq because of the suspected link to one terrorist in last week’s attack. State Department officials argue that that link is so tenuous that the US might be seen as just settling old scores and not seeking justice, and the US would lose a great deal of world support.

MCWETHY A week-long debate over whether to hit targets beyond just Afghanistan appears to be over. The Pentagon wanted to go after Iraq, and even terrorist camps in Lebanon, with the State Department arguing that could destroy world support.

COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE The president has examined all the options available to him and he has decided to go after the al-Qaeda network, to go after the head of it, Osama bin Laden.

MCWETHY Other targets, the president has now decided, must wait.

These excerpts illustrate the intense debate about Iraq in the weeks after the attacks in New York and Washington. Competing versions of the
validity of evidence linking Saddam Hussein to 9/11 were provided, while administration officials hesitated to make any concrete connections between the two. Thus, a connection that the administration admitted was contentious was reported as fact. What is noticeably absent in the representation of Iraq is any references by administration officials to lifting sanctions or opportunities for diplomacy. The coverage of Iraq after 9/11 did not seem significantly different from the way Iraq has been discussed in American media since the Gulf War. The Iraqi regime was an enemy of the US, classified as a country that opposed US policy, a rogue state in contrast to the Arab allies, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt.

Previous research on American media depictions of Iraq (Abunimeh and Masri, 2000) found that broadcast coverage of Iraq was mainly centered around bombing campaigns, and did not devote much attention to reports of suffering by Iraqi civilians. American media systematically ignored or downplayed the sanctions’ effects on the Iraqi civilian population, discredited or ignored reports of civilian victims of the bombings, and personified Iraq as Saddam Hussein. The media also created an artificial balance of coverage by relying on Iraqi official sources as opposed to including independent, non-governmental viewpoints. Journalists were towing the government line, exaggerating the threat of Iraqi weapons and using a narrow selection of experts as sources.
Some of these themes are manifest in network coverage of Iraq during the weeks after 9/11. Reporters were relying on American officials for their information about Iraq’s potential links to the attacks. The networks seemed to exaggerate the Iraqi threat by highlighting links to the attacks by focusing their discourse on a clinical, military attack of Iraq. This approach also obscured the potential impact of such an attack on Iraqi civilians suffering under economic and political sanctions.

THE USE OF ARABS AS EXPERTS

Edmund Ghareeb (1981) noted that in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, there were very few Arabs who were considered legitimate enough to be quoted as experts in American news. That trend seems to have evolved somewhat, since there were Arabs whose opinion and analysis were relevant to network news after 9/11. These Arab expert sources were mainly journalists who were familiar with covering Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Sound bites from Abdel Bari Atwan, Palestinian editor of Al Quds newspaper in London were prominent. Since Atwan had conducted interviews with bin Laden he was regarded as a legitimate source of information about the global terrorist network.

The Arab expert is a relatively new phenomenon to network news. Ghareeb’s in-depth interviews with journalists in 1981 indicated that there was a
dire need for articulate Arabs whom American journalists could easily access and interview. Since the '80s, there has been a rising trend of using the Arab journalist as an expert. However, Western terrorism experts or Orientalist scholars of the Middle East remain a frequently used category of expert opinion about the region, as this ABC report filed by Jim Wooten in London on September 12th reveals.

WOOTEN: Even from this distance, these thousands of miles that separate this place, London from New York and Washington, even from this far away, it's difficult to remain detached, to discard the natural, visceral emotional response to what's happened, to step back a bit for some perspective. Indeed, it may well be asked, what perspective? It seems fairly simple. Yesterday somebody killed thousands of Americans, and didn't the president explain that last night?

Pres. BUSH: America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.

WOOTEN: Well, America may be precisely that, from sea to shining sea, a unique expression of democracy at its best. But whether it is or isn't, that is not why what happened yesterday happened. It's not the reason the few Muslims would murder so many Americans and not the reason others would endorse and applaud their crime.

The US has become a target for terrorism simply because many Arabs regard its policies, not its democracy, as antagonistic to them, their own identities, to their own passionately held causes, to their own religion. Henry Sigmund of the US Council on Foreign Relations.

Mr. HENRY SIGMUND (US Council on Foreign Relations): I'm not sure we're aware of much of the Arab strength. The US is seen as a kind of insensitive hegemon, arrogant, that seeks to impose its own values on--on the rest of the world. And it is also seen, of course, as an uncritical supporter of the state of Israel in it's conflict with the Palestinians. And the combination of the two does not make for US popularity in that part of the world.

WOOTEN: (VO) Here in London, Magnus Ranstorp, an expert on terrorism, concurs.

Mr. MAGNUS RANSTORP: Many in the Arab world regard the United States as not an honest broker, but protecting and shielding Israel over very important political as well as religious issues.

WOOTEN: (VO) The most confrontational issues? Israel's control over Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, the Dome of the Rock, for example. The presence of US troops near some of Islam's holiest cities in Saudi Arabia, Mecca and Medina. Economic sanctions against Iraq, widely seen by Arabs as depriving children of medicine and food. And perhaps the most infuriating of all to them, Israel's attacks on prominent Palestinian militants using equipment, including helicopter gunships, provided by the US. One more escalation of the tit-for-tat violence that has marred almost every single day of the past year in the Middle East.

Former President JIMMY CARTER: (From file footage) We'll all sign three times for this one.

WOOTEN: (VO) Ever since the first Camp David accords, for 23 years now, the US has presented itself,
This story is particularly interesting, since it was an attempt by ABC to report on the roots of anti-American sentiment among Arabs. It was a thoughtful, analytical examination of the possible motivations behind the attacks on New York and Washington. Jim Wooten begins with the official version of why the attacks happened, according to President Bush, whose evaluation of the problem emphasized that America’s was being attacked because of its values of freedom and opportunity. Bush’s framing of the situation obscured the realities of US policies in the Middle East, particularly towards Israel. Wooten says that while the US may indeed be the best country in the world, he argues that is not the reason why it was attacked.

The message of Wooten’s story was to debunk the powerfully pervasive myth that the President set up to explain the attacks, which had been adopted and spread well beyond the White House.

“Others jumped on the same bandwagon. Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) in congressional session the next day said ‘They hate us for our freedom’. In the days to come, it became a constantly repeated mantra, expressed by talk-show
hosts, actors and people on the street. Many acted as if even questioning the idea was prima facie evidence of mental deficiency.” (Mahajan, 2002, p.13).

Wooten provides what at that point was the alternative view of the mainstream explanation of why America was attacked: because they hate us for our policies and have several political grievances with the United States, which include ‘our’ policies towards the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The expert sources Wooten interviews for his story are all elderly Caucasian men, one is a ‘terrorism expert’ and the other is on the US Council on Foreign Relations. Mangus Rastorp, the terrorism expert interviewed in London is chosen to articulate the Palestinian position, instead of interviewing a Palestinian. Perhaps the grievances make more sense and sound more legitimate to an American audience if expressed by an educated, White male.

This story is an exception to the rule of network journalists and anchors uncritically accepting the frames set by officials to explain and contextualize acts of terrorism, since Wooten attempted to deconstruct the official frame. However, his final evaluation is that Arabs accept and endorse the irrational madness of suicide bombings as a rational approach to political grievances with America. Therefore, to Wooten, Arabs do not make any more sense than Bush does. Their arguments are just as invalid as the official frames. This leads him to the conclusion that these opposing positions explain "everything and nothing" about relations
between America and the Arabs, which is exactly what his story does: explains everything and nothing about anti-American sentiment in the Middle East. If Arab grievances are systematically marginalized and trivialized as madness because they are equated by journalists with the violent methods used to draw attention to injustices in the Middle East, then those political grievances lose any semblance of legitimacy among rational Americans.

From a close reading of the transcripts and viewing of the tapes, most of the terrorism experts were non-Arab Caucasian males. They included journalists who had been following terrorism for years, such as ABC’s John Miller, academics and members of think tanks, as well as former and current administration officials. Among the Arab experts quoted, they included officials, journalists and spokesmen for Arab-American organizations such as the Arab-American Anti Discrimination Committee (ADC) and the Arab-American Institute (AAI). CBS in particular repeatedly used sound bites from Atwan and other Arab journalists to put the attacks in perspective. The availability of these journalists and the level of articulation is wider than during past crises. Access to Arab journalists is perhaps far easier than before, especially when the Arab experts are based outside the Middle East, in London and Washington.

9/13 Mr. ABDEL BARI ATWAN (Editor, Al-Quds): Maybe the American public will stomach 200, 300, maybe 1,000 casualties simply because they are now affected by
what happened at the World Trade Center in New York. But after that I believe, you know, it could be a civil war. It could be, you know, a war of attrition against these American troops.

9/20 Mr. ABDEL BARI ATWAN (Editor, Al-Quds): I don't believe Osama bin Laden is the man who will allow the Americans to capture him and die. I think the man would like to die as a martyr.

9/12 ALLEN PIZZEY: The secretive Osama bin Laden made his first comments on the outrage. A leading Arabic journalist who says he spoke with bin Laden today said the accused terrorist denied any part in the attacks, but told him...

Voice of JAMAL ISMAIL (Bureau Chief Abu Dhabi TV): ‘For me I was happy when it happened to Americans because they have killed us in Palestine. They have killed us in Lebanon. They have killed us all over the world. Now it is their turn to be punished.’

PIZZEY: Another Arab journalist who has interviewed bin Laden says getting the wanted man won't necessarily end the problem.

Mr. ABDEL BARI ATWAN (Editor, Al-Quds): Even if the American kills bin Laden, I don't believe it will be the end of the story. Bin Laden is a phenomenon; he is not a person.

After the attacks, there was a relatively new level of media exposure to Arabs. Somewhere between the anger of the Arab street and the propaganda spin from Arab public officials were representatives of Arab-American organizations. In September 2001, Hussein Ibish of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee and James Zoghyby of the Arab-American institute were working around the clock to ensure that the Arab-American view was represented on television news. Ibish and Zoghyby, along with Hisham Melhem of the Lebanese newspaper Al Safir, presented moderate and articulate Arab views that were not as prominent on American media agendas before the 9/11 attacks. These men all understood how to appeal to an American audience, and skillfully voiced their concern for with the welfare of Arabs and Arab-Americans alike.
Mousa (1984) found that Western sources were cited more often than Arab ones. He argues that in the early 20th century, Arabs were not presented in America’s elite press as fighting for independence from colonial rule during this period; instead coverage was limited, distorted and presented from a colonial viewpoint. Aspects of this media portrayal have remained constant into the beginning of the 21st century, but much has changed for the status of Arabs and Muslims both in America and the Mideast, as demonstrated by the presence of Ibish, Melhem and Zogby on network news after 9/11.

SUMMARY

This chapter has attempted to analyze how network news discourse framed key countries in the Middle East. Arabs countries were interpreted and explained to the American public according to how they were classified by the White House. Network news coverage directly after 9/11 closely followed the diplomatic and military frames set by the Bush administration, namely that countries would be regarded as either friends or enemies of the US. Allies Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were described in moderate terms and language that differed from the depictions reserved for rogue states such as Iraq.
A close reading of sound bites illustrates the differences between the strong anti-American rhetoric coming from the Arab street in contrast to the diplomatic rhetoric from Arab leaders and diplomats. While the Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Jordanian leaders were pledging their support to the US and expressing sympathy after the attacks, the people in those countries were mostly angry and resentful of US policies. There was no public criticism of the US from any of its moderate Arab leaders or representatives.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was framed differently by official representatives from each side, and the reports filed from Israel by network correspondents highlighted the celebrating Palestinians and the sympathy of the Israelis without critically examining the power relationship and history of political struggle between these two groups. The Palestinians had their legitimacy severely damaged after the attacks, since footage of celebrating Palestinians was being repeated on the networks during the first two weeks after the attacks. Palestinian spokespeople struggled to frame this strong public reaction within a context that would improve its marred image in America. The Israeli spokespeople were also attempting to put the 9/11 attacks within a context that increased the country's credibility and further linking the Palestinian cause with terrorism.
One of the important factors affecting coverage of Arab countries is the level of access provided to the media. Since public opinion was difficult to gather in countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, those perspectives remained obscured. Egypt was the only Arab country to allow network access to interview people on the street, while opinions from Saudis and Jordanians simply could not be gathered. After the attacks, many people in the Middle East did not have much sympathy with the US, and this may have been one of the reasons why their views were not included in network reports. However, with the increasing availability of Arab journalists and Arab-American spokespeople, there were opportunities to include articulate Arab views that were not necessarily connected with officials.

The Arab world is an extremely complex and diverse region of the world; and this chapter hopes to break down the whole into discrete elements that can be individually examined. There is no monolithic coverage of the Middle East; reports can vary widely which is why there are no absolute conclusions that can be made here, only subjective interpretations of reality as presented by the networks. Given this complexity of the players and issues, there can be no generalized statements as to whether the networks were positive or negative about the Arabs. It is far more fruitful to examine the competing frames at play in the
coverage and how they relate to institutional power. The examples in this chapter lead to only one conclusion about network news coverage of the Middle East: representation of Arab countries on a diplomatic level is closely tied to official representations of how administration officials view those countries. In other words, it was rare to find a reporter who ventured beyond Washington's viewpoint or official classification of Arab countries.
Chapter 6: Discussion

ISLAM ON NETWORK NEWS

This project has attempted to illustrate the multi-faceted representations of Islam and Muslims that emerged from my close reading and viewing of network news following September 11th. Two sets of frames were apparent: militant Islam as an angry, violent threat mostly external to the US, and mainstream Islam as practiced by those who live in the US as a religion of peace.

Since the organizations analyzed were American national networks, their emphasis during this short time period of study was on Muslims living within the US. The proportion of international stories was low, so Muslims living in the US were the dominant group for the first two weeks after Sept. 11th. These American Muslims were presented in network stories as mostly peace-loving, law-abiding citizens with an underlying assumption that they could be potential members of terrorist sleeper cells. They are a religious group composed of a myriad of ethnicities that all became under suspicion because of their faith. This was a frame set by President Bush when he publicly announced that Islam was a peaceful religion, in a public
relations attempt to gain Muslim allies and calm the fears of American Muslims and Arabs.

But Muslims who were framed as irrational and angry were mainly the Muslims that lived outside the US in countries like Pakistan and Egypt. These Muslims who were opposed to the impending war in Afghanistan and were critical of American policies were framed as violent – part of the alien other, while Muslims who pledged their allegiance America were framed as an integral part of "us" or the American fabric of life.

While previous literature found that coverage of Islam tends to be centered on the geographic region of the Middle East; that was not the case with network news after 9/11. Pakistan and Afghanistan were two Muslim countries that were heavily covered by the networks, possibly far more than the coverage these countries regularly received before the attacks, when Islam was mostly associated almost exclusively with Arabs. But even though the spectrum of Muslim perspectives extended to Pakistan and Afghanistan, non-Arab Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey and Iran were marginalized. The coverage of Muslim as well as non-Muslim countries was entirely framed by the ever-present question of whether they were with or against America, i.e. depending on support or rejection of US policies. This to the conclusion that network reporters were not independent of official ideological representations when
it came to coverage of Islam. The frames used were closely tied to what the White House and Bush administration said and did after the attacks.

The discourse about Islam on network news in the immediate aftermath of the attacks in New York and Washington was not monolithic. Much like the faith itself, the coverage was under constant flux, varying between narrow minded, xenophobic interpretations to profound acceptance and tolerance. There was no homogenous dominant representation of Islam on network television news; it was a shifting discourse that adapted to the rapidly unfolding political and social circumstances following the terrorist attacks. There seemed to be a great deal of internal tension between a desire to portray Islam as an acceptable, legitimate faith shared by millions of Americans and non-violent people around world and the fact that the terrorists themselves were Muslim.

Sheikh et. al (1995) found that most stories about Muslims involved events, groups and individuals from the Middle East. Topics were mostly centered on crises, conflicts and wars and coverage of Islam was for the most part, international. References to Muslim groups and organizations lacked specificity and most stories did not distinguish between the various branches of Islam. The authors found weak support for their hypothesis that a high level of 'negative tone' would be detected. However, the range
of representations on network news, which included diverse interpretations of the religion, was broad after the attacks in 2001. These representations seemed to be consistently determined by officials and since the networks tend to replicate the worldview of those in power, official views remained for the most part unchallenged by the networks. Given the unprecedented threat to national security and the civil disorder perpetuated by the 9/11 attacks as well as the widespread crimes against Arab and Muslim communities, network news was one of many media channels used by officials to calm the nation down.

Beyond the reporting about the crisis-centered events, there is scant analysis on American network news of political Islam, its goals and motivations and the factors influencing its existence. This is a major problem that the network evening news is probably not structurally capable of handling, therefore their terrorism news coverage lacks in vital background information and historical context from non-American perspectives. Network newscasts are structured to deliver half an hour of mostly national news. The average package (TV story) is a minute and a half long. This is not enough time to delve into detailed analysis of militant Islam or any other political issue. Analysis is more likely to be found on the newsmagazine shows, where more time and attention can be devoted to in-depth topics such as the origins of political Islam.
Derogatory frames of Islam have been supported and perpetuated in the West beginning with colonial interpretations of the religion, and extending to media coverage during the latter half of the 20th century. However, Islam raises its status by the standards of American media if it incorporates Western values such as freedom, democracy, free market economies and human rights. Friendly Muslims like Egypt’s Sadat and Mubarak, Pakistani Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf, the late King Hussein of Jordan and his son King Abdallah are more likely to be described using favorable terms due to their association with political and religious moderation, regardless of their oppressive tactics with their own citizens (Said, 1997). This observation made by Said before 9/11, still proves true. Network news discourse about ‘moderate’ friendly Muslims whose governments support the US is clearly more temperate than the language used to describe enemy states like Iraq, Iran or Libya.

Networks news reporters are generally uncritical of US policies and tend to tow the official line when it comes to either Islam or the Middle East. There is a major difference in coverage of Muslims in America who pledge allegiance to the flag and adopt western values, and the Arabs and Muslims who are on the street in the Middle East and Pakistan. There is a clear distinction between internal and external Muslims.
In scholarship of representation of Arabs and Muslims in American news, it is important to employ a variety of methodological tools, including discourse analysis and more qualitative methods that are better suited to handling the complexity of portrayals. Media scholars interested in the study of Islam in US media should attempt to transcend discussions of bias, and instead endeavor to closely examine media frames and their ideological influences in media texts. Representation of Islam is not black or white; it is instead a complex, intricate web of realities that are highlighted and obscured by reporters and anchors in the United States.

ARABS ON NETWORK NEWS

Objectivity in coverage of the Middle East is elusive, and this is evident in the network coverage. The Middle East is one of the most difficult regions to cover while keeping all parties satisfied. Objectivity is a goal all correspondents strive for, but those covering the Middle East find it particularly difficult to achieve. Trudy Rubin, a Christian Science Monitor Middle East correspondent said,

"[It] is a place where on both sides there is somehow an assumption that if you’re not 100 percent for us, then you’re an enemy. So, neutral and
objective coverage is something that’s not regarded as a virtue.”
(Ghareeb, 1983 p. 97).

Schema theory (Graber, 1984), negates the routine of objectivity and suggests that an individual’s background and previous experiences can shape the way they perceive the world. Reporters are to some extent trapped within their preconceived notions about Arabs and Muslims, and their good and bad experiences with them. Particularly when speaking of Americans covering the Middle East, objectivity is difficult to achieve, as is independence from an official viewpoint.

There is a distinct difference between how Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were covered and how Iraq was portrayed on network news after the attacks. The three American allies in the region were always introduced as allies or friends of the US, not as countries who were implicated in the attacks, even though the hijackers included Saudis and Egyptians. The leaders and diplomats of the allied countries, Hosni Mubarak, King Abdallah and Saud Al Faisal were featured far more prominently and more frequently than the citizens of these countries. The lack of access to unrestrained reporting from these countries remains one of the main major obstacles to insightful reporting on the Middle East. The statements made by Arab allied officials were completely different from the statements made by the people on the street. This applies not only to Egypt, and Jordan, but it also applies to Palestinians. While the officials were trying to
put their own political spin on the events of 9/11, and they were stressing the need for cooperation on terrorism, criticism of US policies came from the street. The people interviewed on the streets of Cairo were openly critical of the US and the reports implied that most (though not all) ordinary Arabs supported the attacks; and thought that America deserved what it got.

Critics of US policy in the Mideast were marginalized and labeled irrational by network reporters; this frame is used when referring to Arab public opinion. The treatment these sources received from the anchors and reporters depended on who the sources were. The officials that conducted face-to-face interviews with anchors and reporters (Mubarak and Abdallah) were treated with respect; while the Egyptian and Palestinian citizens were described as irrational. On the one hand, their perspectives were included and explained. However they were not treated or regarded as legitimate by the reporters. Legitimacy was instead reserved for Israelis, who were regarded as the experts with the most terrorism experience that America can turn to in a time of crisis. Israeli officials and citizens, in turn identified with the US, and perhaps the American public further identified with Israelis after the attacks, given their perceived shared victim status. But this assertion cannot be confirmed without future research, perhaps conducting focus groups of Americans and Arab-Americans to understand how Israel and the Arab countries were perceived after the September 11th attacks.
Two frames were used to explain the roots and causes of terrorism in the stories which explored the roots of anti-American sentiment among Arabs: they hate us because we're great, and they hate us because of our policies in the region. The first frame used to explain the roots and causes of terrorism was "they hate us because we are great" which was the frame set by President Bush and members of his administration. This frame is also present in the interviews conducted with ordinary Americans in stories about the public reaction to the attacks. There was some skepticism of this official frame in certain network reports that interviewed people in the Middle East and Caucasian terrorism experts. These sources explained Arab resentment of American policies and how America is viewed as pro-Israeli and unwilling to promote peace in the region. But despite the skepticism of official frames which acknowledged American policies in the Middle East could have created the conditions that eventually led to violent protest in the form of terrorism, the official explanation and frame prevailed. Following 9/11, networks news reporters were not critical enough of US foreign policy, and towed the official line regarding Islam and the Middle East. Arab critics of US policy in the Mideast are generally marginalized and labeled 'irrational' by network reporters and this frame is used when referring to Arab public opinion.
There are more Arab experts quoted on TV than there were 20 years before the September 11th attacks. These experts are articulate and know how to make their messages and viewpoints relate to Americans. Arabs in positions of authority are quoted more often and more prominently and shown more respect than those on the street, and the messages from the street and the officials are mutually exclusive and distinct from one another. While the street is more critical, the leaders are more supportive and diplomatic. In terms of sources, Arabs of all walks of life were included. There were a few recurring Arab experts that were interviewed more frequently than others, such as Abdel Bari Atwan, editor of Al Quds newspaper. Atwan was all over the networks because he was one of the few journalists who had interviewed Osama bin Laden. Atwan also spoke fluent English and was able to articulate the Arab viewpoint without sounding hysterical or uninformed. Atwan was joined by prominent Arab-Americans like Hussein Ibish and James Zogby, who are changing the landscape of Arab commentary in American media by making themselves available to reporters in need of representing the Arab view. This is a major shift from earlier years, when reporters would find it difficult to find an Arab who was highly articulate and appealed to a Western audience.
In terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, officials from both sides framed their reaction to the attacks and their framing of 9/11 reveals much about their individual political goals. From the statements of Israeli and Palestinian spokespeople it becomes evident that both sides attempted to identify with America as victims of violence. The Palestinians were frequently represented on the networks by Hanan Ashrawi, a highly articulate spokeswoman and former member of the Palestinian Authority. Ashrawi was trying to control the damage to Palestinian legitimacy by downplaying the images of jubilant Palestinians celebrating the attacks on America. Former and current Israeli officials repeatedly emphasized what they viewed as the irreconcilable differences between western civilization and Middle Eastern fanaticism and how "we" (the US and Israel) must triumph over "them" (Palestinians and Muslims). The Israeli officials also ideologically linked Palestinian militant extremism with the terrorist acts of 9/11, in an attempt to gain public sympathy in America. Remedies to the problem of terrorism were viewed very differently by Israeli and Palestinian spokespeople. While Hanan Ashrawi advocated diplomacy and peaceful means of resolving political conflicts, Israeli officials called for a strong military response to the attacks.

As previous research (Asi, 1981) indicates, coverage of Arabs is closely associated to their military and diplomatic relationship with the
United States and Israel. Both Egypt and Jordan have peace treaties with Israel, therefore they are classified as friends of the United States, and subsequently framed as such by network news. This is consistent with the previous findings regarding Middle East coverage by American media: favorable coverage of an Arab nation will be invariably linked with the extent of its diplomatic ties with Israel. Peace with Israel on its terms will invariably lead to more favorable coverage of Arab countries by American journalists. Arab unity, the struggle for occupied lands, and opposition to Israeli policies are frowned upon by the American administration and consequently the media.

In scholarship of representation of Arabs and Muslims in American news, it is important to employ a variety of methodological tools, including discourse analysis and more qualitative methods that are better suited to handling the complexity of portrayals. Media scholars interested in analyzing content involving the Middle East should move past notions of bias, in order to achieve complexity. Instead of measuring bias, media scholars need to examine the ideological influences of frames of the Middle East in television content. This will lead to a more detailed, honest account of the various representations present in media texts. Representation of Arabs and Islam is not monolithic, it is instead a complex, intricate web of realities that are highlighted by reporters and
anchors from multiple angles. The main contribution of this research to previous literature is it departs from categories of positive and negative in order to acknowledge the conflicting ways in which Islam was represented. In addition, previous studies about Arabs in US media often do not take into account the ideological influences on media content and how closely media coverage can follow official policy.

This study is only the first step in a research journey that will explore further avenues of television content related to terrorism, the Middle East and Islam. The endeavor will not be complete until the effect of the frames in the media examined can be assessed, and the views of the journalists themselves about the framing process are documented. However, once the frames and the system in which they operate are defined, the task of investigating effects and the production process will be easier to navigate in future research.
REFERENCES

Arnove, Anthony, ed. Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of
Sanctions and War. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Adnan, Mohammed Hamdan Haji (1989). Mass Media and Reporting
Islamic Affairs. Media Asia. Vol 16 (2) p. 63-70.

Allen, Andrea (2002). The President and the Marketing of American Civil
Religion. Paper presented at AEJMC Conference in Miami, FL.

Perception of Arabs in Political Cartoons. In Kamalipour, Yahya.
The US Media and the Middle East Westport, CT: Praeger p. 222-
230.

Policy. New York, Longman.

Asi, Morad. Arabs, Israelis and TV News: A Time-Series, Content


Pan, Zhongdang & Gerald M. Kosicki (2001). Framing as a Strategic Action in Public Deliberation. In Reese, Stephen D., Oscar Gandy, Jr. & August E. Grant, eds. Framing Public Life: Perspectives on


Schmid, Alex P. & Jenny de Graaf (1982). Violence as Communication:


226


VITA

Dina A. Ibrahim was born in Hitchin, England on August 21st, 1975. She is the daughter of Dr. Abdel Wahab Wahab Ibrahim and Dr. Aida El Bermawy. After completing a Bachelor’s degree in Journalism and International Relations in 1994 and a Masters Degree in Middle East Studies in 1996 at the American University in Cairo, she worked as a reporter for the UPI wire service in Cairo, Egypt. This was followed by a move to Saudi Arabia and a reporting position with Arab News newspaper in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. In 1997, she moved to London and reported for the BBC World Service radio. In 1998, she entered the Graduate School of the University of Texas at Austin.

Permanent Address: 803 W. 28th St. Austin, Texas 78705

This dissertation was typed by the author.